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Abstract




Argumentation theory is concerned with the way that intelligent agents
discuss whether some statement holds. It is a claim-based theory1, that is
widely used in many areas, such as law, linguistics and computer science. In
the past few years, formal argumentation frameworks have been heavily stud-
ied and applications have been proposed in fields such as natural language
processing, the semantic web and multi-agent systems. Studying argumen-
tation provides results which help in developing tools and applications in
these areas. Argumentation is interesting as a logic-based approach to deal
with inconsistent information. Arguments are constructed using a process
like logical inference, with inconsistencies giving rise to conflicts between ar-
1An argument is a claim on our attention and belief, a view that would seem to authorize
treating, say, propaganda posters as arguments.[79]
vguments. These conflicts can then be handled by well-founded means, giving
a consistent set of well-justified arguments and conclusions.
Dung’s seminal work [65] tells us how to handle the conflicts between
arguments. However, it says nothing about the structure of arguments, or
how to construct arguments and attack relationships from a knowledge base.
ASPIC+ is one of the most widely used systems for structured arguments.
However, there are some limitations on ASPIC+ if it is to satisfy widely
accepted standards of rationality. Since most of these limitations are due to
the use of strict rules, it is worth considering using a purely defeasible subset
of ASPIC+.
The main contribution of this dissertation is the purely defeasible argu-
mentation framework ASPIC+D. There are three research questions related
to this topic which are investigated here: (1) Do we lose anything in remov-
ing the strict elements? (2) Do purely defeasible version of theories generate
the same results as the original theories? (3) What do we gain by removing
the strict elements?
I show that using ASPIC+D, it is possible, in a well-defined sense, to cap-
ture the same information as using ASPIC+ with strict rules. In particular,
I prove that under some reasonable assumptions, it is possible to take a well-
defined theory in ASPIC+, that is one with a consistent set of conclusions,
vi
and translate it into ASPIC+D such that, under the grounded semantics, we
obtain the same set of justified conclusions. I also show that, under some
additional assumptions, the same is true under any complete-based seman-
tics. Furthermore, I formally characterize the situations in which translating
an ASPIC+ theory that is ill-defined into ASPIC+D will lead to the same
sets of justified conclusions. In doing this I deal both with ASPIC+ the-
ories that are not closed under transposition and theories that are axiom
inconsistent. At last, I analyze the two systems in the context of the non-
monotonic axioms in [46]. I show that ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D satisfy exactly
same axioms under what I call the “argument construction” interpretation
and the “justified conclusions” interpretation under the grounded semantics.
Furthermore, because of the lack of strict elements, ASPIC+D satisfies more
of the non-monotonic axioms than ASPIC+ in the “justified conclusions”
interpretation under the preferred semantic. This means that ASPIC+ and
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Argumentation theory is concerned with the way that intelligent agents dis-
cuss whether some statements hold. It is a claim-based theory, that is widely
used in many areas, such as law, linguistics and computer science. In the
past few years, formal argumentation frameworks have been heavily stud-
ied and applications have been proposed in fields such as natural language
processing, the semantic web and multi-agent systems. Studying argumen-
tation provides results which help in developing tools and applications in
these areas. Argumentation is interesting as a logic-based approach to deal
with inconsistent information. Arguments are constructed using a process
like logical inference, with inconsistencies giving rise to conflicts between ar-
guments. These conflicts can then be handled by well-founded means, giving
a consistent set of well-justified arguments and conclusions.
Researchers in AI have done much work to analyze the act of argumen-
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
tation. Argumentation has been used to provide a proof-theoretic semantics
for non-monotonic logic, starting with the most influential work of Dung [65].
Computational argumentation systems have found particular applications in
some domains, for example law, where classical logic and decision theory are
too abstract to capture the richness of reasoning [66]. There are a number of
works which identify the application of argumentation in a specific domain.
For example, [14] considers argumentation in legal reasoning, [18] discusses
argumentation in machine learning, [72] looks at an interchange format for
argumentation and arguments.
Most current formal argumentation frameworks can be linked back to
Dung’s abstract argumentation framework [65], which gives us an overall idea
about the acceptability of the arguments generated by these frameworks. All
these argumentation frameworks contain defeat relationships and arguments,
allowing us to represent pieces of information and the relationships between
them. Dung gives different kinds of extensions allowing us to determine
which of the arguments can be accepted and which can not, and the recent
labeling approach [13] provides a convenient computational mechanism to
determine the different extensions as well as the acceptable arguments.
Dung’s abstract argumentation framework gives us an intuitive way to
handle conflicts, however, it does not allow us to represent the internal the
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structure of arguments. There are a number of structured argumentation
frameworks which give a formal way of constructing arguments, such as rule
based argumentation [64, 77, 78, 60, 67, 59, 3], logic based argumentation
[15], and assumption based argumentation [36]. Because structured argu-
mentation provides a more complete account of the reasoning of an agent, it
is the form of argumentation that I study in this thesis.
There is a large family of rule-based argumentation frameworks. ASPIC
[60, 67, 59, 3] is one of the most influential one and will be the basis of the
work in this thesis. It contains both strict rules and defeasible rules. A
strict rule means that without exception, the rule always holds, in contrast,
a defeasible rule means that by experience, the rule usually holds. The
very first version of ASPIC [3] only contains two attack relations, rebutting
and undercutting. Rebutting captures the conflicts between conclusions and
the undercutting gives the exception where a defeasible rule fails. However,
ASPIC does not satisfy the rationality postulates given by [21], since the
language used is not expressive enough to capture all the different kinds of
conflicts. By defining restricted rebutting, the problems can be resolved.
Intuitively, if A is proposed as an argument, then one can construct a
counter-argument to A, whose final conclusion conflicts with some supporting
elements of A. In ASPIC+, the authors revised the definition of rebutting
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[59]. Furthermore, undermining attack was added in ASPIC+ to capture the
conflict between conclusions and premises [59]. After that, there have been
minor revisions to ASPIC+, including preference dependent and preference
independent attack [60], which introduces how preferences work in resolving
conflicts.
However, there are some limitations on ASPIC+ if it is to satisfy widely
accepted standards of rationality postulates [21]. Since most of these lim-
itations are due to the use of strict rules, it is worth considering using a
purely defeasible subset of ASPIC+. The major contribution of this disser-
tation is determining the limits of purely defeasible reasoning. I will analyze
the limitations in two directions. First, I directly compare the difference
between ASPIC+ theory and its purely defeasible version. Second, I use
non-monotonic axioms introduced in [46] to understand the relationship at
a more abstract level.
The outline of this dissertation is as follow. Chapter 2 will give a brief lit-
erature review for the current research. Chapter 3 summarize the motivation
in this dissertation. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will introduce ASPIC+D —
an argumentation framework containing only defeasible elements. Chapter 6
will exam the non-monotonic axioms introduced in [46] based on ASPIC+
system and ASPIC+D system. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation
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and outlines potential future work.
Parts of the results have been published in the following articles:
Z. Li, N. Oren, and S. Parsons. On the links between argumentation-based
reasoning and nonmonotonic reasoning. In International Workshop
on Theory and Applications of Formal Argumentation, pages 67—-85.
Springer, 2017.
Z. Li and S. Parsons. On argumentation with purely defeasible rules. In
Scalable Uncertainty Management, pages 330—-343. Springer, 2015.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we will briefly review the existing work in two areas, ar-
gumentation frameworks and non-monotonic reasoning. Argumentation is
widely studied in AI, and has now been applied for a range of tasks, in-
cluding: legal reasoning, where classical logic and decision theory are too
abstract to capture the richness of reasoning [14, 66]; providing additional
information in machine-learning [18]; and and as a mechanism to support
interaction between autonomous agents [54]. Argumentation also has appli-
cations to the semantic web [72]. Given this breadth, I will focus here just
on the most related work. From this perspective, there are two important
classes of work on argumentation that I will briefly discuss, work on abstract
argumentation, and work on rule-based argumentation.
Non-monotonic logic is the study of those ways of inferring additional
information from given information that do not satisfy the monotonicity
6
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 7
property satisfied by all methods based on classical logic. [46] proposed a set
of axioms which characterize non-monotonic inference in logical systems, and
studied the relationships between sets of these axioms. I will use these axioms
as the basis to analyze the argumentation frameworks. Many researchers
have proposed systems that perform such non-monotonic inferences. The
best known are probably: Reiter’s default systems [73], Clark’s negation as
failure [29], circumscription [55], the modal system of [58], autoepistemic logic
[62] and inheritance systems [80]. I will give a brief review of the systems
and focus on defeasible logic, because it is closely related to argumentation
frameworks.
2.1 Argumentation Framework
2.1.1 Abstract Argumentation Framework
All current formal argumentation frameworks can be linked back to Dung’s
abstract argumentation framework [65], which gives us an overall idea about
the acceptability of the arguments generated by these frameworks. All these
argumentation frameworks contain defeat relationships and arguments, al-
lowing us to represent pieces of information and the relationships between
them. Dung gives different kinds of extensions allowing us to determine
which of the arguments can be accepted and which can not. We give a brief
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summary here.
Definition 2.1 (Argumentation Framework) An argumentation frame-
work is a pair AF = 〈A,R〉 where A is a set of arguments, and R is a binary
relation collecting all pairs of arguments A and B such that A attacks against
B, written as (A,B) ∈ R, i.e. R ⊆ A×A
A symmetric argumentation framework is one for which R is symmetric,
nonempty and irreflexive.
Given a set of arguments containing attacks, one wants to determine
which arguments can be accepted and which can not. The answer corre-
sponds to defining an argument based semantics or simply semantics,
which is one of the basic building blocks of argumentation theory. In [65],
different semantics for the notion of acceptability have been proposed.
Definition 2.2 (Conflict-free) A set S of arguments is said to be conflict-
free if there are no arguments A,B in S such that A attacks B.
Definition 2.3 (Acceptable) An argument A ∈ A is acceptable with re-
spect to (w.r.t.) a set S of arguments iff for each argument B ∈ A: if B
attacks A then B is attacked by S
Definition 2.4 (Admissible) A conflict-free set S of arguments is admis-
sible iff each argument in S is acceptable w.r.t. S.
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The process of finding admissible set is monotonic, i.e.,
Lemma 2.1 (Fundamental Lemma) Let S be an admissible set of argu-
ments and A,A′ be arguments which are acceptable w.r.t. S. Then
1. S ′ = S⋃{A} is admissible
2. A′ is acceptable w.r.t. S ′
The idea of a semantics is to specify some (possibly empty) sets of acceptable
arguments for a given argumentation framework. These sets are also called
argument based extensions or simply extensions. In order to specify
different extension, we introduce the following function.
Definition 2.5 (Characteristic Function) The characteristic function
FAF of an argumentation framework AF = 〈A,R〉 is
FAF : 2
A → 2A,
FAF (S) = {A|A is acceptable w.r.t. S}
Using the characteristic function, we can then define extensions.
Definition 2.6 (Semantics) Let S be a conflict-free set of arguments, and
F be the characteristic function,
• S is admissible iff S ⊆ F (S)
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• S is a complete extension iff S = F (S)
• S is a preferred extension iff S is the maximal (w.r.t. set inclu-
sion) complete extension, i.e. largest fixed point of the characteristic
function.
• S is a grounded extension iff S is the minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion)
complete extension, i.e. least fixed point of the characteristic function.
• S is a stable extension iff S is a preferred extension which attacks
all arguments in A− S
These semantics are collectively known as the “Dung semantics”. Later au-
thors have developed additional semantics, such as the the semi-stable seman-
tics [22], the ideal semantics [37] and the stage semantics [81]1 and sometimes
these semantics get described as “Dung semantics” as well.
Now, let’s take Dung’s example [65] to understand the above definitions.
This example describes a discussion between two persons I and A, whose
countries are at war, about who is responsible for blocking negotiation in
their region.
I(i1) My government can not negotiate with your government because your
1Clearly [81] was published before [65], but the approach to establishing a consistent
set of arguments was only discussed as a form of argumentation semantics more recently.
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government does not even recognize my government.
A(a) Your government does not recognize my government either.
I(i2) But your government is a terrorist government.
Base on the dialogues, we can construct the following argument framework
〈A,R〉
A = {i1, i2, a}
R = {(i1, a), (a, i1), (i2, a)}
The conflict-free sets are:
{}, {i1}, {i2}, {a}, {i1, i2}
For each argument, we can tell whether it is acceptable w.r.t. some set.
• i1 is acceptable w.r.t. {i2},{i1, i2},{i1, i2, a}.
• i2 is acceptable w.r.t. ∅,{i2},{i1, i2},{i1, i2, a}.
• a is not acceptable.
We can easily find out the admissible sets:
{}, {i2}, {i1, i2}
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Next, we can calculate the characteristic functions:
FAF ({i1}) = ∅ FAF ({i2}) = {i1, i2} FAF ({a}) = ∅
FAF ({i1, a}) = ∅ FAF ({i1, i2}) = {i1, i2} FAF ({i2, a}) = {i1, i2}
FAF ({i1, i2, a}) = {i1, i2} FAF (∅) = {i2}
Using the characteristic functions, we can determine the different extensions:
• The complete extension set is: {i1, i2}
• The preferred extension set is: {i1, i2}.
• The grounded extension set is: {i1, i2}
• The stable extension set is: {i1, i2}
Labeling Approach
In [13], the author gives a nice summary of the labeling approach to estab-
lishing which arguments are acceptable:
Definition 2.7 (Labeling Function) Let AF = 〈A,R〉 be an argumenta-
tion framework and Λ be a set of labels. A Λ-labeling is a total function
LF : A → Λ
The issue of semantics may be best understood using the approach of
labeling each argument using Λ = {IN, OUT, UNDEC}. In the labeling-based
approach, assigning the IN label to an argument A can be explained as the
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argument being accepted, while assigning the OUT label to A can be explained
as the argument being rejected. The UNDEC label means that we do not know
whether the argument should be accepted or not. This is expressed by the
following definitions.
Definition 2.8 (Legal Labeling) Let LF be a labeling of argumentation
framework.
• An IN-labeled argument is said to be legally IN iff all its attackers are
labeled OUT.
• An OUT-labeled argument is said to be legally OUT iff it has at least one
attacker that is labeled IN.
• An UNDEC-labeled argument is said to be legally UNDEC iff not all its
attackers are labeled OUT and it does not have an attacker that is labeled
IN.
Given the labeling method, we have the corresponding definitions of
Dung’s framework.
Definition 2.9 (Admissible Labeling) An admissible labeling is a label-
ing LF where each IN-labeled argument is legally IN and each OUT-labeled
argument is legally OUT.
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Definition 2.10 (Conflict-free Labeling) Let LF be a labeling of an ar-
gumentation framework AF = 〈A,R〉. LF is conflict-free iff for each A ∈ A
it holds that:
• if A is labeled IN then it does not have an attacker that is labeled IN
• if A is labeled OUT then it has at least one attacker that is labeled IN
Definition 2.11 (Complete Labeling) A complete labeling is a labeling
where every IN-labeled argument is legally IN, every OUT-labeled argument is
legally OUT and every UNDEC labeled argument is legally UNDEC.
From the definition of complete labeling and admissible labeling, we know
that every complete labeling is an admissible labeling (but the reverse does
not hold in general). An alternative characterization of a complete labeling
can be provided:
Proposition 2.1 Let LF be a labeling of an argumentation framework AF =
〈A,R〉. LF is complete labeling iff for each A ∈ A it holds that:
1. A is labeled IN iff all its attackers are labeled OUT
2. A is labeled OUT iff it has at least one attacker that is labeled IN.
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Although Proposition 2.1 does not explicitly mention UNDEC, it follows
that each argument that is labeled UNDEC does not have all its attackers
OUT (point 1) and it does not have an attacker that is labeled IN (point 2).
Therefore, each UNDEC-labeled argument is legally UNDEC.
Then, given a complete labeling LF , we have that
• LF is a grounded labeling iff the set of IN arguments is minimal
(w.r.t. set inclusion).
• LF is a preferred labeling iff the set of IN arguments is maximal
(w.r.t. set inclusion).
• LF is a stable labeling iff the set of UNDEC arguments is empty.
• LF is a semi-stable labeling iff the set of UNDEC arguments is minimal
(w.r.t. set inclusion).
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 provide an overview of how the admissibility-based
semantics can be expressed in terms of complete labelings.
The labeling approach exactly matches the semantics introduced by Dung
[65] and others. If LF is a complete labeling, then every x labeled IN by LF is
in the complete extension, and so on for grounded, preferred, stable and semi-
stable labelings. Note that, as shown in Figure 2.1, all the commonly used
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Table 2.1: Describing admissibility based semantics in terms of complete
labelings[13]
restriction on complete labeling resulting semantics
no restrictions complete semantics
empty UNDEC stable semantics
maximal IN preferred semantics
maximal OUT preferred semantics
maximal UNDEC grounded semantics
minimal IN grounded semantics
minimal OUT grounded semantics
minimal UNDEC semi-stable semantics
semantics are specializations of the complete semantics. These semantics,
and the associated labelings, are therefore collectively known as complete-
based.
Now, given a set of arguments and attacks, we will find it useful to be able
to talk about the subset of arguments that are IN since these are the ones
that are acceptable according to a particular semantics. Since we may have
multiple extensions, and different arguments will be IN in different extensions,
in general it is not possible to say which arguments are IN (accepted) without
reference to an extension. If, as we will want to below, we want to talk more
generally, we need some additional concepts. We will say that the status of
an argument is as follows:
• An argument is credulously accepted if it is a member of at least one
extension.














Figure 2.1: Relations among alternative labeling notions
• An argument is sceptically accepted if it is a member of every extension.
• If neither of the above hold, then the argument is rejected.
Given the relationship between labelings and extensions, this is equivalent
to saying that an argument is credulously accepted if it is IN in at least
one labeling, that an argument is sceptically accepted if it is IN in every
extension, and rejected if it is OUT or UNDEC in every extension.
Under the grounded semantics, where there is one extension (and label-
ing), an argument will either be accepted or rejected. Under the preferred
semantics, we can talk of the sceptically preferred extension to mean the set
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of all the arguments that are sceptically accepted under the preferred seman-
tics. The sceptically preferred extension is thus the intersection of the pre-
ferred extensions. We will call the set of conclusions of the arguments in the
sceptically preferred extension the sceptically justified conclusions. Thinking
about the sceptically preferred extension leads to the notion of an argumen-
tation framework being relatively grounded. This will be the case where the
grounded extension coincides with the sceptically preferred extension2.
Finally, we will need to discuss whether sets of arguments are all accepted
under the same conditions. We say that two arguments, A and B have the
same status iff:
• A is labeled IN iff B is labeled IN; and
• A is labeled UNDEC or OUT iff B is labeled UNDEC or OUT.
Note that we interpret this definition as applying to any semantics. If there
is one extension, then A and B are either both accepted or rejected. If there
are multiple extensions, then for every extension in which A is IN then B is
IN, and for every extension for which A is not IN then B is not IN (and vice
versa).
Another line of work on abstract argumentation is to add a notion of
2[30] shows that any symmetric argumentation framework is relatively grounded.
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support between arguments to the set of arguments and attacks of [65], and
the properties of such “bipolar” systems are explored in, for example [7, 26,
27].
2.1.2 Rule-Based Argumentation Framework
Dung’s abstract argumentation theory gives a nice clue about how to con-
struct argumentation frameworks, however, it says nothing about what argu-
ments actually look like, and how to construct them and the attack relation-
ship from a knowledge base. Rule-based argumentation frameworks, which
are one of the largest families of argumentation frameworks, tell us how to do
these things. In this section, we will introduce some well-known rule-based
argumentation frameworks.
The ASPIC+ argumentation framework is one of the most influential
rule-based argumentation frameworks. Historically, the ASPIC+ framework
originates from the European ASPIC (Argumentation Service Platform with
Integrated Components) project whose goal was to develop a common frame-
work to underpin services that are emerging as core functions of the argu-
mentation paradigm.
ASPIC+ defines two kinds of inference rules: strict rules (denoted →),
meaning the conclusion is always accepted without any exception, and defea-
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sible rules (denoted⇒), meaning the conclusion is accepted unless there is an
exception. The ASPIC+ argumentation system, with symmetric negation,
is presented below. All the definitions in this section can be found in [60] —
we have just made minor changes to the presentation, typically to provide
further explanation of aspects that are often found confusing.
Definition 2.12 (ASPIC+ Argumentation System) An argumentation
system is a triple AS = 〈L,R, n〉 where:
• L is a logical language closed under negation ·¯3.
• R = Rs ∪Rd is a set of strict (Rs) and defeasible (Rd) inference rules
of the form φ1, . . . , φn → φ and φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ φ respectively (where φi, φ
are meta-variables ranging over wff in L), and Rs ∩Rd = ∅.
• n : Rd 7→ L is a naming convention for defeasible rules.
As discussed in [21], it is helpful to think of completing the set of strict rules
by considering all the negative connections between propositions mentioned
in a strict rule:
Definition 2.13 (Transposition) A strict rule s is a transposition of
3As presented in [60, page 365], ASPIC+ is defined more generally, allowing for both
symmetric negation as we have here (through the notion of “contradictory”), but also
allowing for an asymmetric form of negation (through the notion of “contrary”).
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φ1, . . . , φn → ψ iff s = φ1, . . . , φi−1,¬ψ, φi+1, . . . , φn → ¬φi for some 1 ≤ i ≤
n.
Based on the defined notion of transposition, we now define a closure operator
for the set Rs.
Definition 2.14 (Closure) Let Rs be a set of strict rules. Cltp(Rs) is a
minimal set such that:
• Rs ⊆ Cltp(Rs)
• if s ∈ Cltp(Rs) and t is a transposition of s, then t ∈ Cltp(Rs).
We say that Rs is closed under transposition iff Cltp(Rs) = Rs.
Definition 2.15 (Closure under Strict Rule) Let P ⊆ L, the closure of
P under the set Rs of strict rules, denoted as ClS(P), is the smallest set
such that:
• P ⊆ ClS(P)
• if φ1, . . . , φn → ψ ∈ Rs and φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ClS(P) then ψ ∈ ClS(P)
If P = ClS(P), then P is said to be closed under the set Rs. In ASPIC+,
we think of the rules as the part of the system that allows inferences to be
made — it is the machinery that permits reasoning. The information that is
subject to reasoning is then contained in a knowledge base:
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Definition 2.16 (ASPIC+ Knowledge Base) A knowledge base in an
argumentation system 〈L,R, n〉 is a set K ⊆ L consisting of two disjoint
subsets Kn (the axioms) and Kp (the ordinary premises).
We say that a set of propositions in knowledge base is consistent iff there do
not exist two propositions a and a′ such that a = a′.
The definitions of argumentation system and knowledge base distinguish
the premises and the inference rules into two sets, the set of strict elements
(Rs and Kn) and the set of defeasible elements (Rd and Kp). As we will see
below, the reason for this distinction is that the defeasible elements are the
ones that can be attacked. Combining the notions of argumentation system
and knowledge base gives us the notion of an argumentation theory:
Definition 2.17 (ASPIC+ Argumentation Theory) An argumentation
theory AT is a pair 〈AS,K〉 of an argumentation system AS and a knowledge
base K.
Before defining precisely what an argument is, we need to introduce some
notions which can be defined by just understanding that an argument is
made up of some subset of the knowledge base K, along with a sequence of
rules, that lead to a conclusion. Given this, Prem(·) returns all the premises,
Rules(·) returns all the inference rules, Conc(·) returns the conclusion and
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TopRule(·) returns the last rule in the argument. Sub(·) returns all the sub-
arguments of a given argument, that is all the arguments that are a subset
of the given argument.
Definition 2.18 (ASPIC+ Argument) An argument A on the basis of
an argumentation theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉 is:
1. φ if φ ∈ K with: Prem(A) = {φ}; Rules(A) = ∅; Conc(A) = {φ};
Sub(A) = {A}; TopRule(A) = undefined.
2. A1, . . . , An → φ if Ai are arguments such that there exists a strict
rule Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An) → φ in Rs. Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪ . . . ∪
Prem(An); Rules(A) = Rules(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Rules(An) ∪
{Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→ φ}; Conc(A) = φ; Sub(A) = Sub(A1)∪. . .∪
Sub(An) ∪ {A}; TopRule(A) = Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→ φ.
3. A1, . . . , An ⇒ φ if Ai are arguments such that there exists a defeasible
rule Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An) ⇒ φ in Rd. Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪ . . . ∪
Prem(An); Rules(A) = Rules(A1)∪. . .∪Rules(An)∪{Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)⇒
φ}; Conc(A) = φ; Sub(A) = Sub(A1)∪. . .∪Sub(An)∪{A}; TopRule(A) =
Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)⇒ φ.
We write A(AT) to denote the set of arguments on the basis of the theory
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AT . Sometimes we need to distinguish the kinds of premise and rule used in
an argument. Thus we distinguish:
• Premp(A) = Prem(A) ∩ Kp and Premn(A) = Prem(A) ∩ Kn
• Rulesd(A) = Rules(A) ∩Rd and Ruless(A) = Rules(A) ∩Rs
These distinctions, in turn, allow us to distinguish different classes of argu-
ment. We say that an argument A is consistent iff {Conc(A′)|A′ ∈ Sub(A)}
are consistent. We further say that an argument A is strict if the only rules
that A contains are strict, that is Rulesd = ∅; A is defeasible if A contains
at least one defeasible rule, Rulesd 6= ∅; A is firm if the only premises that
A contains are axioms, Premp(A) = ∅; A is plausible if A contains at least
one ordinary premise, Premp(A) 6= ∅. The definition of strict and defeasi-
ble are disjoint; firm and plausible are disjoint. However, a strict argument
can contain ordinary premises, a firm argument can contain defeasible rules.
Therefore, we need to identify both aspects of an argument to fully charac-
terize it, for example arguments are “strict and firm”.
Given the topics we will be discussing, it is necessary to consider the
following relationship between arguments:
Definition 2.19 (Strict Continuation of Arguments) For any set of ar-
guments {A1, . . . , An}, the argument A is a strict continuation of {A1, . . . , An}
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iff:
• the ordinary premises in A are exactly those in {A1, . . . , An};
• the defeasible rules in A are exactly those in {A1, . . . , An};
• the strict rules and axiom premises of A are a superset of the strict
rules and axiom premises in {A1, . . . , An}.
An argument can be attacked in three ways: on its ordinary premises, on its
conclusion, or on its inference rules. These three kinds of attack are called
undermining, rebutting and undercutting attacks, respectively.
Definition 2.20 (ASPIC+ Attack) An argument A attacks an argument
B iff A undermines, rebuts or undercuts B, where:
• A undermines B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = φ for some B′ = φ ∈ Prem(B)
and φ ∈ Kp.
• A rebuts B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = φ for some B′ ∈ Sub(B) of the form
B′′1 , . . . , B
′′
2 ⇒ φ.
• A undercuts B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = n(r) for some B′ ∈ Sub(B) such
that TopRule(B) is a defeasible rule r of the form φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ φ.
We denote “A attacks B” by (A,B).
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 26
Note that, in the ASPIC+ attack relation, rebutting is restricted. That is
an argument with a strict TopRule can rebut an argument with a defeasible
TopRule, but not vice versa.([23] introduce the ASPIC- systems which use
unrestricted rebut).
Attacks can be distinguished as to whether they are preference-dependent
(rebutting and undermining) or preference-independent (undercutting). The
former succeed only when the attacker is preferred. The latter succeed
whether or not the attacker is preferred.
Definition 2.21 (Preference Ordering) A preference ordering  is a bi-
nary relation over arguments, i.e.,  ⊆ A × A, where A is the set of all
arguments constructed from the knowledge base in an argumentation system.
We say A’s preference level is less than or equal to that of B iff A  B.
A ≺ B is then defined as usual as A  B and B 6 A. [60] shows that a
particular class of “reasonable” preference orderings have useful properties.
These orderings are defined as:
Definition 2.22 (Reasonable Argument Orderings) An argument or-
dering  is reasonable iff:
1. • ∀A,B, if B is strict and firm then B ⊀ A;
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Thus every strict and firm argument is at least as highly ranked
as any other argument.
• ∀A,B, if A is strict and firm and B is plausible or defeasible, then
B ≺ A;
Thus any strict and firm argument is more highly ranked than any
plausible or defeasible argument.
• ∀A,A′, B such that A′ is a strict continuation of A, if A ⊀ B then
A′ ⊀ B, and if B ⊀ A then B ⊀ A′
Thus applying strict rules and premises to the conclusion of an
argument neither weakens nor strengthens that argument.
2. Let {C1, . . . , Cn} be a finite subset of A, and for i = 1 . . . n, let C+\i
be some strict continuation of {C1, . . . , Ci−1, Ci+1, . . . , Cn}. Then it is
not the case that: ∀i, C+\i ≺ Ci
[60] suggests two ways of establishing a reasonable ordering, the weakest link
principle and last link principle. These two principles define how to combine
the two pre-orderings ≤,≤′ overRd and Kp respectively into an ordering over
arguments. The weakest link principle considers all the non-strict elements
in an argument — defeasible rules and ordinary premises.
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Definition 2.23 (Weakest Link Principle) Let A and B be two argu-
ments. A  B iff:
• Both A and B are strict, and Premp(A)E Premp(B); or
• Both A and B are firm, and Rulesd(A)E Rulesd(B); or
• Premp(A)E Premp(B) and Rulesd(A)E Rulesd(B).
The last link principle considers the last defeasible inference rule used in an
argument.
Definition 2.24 (Last Defeasible Rule) Let A be an argument.
• LastDefRules(A) = ∅ iff Rulesd(A) = ∅.
• If TopRule(A) = A1, . . . , An ⇒ φ, then LastDefRules(A) = {A1, . . . , An ⇒
φ}; otherwise, LastDefRules(A) = LastDefRules(A1)∪. . .∪LastDefRules(An).
Definition 2.25 (Last Link Principle) Let A and B be two arguments.
A  B iff:
• LastDefRules(A) = LastDefRules(B) = ∅ and Premp(A)EPremp(B);
or
• LastDefRules(A)E LastDefRules(B).
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Clearly both these principles hinge on the definition of E in terms of the or-
dering over rules and premises. There are two ways of defining E, Elitist and
Democratic. The Elitist approach compares sets on their minimal elements
and Democratic approach compares sets on their maximal elements.
Definition 2.26 (Orderings) Let Γ and Γ′ be finite sets . Then E is de-
fined as follows:
• If Γ = ∅ then Γ 5 Γ′.
• If Γ = Γ′ = ∅ then ΓE Γ′.
• ΓEEli Γ′ if ∃x ∈ Γ, s.t.,∀Y ∈ Γ′, X ≤ Y .
• ΓEDem Γ′ if ∀x ∈ Γ, s.t.,∃Y ∈ Γ′, X ≤ Y .
In other words, ΓEEliΓ′ if some element in Γ is less than every element in Γ′,
while ΓEDem Γ′ if every element in Γ is less than some element of Γ′. When
necessary, we will distinguish between the orderings obtained by using the
Elitist and Democratic definitions of E, referring to, for example, the “elitist
weakest link principle” and the “democratic last link principle”.
By combining the definition of arguments, attack relations and preference
ordering, we have the following definitions:
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Definition 2.27 (Structured Argumentation Framework) A structured
argumentation framework is a triple 〈A, att,〉, where A is the set of all ar-
guments constructed from the knowledge in the argumentation system, att is
the attack relation,  is an preference ordering on A.
Definition 2.28 (ASPIC+ Defeat) A defeats B iff A undercuts B, or if
A rebuts/undermines B on B′ and B′’s preference level is less than or equal
to that of A (B′  A).
Then the idea of an argumentation framework follows from Definitions 2.18
and 2.28.
Definition 2.29 (Argumentation Framework) An (abstract) argumen-
tation framework AF corresponding to a structured argumentation framework
SAF = 〈A, att,〉 is a pair 〈A, Defeats〉 such that Defeats is the defeat
relation on A determined by SAF .
The following provides a concrete example of an ASPIC+ argumentation
framework, adapted from [60]:
Example 2.1 Consider that we have the argumentation system AS = 〈L,R, n〉
where:
L = {a, b, c, d, e, f, a, b, c, d, e, f , nd, nd}
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R is then:
Rs = {d, f → b}
Rd = {a⇒ b; c⇒ d; e⇒ f ; a⇒ nd}
and n(c⇒ d) = nd. We then add the knowledge-base K such that:
Kn = ∅
Kp = {a; c; e; e}
to get the argumentation theory AT1 = 〈AS,K〉. From this we can construct
the arguments:
A1 = [a]; A2 = [A1 ⇒ b]; A3 = [A1 ⇒ nd];
B1 = [c]; B2 = [B1 ⇒ d];




1 ⇒ f ]; B = [B2, B′2 → b];
C = [e];
Let’s call this set of arguments A, so that:
A = {A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B′1, B′2, B, C}
Note that
Prem(B) = {c; e}
Sub(B) = {B1;B2;B′1;B′2;B}
Conc(B) = b
TopRule(B) = d, f → b





















Figure 2.2: The attack and defeat relations from AT1 in Example 2.1. In (a),
a dotted arrow in denotes undercutting, a dashed arrow denotes rebutting,
and a solid arrow denotes undermining. In (b) all the arrows denote defeats.
The attacks between these arguments are shown in Figure 2.2(a). These make
up the set att, where:
att = {(C,B′1), (B′1, C), (C,B′2), (C,B), (B,A2), (A3, B2), (A3, B)}
With a preference order  defined by : A2 ≺ B;C ≺ B;C ≺ B′1;C ≺ B′2,
we have the structured argumentation framework 〈A, att,〉. This structured
argumentation framework establishes a defeat relation
Defeats = {(B′1, C), (B,A2), (A3, B), (A3, B2)}
which is shown in Figure 2.2(b). With this, we can finally write down the
argumentation framework 〈A, Defeats〉.
Given an abstract argumentation framework constructed from a struc-
tured argumentation framework, one can use the labeling approach discussed
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above to establish which arguments are acceptable under a given semantics.
Since arguments are structured, we may be interested whether to accept
the conclusions of an argument We will extend the ideas above by adopting
the terminology of [31] which distinguishes between sceptical, credulous and
universal acceptance of the a conclusion of an argument:
Definition 2.30 (Justified Conclusions) For AF = 〈A, Defeats〉 is an
argumentation framework. we say that:
• φ is a credulously justified conclusion of AF iff there exists an argument
A and an extension E such that A ∈ E and Conc(A) = φ.
• φ is a sceptical justified conclusion of AF iff for every extension E,
there exists an argument A ∈ E such that Conc(A) = φ.
• φ is a universal justified conclusion of AF iff there exists an argument
A for every extension E, such that A ∈ E and Conc(A) = φ.
We also extend the notion of status to conclusions. Given two arguments A
and B, we say that Conc(A) and Conc(B) have the same status iff A and B
have the same status.
Clearly under the grounded semantics, all of the notions of justified
conclusion in Definition 2.30 coincide, and so if A is acceptable under the
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grounded semantics, we just say that the conclusion of A, Conc(A) is a jus-
tified conclusion. We will use the notion of the justified conclusions below
to compare the sets of conclusions of two argumentation frameworks. If two
frameworks have the same justified conclusions then they are, in some sense,
equivalent because they allow the same set of conclusions to be drawn. A
similar situation can arise in the case of two frameworks that have multiple
extensions. If the set of extensions of the two frameworks are the same, then
we can pair the sets of extensions E11, E12, . . . E1n and E21, E22, . . . E2n so
that each E1i is identical to its corresponding E2i and so contains exactly
the same arguments. Every argument has the same status in both sets of
extensions, and we can again consider the two sets of extensions to allow
the same sets of conclusions to be drawn. In such a case, by analogy to
the grounded semantics, we say that the sets of extensions have the same
justified conclusions.
Modgil and Prakken [60] distinguish several classes of ASPIC+ argu-
mentation framework. Of particular interest to me in this dissertation is
the class they call well-defined, which is the class for which they provide
results (frameworks that are ill-defined are problematic for reasons that we
will discuss below). For the slightly simpler version of ASPIC+ that we are
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considering here, the following definition gives captures the essence4 of [60]’s
notion of “well-defined”5, and so we use the same term:
Definition 2.31 (Well-defined) An argumentation theory AT = 〈AS,K〉,
where AS = 〈L,R, n〉 is well-defined if and only if it meets the following
conditions:
1. The strict rules Rs of R are closed under transposition.
2. The strict elements of AT is consistent, so ClS(Kn) is consistent. If
this condition holds, AT is said to be axiom consistent.
where ClS(·) denotes closure under strict rules.
The original ASPIC argumentation framework was introduced in [3]. In
[3], the attacks are only rebutting and undercutting. [20, 21] points out that
ASPIC is not expressive enough to capture all the different kinds of conflicts
4Any ASPIC+ theory, as defined here, that is well-defined in the sense used here will be
the basis of a structured arguentation framework that is well-defined in the sense defined
in [60].
5In [60], a “well-defined” theory needs to be “well-formed”, in addition to the require-
ments in Definition 2.31. We do not require AT to be well-formed because this property
follows from symmetrical negation (for example, see the proof of Proposition 25 in [60]), so
any theory we deal with is automatically well-formed. [60] also suggests that rather than
being closed under transposition, having a theory be closed under contraposition will suffice
to ensure the relevant behavior. A theory is closed under contraposition iff for all S ⊆ L,
s ∈ S and φ, if there exists a strict argument A such that Conc(A) = φ, Prem(A) ⊆ S,
then there exists a strict argument A′ such that Conc(A′) = φ, Prem(A′) ⊆ S\{s}∪{φ}.).
In other words [61], contraposition means that if there is a strict argument for φ which
uses some set of premises from S, then replacing any of these premises s with φ gives a
strict argument for s. Since closure under transposition is an alternative to closure under
contraposition, we see no need to consider both properties here.
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that may exist between arguments, and introduced the idea of rationality
postulates for structured argumentation. The rationality postulates suggests
that all the rule-based argumentation framework should satisfy the following
properties.
Definition 2.32 (Rationality postulates) For an argumentation theory
AT and associated argumentation framework AF with a set of sceptical jus-
tified conclusions C, and extensions, under a given semantics E1, . . . , En:
Postulate 1 (Closure) AF satifies closure, also called closure under strict
rules, iff:
1. Concs(Ei) = Cls(Concs(Ei)), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2. C = ClS(C)
Postulate 2 (Direct consistency) AF satifies direct consistency iff:
1. Concs(Ei) is consistent for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2. C is consistent
Postulate 3 (Indirect consistency) AF satifies indirect consistency iff:
1. ClS(Concs(Ei)) is consistent for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2. ClS(C) is consistent
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where Concs(·) denotes the conclusions of a set of arguments, and ClS(·)
denotes closure under strict rules.
[21] characterises the postulates as follows. Closure ensures that: “the user
[can] do [their] own reasoning (take the outcome of the formalism and apply
modus ponens using the strict rules) to derive statements that the formalism
apparently ‘forgot’ to entail.” Direct consistency ensures that the formalism
does not generate “absurdities” in the sense of allowing two conclusions that
contradict each other. Indirect consistency ensures that: “one may . . . take
the outcome of the formalism and apply modus ponens using the strict rules”
and be sure that the results will be consistent (and hence sensible). The
original ASPIC system, which was studied in [21] did not satisfy closue
or indirect consistency, and ASPIC+ satisfies it by restricting rebut and
requiring theories to be closed under transposition.
In addition to the three rationality postulates of Definition 2.32, a further
postulate (sometimes presented as the first of four) is considered by some
authors, for example [60]:
Definition 2.33 (Sub-argument Closure) For an argumentation theory
AT and and associated argumentation framework AF with extensions E1, . . . , En,
under a given semantics. AF satisfies sub-argument closure iff for any ar-
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gument A in Ei, all sub-arguments of A are in Ei, i.e., ∀Ei ∈ {E1, . . . , En},
∀A ∈ Ei, if A′ ∈ Sub(A), then A′ ∈ Ei.
We do not consider sub-argument closure in any detail here because [21]
showed that the original ASPIC system satisfies this property for any com-
plete semantics, and the systems that we consider here are similar enough to
ASPIC that the same result holds without modification (other than some
slight changes in notation).
The value of the postulates is that they allow us to distinguish different
argumentation theories as being rational or not — since rationality can hinge
on the content of the theory, some theories expressed in some formalism can
be rational, while others are not, and the work in this paper explores areas
along exactly this kind of fault line in ASPIC+:
Definition 2.34 (Rational) If an argumentation theory AT meets all the
rationality postulates, it is said to be rational. An argumentation theory that
is not rational is said to be irrational.
Because rationality is defined with respect to justified conclusions, it depends
on the semantics being applied to obtain the justified conclusions. Any use
we make of the term in a formal sense will be in the context of a specific
semantics or set of semantics. Informally, we sometimes use the term without
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specifying a semantics to either mean for at least one semantics or for any
semantics, with the context making clear which. [60] shows that any well-
defined ASPIC+ structured argumentation framework is rational. However,
an ASPIC+ framework may be both rational and ill-defined. We can see this
in Example 2.1 where AT2.1 is ill-defined, but is rational under any semantics
because the set of justified conclusions:
{a, b, c, e, f, nd}
conforms to the rationality postulates, by being closed under strict rules, and
both directly and indirectly consistent. The following example is a slight
modification of Example 2.1 to highlight a theory which is irrational because
its justified conclusions are not consistent:
Example 2.2 Consider a theory AT2.2 which has the knowledge base:
Kn = ∅
Kp = {b; c; e}
and where the remaining elements are the same as in AT2.1 from Example 2.1.
Now we can construct the arguments:
A = [b];
B1 = [c]; B2 = [B1 ⇒ d];




1 ⇒ f ]; B = [B2, B′2 → b];
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The only attack is (B,A). However, if we set B ≺ A, then there are no
defeat relations. Therefore, both A and B are justified, and the set of justified
conclusions is:
{b, b, c, d, e, f}
which is not consistent.
Note that, indirect consistency can be derived by direct consistency and clo-
sure under strict rules. [67] then introduced the ASPIC+ argumentation
framework, a revised version of ASPIC. Moreover, it also distinguish the
preference dependent attack and preference independent attack. [2] ana-
lyzes the ASPIC+ argumentation system, and shows that there are several
drawbacks of ASPIC+. [69] argues that the criticisms in [2] are not justified,
but are caused by a number of misconceptions. Recently, [68] points out that
ASPIC+ may not be able to capture the lottery paradox [49]. Therefore, [68]
introduced fallible arguments, and then revised the rationality postulates.
In general, theASPIC+ argumentation framework does not satisfy all the
rationality postulates. However, if the strict rules are closed under transposi-
tion, then any ASPIC+ argumentation framework satisfies all the rationality
postulates. We call these frameworks rational argumentation frameworks.
There are a number of ASPIC+ related framework published recently.
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[23] introduced the ASPIC- argumentation framework, where the rebuttal
is unrestricted. [50] focus on purely defeasible argumentation framework,
ASPIC+D, showing that the purely defeasible part of ASPIC
+ has the same
expressiveness as ASPIC+.
[19] postulates the property of non-contamination as being desirable for
argumentation system. Non-contamination captures the idea that an argu-
mentation framework should be proof against a localized inconsistency prop-
agating to affect arguments which do not directly depend on the inconsistent
elements.
Definition 2.35 (Non-contamination) It may not be the case that two
arguments that rebut each other can be combined into an argument that can
keep any arbitrary other argument from becoming justified.
We can see the value of this postulate by considering a case in which it does
not hold. Consider an argumentation framework, based on ASPIC+, in
which the ex falso quodlibet principle, also called the principle of explosion,
is incorporated a strict rule6. The principle states that once a contradiction
has been asserted, any proposition can be inferred from it. Here is an example
using such a framework:
6This will be the case for any argumentation system which is a super-set of classical
logic since that rule is a (strict) rule in classical logic.
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Example 2.3
Rd = {a⇒ b; c⇒ ¬b; e⇒ d}
Rs = {b,¬b→ ¬d}
Kn = {a; c; e}
Kp = ∅
The arguments are:
A1 = [a] A2 = [A1 ⇒ b]
B1 = [c] B2 = [B1 ⇒ ¬b] [C ′2] = [A2, B2 → ¬d]
C1 = [e] C2 = [C1 ⇒ d]
In this example, argument A2 and argument B2 rebut each other. That is
uncontroversial. However, ex falso quodlibet makes it possible to construct
argument C ′2, which defeats C2. This is possible whatever formulae e and
d represent, so C2 can be defeated even when d and e are unrelated to a,
b and c. (To riff on an example from Martin Caminada, two contradictory
arguments about whether or not to put sugar in tea can make it possible to
defeat an argument about nuclear disarmament.) Clearly, this does not make
any sense — it is not reasonable, in general, for an argument to prevent any
other argument from being justified.
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Example 2.3 demonstrates that ASPIC+ theories do not satisfy the non-
interference property. We could complain that rules like b,¬b → ¬d should
just not be used — if we want to block the propagation of inconsistency why
allow rules that can be used to propagate it — but the problem with doing so
is that ex falso quodlibet is part of the fabric of classical propositional logic.
As a result, any ASPIC+-based system that includes classical propositional
logic will have this problem. [19] proposes a solution which will work for
any argumentation system by redefining arguments to be consistent (as, for
example, in [5]), thus ruling out inconsistent arguments (and hence the reason
non-interference fails to hold).
The original solution presented by Caminada in [19] is to rule out incon-
sistent arguments. Caminada does this by constructing arguments as normal,
that is as in Definition 2.18, and then filtering out the inconsistent ones before
applying Dung’s semantics. As a result of the filtering, no inconsistent ar-
guments can be justified, and since combining two rebutting arguments into
a third argument would make that third argument inconsistent, restricting
arguments to being consistent ensures non-contamination. Ruling out in-
consistent arguments is reasonable — inconsistent arguments are pretty bad
arguments after all — and has echoes of [39] where inconsistent arguments
are permitted, but are considered weaker than any other kind of argument.
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ArgTrust
Similar to ASPIC+, [77] uses a graph to represent the argument, which may
be more intuitive to a decision maker. The knowledge available to an agent
is defined as Σ = P ∪ ∆ where P is a set of premises, each of which is a
logical statement in a language L. ∆ is a set of inference rules, each of which
denoted by δ, is of the form:
c :− p1, p2, . . . , pn
where pi and c are members of L. In other words the inference rules link
some sets of premises pi to a conclusion c.
The inference rule can be represented as a graph
Definition 2.36 (Rule Network) A rule network R is a directed hyper-
graph 〈V r, Er〉 where:
1. the set of vertices V r are elements of L
2. the set of edges Er are inference rules δ
3. the initial vertices of an edge e ∈ Er are the premises of the corre-
sponding inference rule
4. the terminal node of that edge is the corresponding conclusion c.
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Thus a rule network simply connects premises and conclusions of rules. Under
certain circumstances, a rule network captures a proof.
Definition 2.37 (Proof Network) For a given knowledge base Σ = P∪∆,
a rule network 〈V r, Er〉 is a proof network iff every premise of each inference
rule δ ∈ Er is either a member of P or the conclusion of some δ′ ∈ Er
Some proof networks correspond to arguments:
Definition 2.38 (Argument) An argument A from a knowledge base Σ =
P ∪∆ is a pair 〈h,H〉 where H = 〈V r, Er〉 is a proof network for h, and h
is the only leaf of H.
H is the support of the argument, and h is the conclusion. C(H) is the
set of intermediate conclusions of H, the set of all the conclusions of the
δ ∈ Er other than h. P (H) is the set of pure premises of H, the premises of
the δ ∈ Er that are not intermediate conclusions of H.
[77] distinguishes a number of ways that a defeat may occur as follows:
Definition 2.39 (Defeats) An argument 〈h1, H1〉 defeats an argument 〈h2, H2〉
iff it rebuts, undermines, intermediate-rebuts, or undercuts it, where:
1. An argument 〈h1, H1〉 rebuts another argument〈h2, H2〉 iff h1 ≡ ¬h2.
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2. An argument 〈h1, H1〉 premise-undercuts7 another argument〈h2, H2〉 iff
there is a premise p ∈ P (H2) such that h1 ≡ ¬p.
3. An argument 〈h1, H1〉 intermediate-rebuts another argument〈h2, H2〉 iff
there is an intermediate conclusion c ∈ C(H2) such that c 6= h2 and
h1 ≡ ¬c.
4. An argument 〈h1, H1〉 inference-undercuts8 another argument〈h2, H2〉
iff there is an inference rule δ ∈ ∆(H2) such that h1 ≡ ¬pδq.
where p·q is the naming convention.
Let’s look at an example for ArgTrust.
Example 2.4 Suppose that John is trying to decide whether or not he should
watch the film hce, the only film currently in the knowledge base. Dave, a
friend of John, suggests that they should watch the film if the film is an
Indian film and directed by Almodovar. Figure 2.3 shows a rule network for
this example. The rectangular nodes denote the premises and the conclusion.
The oval, which represent a hyper-edge, denotes an inference rule.
7Similar to undermines in ASPIC+.
8Similar to undercuts in ASPIC+.






Figure 2.3: Example for Rule Network
Defeasible Logic Programming
There are a number of research works about defeasible logics in argumenta-
tion [74, 71, 28]. Among them, [41] is influential. [41] presents an argumenta-
tive approach — defeasible logic programming (DeLP). The DeLP language
is defined in terms of three disjoint sets: a set of facts, a set of strict rules
and a set of defeasible rules.
In the language of DeLP a literal L is a ground atom A or a negated
ground atom ∼ A, where ∼ represents strong negation. The following defi-
nitions introduce the language of DeLP.
Definition 2.40 (Fact) A fact is a literal, i.e. a ground atom, or a negated
ground atom.
Definition 2.41 (Strict Rule) A strict rule is an ordered pair, denoted
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“Head ← Body”, whose first member, Head, is a literal, and whose second
member, Body, is a finite non-empty set of literals. A strict rule with the head
L0 and body {L1, . . . , Ln} can also be written as: L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln(n > 0).
Definition 2.42 (Defeasible Rule) A defeasible rule is an ordered pair,
denoted “Head −< Body”, whose first member, Head, is a literal, and whose
second member, Body, is a finite non-empty set of literals. A strict rule
with the head L0 and body {L1, . . . , Ln} can also be written as: L0 −<
L1, . . . , Ln(n > 0).
Combining the above definitions, we can define a defeasible logic program.
Definition 2.43 (Defeasible Logic Program) A Defeasible Logic Pro-
gram P is a possibly infinite set of facts, strict rules and defeasible rules. In
a program P , we will distinguish the subset Π of facts and strict rules, and
the subset ∆ of defeasible rules. When required, we will denote P as (Π,∆).
Next, we will define what constitutes a defeasible derivation and a strict
derivation.
Definition 2.44 (Defeasible Derivation) Let P = (Π,∆) be a DeLP.
and L a ground literal. A defeasible derivation of L from P , denoted
P |∼ L, consists of a finite sequence L1, L2, . . . , Ln = L of ground literals,
and each literal Li is in the sequence because:
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• Li is a fact in Π, or
• there exists a rule Ri in P (strict or defeasible) with head Li and body
B1, B2, . . . , Bk and every literal of the body is an element Lj of the
sequence appearing before Li(j < i).
Definition 2.45 (Strict Derivation) Let P be a DeLP and h a literal with
a defeasible derivation L1, L2, . . . , Ln = h. We will say that h has a strict
derivation from P , denoted P ` L, if either h is a fact or all the rules used
for obtaining the sequence L1, L2, . . . , Ln are strict rules.
Next we will introduce the defeasible argumentation formalism.
Definition 2.46 (Argument Structure) Let h be a literal, and P = (Π,∆)
a DeLP. We say that 〈A, h〉 is an argument structure for h, if A is a set
of defeasible rules of ∆, such that:
1. there exists a defeasible derivation for h from Π ∪ A,
2. the set Π ∪ A is consistent,
3. A is minimal: there is no proper subset A′ of A such that A′ satisfies
conditions 1 and 2.
In summary, an argument structure 〈A, h〉, or simply an argument A for
h, is a minimal consistent set of defeasible rules, obtained from a defeasible
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derivation for a given literal h. The literal h will also be called the con-
clusion supported by A. Note that strict rules are not part of an argument
structure.
Definition 2.47 (Sub-argument) An argument structure 〈A′, h′〉 is a sub-
argument structure of 〈A, h〉 if A′ ⊆ A.
It is important to note that the union of arguments is not always an argument.
That is, given two argument structures 〈A, h〉 and 〈A′, h′〉, the set A ∪ A′
might not be an argument, because A∪A′ could be not minimal or A∪A′∪Π
could be contradictory.
In DeLP, the attack relationship is defined as follows
Definition 2.48 (Disagree) Let P = (Π,∆) be a DeLP. We say that two
literals h and h′ disagree, iff the set Π ∪ {h, h′} is contradictory.
Definition 2.49 (Attack) We say that 〈A1, h1〉 attacks 〈A2, h2〉 at literal
h, iff there exists a sub-argument 〈A, h〉 of 〈A2, h2〉 such that h and h1 dis-
agree.
Again, we will use an example to introduce defeasible logic programs.




h1 ← b h2 ← b




b −< c b −< d
e −< c f −< d
}
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We can construct the following argument structures: 〈A1, h1〉 = 〈{b −<
c}, h1〉 and 〈A2, h2〉 = 〈{b −< d}, h2〉. Consider now the set A = A1 ∪ A2 =
{b −< c, b −< d}. From Π ∪ A there exists a defeasible derivation for h,
however, 〈A, h〉 is not an argument structure because A is not the minimal
set of defeasible rules that provides an argument structure for h because A1
is a proper subset of A. Therefore the argument should be 〈A1, h〉.
2.1.3 Other Argumentation Frameworks
Unlike the rule-based argumentation framework, there are some other argu-
mentation frameworks, such as logic-based argumentation frameworks. [82]
proposed a more general approach to logic-based argumentation. It leaves the
logic for deduction as a parameter, and this is developed in assumption-based
argumentation [35].
More research about logic-based argumentation include: variants of de-
feasible logic with annotations for lattice-theoretic truth values [76] and for
possibility theory [1], temporal reasoning calculi used with defeasible logic
[12] and with classical logic [53], minimal logic [48], and a form of modal
logic [38].
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 52
Classical Logic-based Argumentation Framework
The classical logic based argumentation framework [25, 4, 15] is an argument
iff Φ ` α and there is no Φ′ ⊂ Φ such that Φ′ ` α and Φ ` ⊥. [15] explores a
framework for argumentation based on classical logic in which an argument
is a pair where the first item is a minimal consistent set of formula that
proves the second item (which is a formula). The authors assume familiarity
with classical logic, and consider a propositional language. We use α, β, . . .
to denote formulas and ∆,Φ, . . . to denote sets of formulas, and ∆ denotes a
database (a finite set of formulas)
Definition 2.50 (Argument) An argument is a pair 〈Φ, α〉 such that
1. Φ is consistent.
2. Φ ` α.
3. Φ is a minimal subset of ∆ satisfying (2).
We say that 〈Φ, α〉 is an argument for α. We call α the consequent of the
argument and Φ the support of the argument.
Conflicts is captured in a concrete form with the notion of defeater.
Definition 2.51 (Defeater) A defeater for an argument 〈Φ, α〉 is an ar-
gument 〈Ψ, β〉 such that β ` ¬(φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) for some {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊆ Φ.
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Some arguments directly oppose the support of others, which is the notion
of an undercut.
Definition 2.52 (Undercut) An undercut9 for an argument 〈Φ, α〉 is an
argument 〈Ψ,¬(φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn)〉 where {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊆ Φ.
The another form of conflict is when two arguments have opposite conclu-
sions, which is the notion of a rebuttal.
Definition 2.53 (Rebuttal) An argument 〈Ψ, β〉 is a rebuttal for an ar-
gument 〈Φ, α〉 iff β ↔ ¬α is a tautology.
Let’s take a look at an example.
Example 2.6 Let ∆ = {α, α > β, γ > ¬β, γ,¬α}. Some arguments are:
〈{α, α > β}, β〉 〈{γ, γ > ¬β},¬β〉
〈{¬α},¬α〉 〈{α > β},¬α ∨ β〉
Note that, the symbol > denotes material implication in logic.
Unlike some rule-based argumentation frameworks, logic based argumen-
tation does not have any attacks on inference rules, since the only inference
rule is general modus ponens which is a strict rule.
9same as undermine in ASPIC+
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Assumption-Based Argumentation Framework
Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) [36] was developed as a general-
purpose computational framework. Arguments in ABA are defined as back-
ward deductions of a conclusion (using the inference rules of the underlying
logic) supported by sets of assumptions. In other words, this can be un-
derstood as a strict inference rule with some defeasible assumptions. The
assumptions act as the premises of inference rules.
Since ABA is an instance of abstract argument, all the semantic notions
for “acceptability” also apply to ABA. In contrast to a number of existing ap-
proaches to non-abstract argumentation frameworks, the attack relationship
in ABA is reduced to undermining which means the contrary of an assump-
tion. Like ArgTrust, ABA can be represented as a tree as well: the root is
the conclusion; for every node, the children of that node are the assump-
tions supporting the node. All the leaves are either assumptions or τ (empty
assumption).
2.2 Non-monotonic Reasoning
Suppose we have a collection of information, there are two methods for ex-
tracting more information from the collection: monotonic reasoning and non-
monotonic reasoning. The monotonic deductive systems are the familiar log-
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ical systems such as classical logic and modal logic. They are called mono-
tonic because the addition of information does not affect the validity of the
previous results.
Definition 2.54 (Monotonic System) Assume we have a collection of in-
formation, P , a system is called monotonic iff given addition information P ′,
P ` α then P ∪ P ′ ` α.
On the contrary, non-monotonic systems are such that additional informa-
tion may contradict with previous results. Well-known systems are: Reiter’s
default systems [73], Clark’s negation as failure [29], circumscription [55], the
modal system of [58], autoepistemic logic [62] and inheritance systems [80].
Definition 2.55 (Non-monotonic System) Assume we have a collection
of information, P , a system is called non-monotonic iff given addition infor-
mation P ′, P |∼ α then P ∪ P ′ 6|∼ α.
2.2.1 Axioms of Non-monotonic System
Gabbay [40] take the first step to characterize what a non-monotonic system
looks like. To be a deductive monotonic logical system, the consequence
relation ` should satisfy the following conditions:
Reflexivity α ` α
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Monotonicity α ` γ
α ∧ β ` γ
Cut α ∧ β ` γ α ` β
α ` γ
Gabbay [40] introduces the minimum non-monotonic system, where the con-
sequence relation |∼ should satisfy the following conditions:
Reflexivity α |∼ α
Restricted Monotonicity α |∼ β α |∼ γ
α ∧ β |∼ γ
Cut α ∧ β |∼ γ α |∼ β
α |∼ γ
Later, Kraus et al. [46] summarizes the different axioms among literature,
and introduces different systems by combining different axioms.
Kraus et al. [46], building on earlier work by Gabbay [40], identified a
set of axioms which characterize non-monotonic inference in logical systems,
and studied the relationships between sets of these axioms. Their goal was
to characterize different kinds of reasoning; to pin down what it means for
a logical system to be monotonic or non-monotonic; and — in particular
— to be able distinguish between the two. Table 2.2 presents the axioms
of [46]. The symbol |∼ encodes a consequence relation, while |= identifies
the statements obtainable from the underlying theory. Note that we have
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Abbr. Axiom Name
Ref α |∼ α Reflexivity
LLE |= α ≡ β α |∼ γ
β |∼ γ
Left Logical Equivalence
RW |= α ↪→ β γ |∼ α
γ |∼ β
Right Weakening
Cut α ∧ β |∼ γ α |∼ β
α |∼ γ
Cut
CM α |∼ β α |∼ γ
α ∧ β |∼ γ
Cautious Monotonicity 10
M |= α ↪→ β β |∼ γ
α |∼ γ
Monotonicity
EHD α |∼ β ↪→ γ
α ∧ β |∼ γ
EHD
T α |∼ β β |∼ γ
α |∼ γ
Transitivity




α0 |∼ α1, α1 |∼ α2,. . . , αk−1 |∼ αk, αk |∼ α0
α0 |∼ αk
Loop
Or α |∼ γ β |∼ γ
α ∨ β |∼ γ
Or
Table 2.2: The axioms from [46] that we will consider.
altered some of the symbols used in [46] to avoid confusion. Equivalence is
denoted ≡ (rather than ↔), and ↪→ (rather than →) denotes the existence
of an inference rule.
There are numerous systems studied, we summarize them here:
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C A consequence relation is said to be cumulative iff it contains all instances
of the Reflexivity axiom and is closed under the inference rules of Left
Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, Cut and Cautious Monotonic-
ity.
CL A consequence relation that satisfies all rules of C and Loop, is said to
be loop-cumulative.
P A consequence relation that satisfies all rules of C and Or, is said to be
preferential.
CM A consequence relation that satisfies all rules of C and Monotonicity, is
said to be cumulative monotonic.
M A consequence relation that satisfies all rules of C and Contraposition, is
said to be monotonic.
The first system, C, corresponds to Gabbay’s proposal [40]. The second,
stronger, system, CL, includes a rule of inference that seems original, and
corresponds to models that seem to be more natural. None of those systems
assumes, in any essential way the existence of the classical logical connectives,
if one allows a finite set of formulas to appear on the left of our symbol |∼.
The systems below assume the classical connectives. The third, stronger,
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system, P, has particularly appealing semantics. The fourth system, CM,
is stronger than CL but incomparable with P. It provides an example of a
monotonic system that is weaker than classical logic. The last one of those
systems, M, is stronger than all previous systems and equivalent to classical
propositional logic.
Besides the basic axioms, there are a lot of axioms that can be derived
from different systems. We will not summarize them here.
2.2.2 Non-monotonic Systems
There are a lot of non-monotonic systems introduced over time. In this
section, we will give a brief summary of well-known non-monotonic system.
Clark [29] presents a negation as failure inference rule, whereby ¬P can
be inferred if every possible proof of P fails. Moreover, they show that the
negation as failure rule only allows to conclude negated facts that could be
inferred from the axioms of the completed knowledge base.
Reiter [73] proposes default logic to provide a formal definition of the
extensions to an underlying first order theory induced by a set of defaults.
They also provide a proof theory by focusing upon a special class of defaults
called normal defaults. In addition to providing a proof theory for normal
defaults, they obtains the pessimist result that in general the beliefs of a
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theory are not recursively enumerable. Finally, they determine conditions
under which it is necessary to revise a set of derived beliefs when confronted
with some new observations about a world.
McCarthy [55] presents a non-monotonic system, circumscription, to for-
malize the common sense assumption that things are as expected unless
otherwise specified. To implement circumscription in his initial formulation,
McCarthy augmented first-order logic to allow the minimization of the ex-
tension of some predicates, where the extension of a predicate is the set of
tuples of values the predicate is true on. This minimization is similar to the
closed world assumption that what is not known to be true is false. Later,
[56] use circumscription in an attempt to solve the frame problem [57].
McDermott and Doyle [58] defines a standard language of discourse in-
cluding the non-monotonic term “consistent”. Moreover, [58] defines the se-
mantics of the language based on models. With the definitions, they justify
the soundness and completeness of the theory.
Lin and Shoham [51] first introduce an argument system, contain two
kinds of inference rules, namely, monotonic inference rules and non-monotonic
inference rules. And they show that most well-known non-monotonic sys-
tems, such as default logic, autoepistemic logic, negation as failure and cir-
cumscription, can be formulated as special argument systems.
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Bondarenko et al. [17] continues this line of work, presents an abstract
framework for default reasoning which includes Theorist, default logic, logic
programming, autoepistemic logic, non-monotonic modal logics, and certain
instances of circumscription as special cases.
Billington [16] describes Defeasible Logic, a logic that, as its name im-
plies, differs from classical logic in that it deals with defeasible reasoning. In
addition to introducing the logic, [16] shows that defeasible logic satisfies the
axioms of reflexivity, cut and cautious monotonicity suggested in [40], thus
satisfying what [40] describes as the basic requirements for a non-monotonic
system (such a system is equivalent to a cumulative system in [46]).
Governatori et al. [43] subsequently established significant links between
reasoning in defeasible logic and argumentation-based reasoning. To do this,
[43] provides an argumentation system that makes use of defeasible logic as
its underlying logic, and shows that the system is compatible with Dung’s
semantics [65]. [8] presents a framework for defeasible logic, which shows
how to tune defeasible logic in order to define variants able to deal with dif-
ferent non-monotonic phenomena. Given Defeasible Logic’s close relation to
Prolog [63], this line of work is closely related to Defeasible Logic Program-
ming (DeLP) [41], a formalism combining results of Logic Programming and
Defeasible Argumentation as we introduced before.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 62
Hunter [44] investigates various consequence relations of deductive argu-
mentation and their satisfaction of various properties. [33] and [34] inves-
tigates cumulativity of ASPIC-like structured argumentation frameworks.
[32] analyzes cautious monotonicity and cumulative transitivity with respect
to Assumption-Based Argumentation.
Prakken and Sartor [70] presents a semantics and proof theory of a system
for defeasible argumentation. The semantics of the system is given with a
fix-point definition, and the proof theory is stated in dialectical style.
Next, we will give a brief introduction about defeasible logic and its se-
mantics.
A defeasible theory D is a pair (R, >) where R a finite set of rules,
and > a superiority relation on R. There are three kinds of rules — strict
rules, defeasible rules and defeater. Same as the ASPIC+ framework, strict
rules are rules always true, and defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated
by contrary evidence. Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any
conclusions, and act as a contrary to the defeasible rules. An example of
defeater is “If an animal is heavy then it might not be able to fly”. Formally:
heavy(X) 7→ ¬flies(X). In this case, we do not want to conclude ¬flies
if heavy, however, we simply want to prevent a conclusion flies. The su-
periority relation is the preference ordering over rules. When r1 > r2, then
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r1 is called superior to r2, and r2 inferior to r1. This expresses that r1 may
override r2. The superiority relation is required to be acyclic. Here we only
consider essentially propositional rules. Rules containing free variables are
interpreted as the set of their ground instances. On the other hand, a defea-
sible theory D can be defined as (K,R, >), where K is a set of rules with no
antecedents.
Before we introduce the details of defeasible theory, we need to define
some notions. A(r) denotes the antecedents of a rule r, and C(r) is the
conclusion of r. As before, Rs denotes the set of strict rules, Rd denotes
the set of defeasible rules. In addition, Rsd denotes all the strict rules and
defeasible rules. We use the notion R[q] to represent the set of rules with
conclusions q. If q is a literal, ∼ q denotes the complementary literal.
Definition 2.56 (Conclusion) Suppose D is a defeasible theory, a conclu-
sion of D is a tagged literal. In the original defeasible logic there are two
tags, ∂ and ∆, that may have positive or negative polarity:
+∆q which is intended to mean that q is definitely provable in D (i.e., using
only strict rules).
−∆q which is intended to mean that it is proved that q is not definitely
provable in D.
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+∂q which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q which is intended to mean that it is proved that q is not defeasibly prov-
able in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation in D.
Definition 2.57 (Derivation(ambiguity blocked)) A derivation is a fi-
nite sequence P = (P (1), . . . , P (n)) of tagged literals satisfying the following
conditions.
+∆ If P (i+ 1) = +∆q then
∃r ∈ Rs[q]
∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P (1 . . . i).
−∆ If P (i+ 1) = −∆q then
∀r ∈ Rs[q]
∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1 . . . i).
+∂ If P (i+ 1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1 . . . i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q]∀a ∈ A(r)
+∂a ∈ P (1 . . . i) and
(2.2) −∆ ∼ q ∈ P (1 . . . i) and
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(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼ q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1 . . . i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1 . . . i) and
t > s
−∂ If P (i+ 1) = −∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1 . . . i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q]∃a ∈ A(r)
−∂a ∈ P (1 . . . i) or
(2.2) +∆ ∼ q ∈ P (1 . . . i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼ q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1 . . . i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1 . . . i) or
t 6> s
Let’s take “flying bird” from [16] as an example to illustrate the defeasible
logic.
Example 2.7 Consider the following set of rules:
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 66
f1 → Bird(Tweety) Tweety is a bird.
f2 → Penguin(Tweety) Tweety is a penguin.
f3 → Sick(Tweety) Tweety is sick.
r1 Penguin(x)→ Bird(x) Penguins are birds.
r2 Bird(x)⇒ Flies(x) birds usually fly.
r3 Penguin(x)⇒ ¬Flies(x) Penguins usually do not fly.
r4 Bird(x), Sick(x) 7→ ¬Flies(x) Sick birds might not fly.
SUPERIORITY RELATION
r3 > r2 and r4 > r2
Let D = (R, >) be the defeasible theory with R = {f1, r1, r2, r3, r4}. Then
D ` +∂F lies(Tweety), which indicates that there is sufficient evidence to
defeasibly conclude that Tweety flies. But if Tweety turns out to be a pen-
guin then (R ∪ {f2}, >) ` +∂¬Flies(Tweety) which indicates that there is
sufficient evidence to defeasibly conclude that Tweety does not fly. How-
ever if all we know is that Tweety is a sick bird then there is not sufficient
evidence to even defeasibly conclude that Tweety flies or does not fly, i.e.,
(R∪ {f3}, >) ` −∂F lies(Tweety) and (R∪ {f3}, >) ` −∂¬Flies(Tweety).
The above definition is also called the ambiguity blocking approach. In
contrast, [8] introduces an ambiguity propagating variant. Let’s take an
example from [43] to illustrate the difference between the two.
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Example 2.8 Consider the following set of rules:
⇒ a ⇒ b
⇒ ¬a a⇒ ¬b
Here a is ambiguous since we have applicable rules for both a and ¬a, and
we have no means to decide between them. In a setting where the ambiguity
is blocked, b is not ambiguous because we have an applicable rule for b and,
at the same time, the rule for ¬b is not applicable since we cannot prove
its antecedent. On the other hand, in an ambiguity propagating setting, b is
ambiguous because there are rules for both b and ¬b, antecedent of the rule for
¬b is ambiguous, and hence the ambiguity is propagated to b. We have proofs
in this theory for −∂a, −∂¬a, +∂b, and −∂¬b, thus showing the ambiguity
blocking behavior of Defeasible Logic.
In the following we introduce an ambiguity propagating variant. The
first step is to determine when a literal is “supported” in a defeasible theory.
Support for a literal p(+Σp) consists of a monotonic chain of reasoning that
would lead us to conclude p in the absence of conflicts. This is defined as:
+Σ If P (i+ 1) = +Σq then
∃r ∈ Rsd[q]
∀a ∈ A(r) : +Σa ∈ P (1 . . . i).
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−Σ If P (i+ 1) = −Σq then
∀r ∈ Rsd[q]
∃a ∈ A(r) : −Σa ∈ P (1 . . . i).
A literal that is defeasibly provable is supported, but a literal may be sup-
ported even though it is not defeasibly provable. Thus support is a weaker
notion than defeasible provability. For example, given two rules ⇒ p and
⇒ ¬p, both p and ¬p are supported, but neither is defeasibly provable. We
say that p is ambiguous. In general, a literal is ambiguous if there is a chain
of reasoning that supports a conclusion that p is true, and another that
supports that ∼ p is true.
We can achieve ambiguity propagation behavior by making a minor change
to the inference condition for +∂: instead of requiring that every attack on
p be inapplicable in the sense of −∂, now we require that the rule for ∼ p be
inapplicable because one of its antecedents cannot be supported. Here is the
formal definition:
+∂ap If P (i+ 1) = +∂apq then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1 . . . i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q]∀a ∈ A(r)
+∂apa ∈ P (1 . . . i) and
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(2.2) −∆ ∼ q ∈ P (1 . . . i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼ q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −Σa ∈ P (1 . . . i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +Σa ∈ P (1 . . . i) and
t > s
−∂ap If P (i+ 1) = −∂apq then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1 . . . i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q]∃a ∈ A(r)
−∂apa ∈ P (1 . . . i) or
(2.2) +∆ ∼ q ∈ P (1 . . . i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼ q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +Σa ∈ P (1 . . . i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −Σa ∈ P (1 . . . i) or
t 6> s
Let’s use Example 2.8 to say the above notions.
Example 2.9 Consider the defeasible theory of Example 2.8, we have +Σa,
+Σ¬a, +Σb and +Σ¬b showing that there are chains of reasoning supporting
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a, ¬a, b and ¬b. Moreover we can derive −∂apa, −∂ap¬a, −∂apb and −∂ap¬b
showing that the resulting logic exhibits an ambiguity propagating behavior.
In fact b is now ambiguous, and its ambiguity depends on the ambiguity of a.
Next, we will give a formal definition of argumentation framework based
on defeasible logic.
Definition 2.58 (Argument) An argument for a literal p based on a set
of rules R is a (possibly infinite) tree with nodes labeled by literals such that
the root is labeled by p and for every node with label h:
• If b1, . . . , bn label the children of h then there is a rule in R with body
b1, . . . , bn and head h.
• If this rule is a defeater then h is the root of the argument.
• The arcs in a proof tree are labeled by the rules used to obtain them.
Let’s take a look at an example from [43] to illustrate the definition.
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Then 7→ a 7→ b is not an argument. The reason is that, as said before,
defeaters are only used to prevent conclusions, but do not provide positive
evidence. In the example, we have evidence against ¬a (by the first defeater),
but no evidence for a. Therefore the second defeater cannot be used since to
do so we would need evidence for a. The proof theory of defeasible logic was
defined in agreement with this reading, therefore D ` +∂¬b and D ` +∂ap¬b.
Given a defeasible theory D, the set of arguments that can be generated
from D is denoted by ArgsD. Depending on the rules used, we have different
notions of arguments:
• A supportive argument is a finite argument in which no defeater is
used.
• A strict argument is an argument in which only strict rules are used.
• An argument that is not strict is called defeasible.
Let’s take a look at an example to understand the different notions.
Example 2.11 Consider the following defeasible theory D = (R, >) with
R = {⇒ d;→ e;⇒ f ; a,¬b ⇒ c; e → a; f 7→ b; d ⇒ ¬b} and the superiority
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relation is empty. Now we can construct the following arguments:
A = [(→ e→ a,⇒ d⇒ ¬b)⇒ c]
B = [⇒ f 7→ b]
C = [→ e→ a]
Then A is a supportive argument for c, but not a strict argument. B is an
argument for b that is not supportive. C is a strict supportive argument for
a.
Now we can characterize the definite conclusions of defeasible logic in
argumentation-theoretic terms.
Proposition 2.2 Let D be a defeasible theory and p be a literal.
• D ` +∆p iff there is a strict supportive argument for p in ArgsD
• D ` −∆p iff there is no (finite or infinite) strict argument for p in
ArgsD
• D ` +Σp iff there is a supportive argument for p in ArgsD
• D ` −Σp iff there is no (finite or infinite) argument ending with a
supportive rule for p in ArgsD
Let’s use the above example to explain this:
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Example 2.12 For the theory D in Example 2.11 we have the following:
D ` +∆a
D ` +Σc
D ` −∆f(there is no strict rule with head f )
D ` −Σb(there is no strict or defeasible rule with head b)
An argument A attacks a defeasible argument B if a conclusion of A is the
complement of a conclusion of B, and that conclusion of B is not part of a
strict sub-argument of B. A set of arguments S attacks a defeasible argument
B if there is an argument A in S that attacks B. A defeasible argument A is
supported by a set of arguments S if every proper sub-argument of A is in S.
A defeasible argument A is undercut by a set of arguments S if S supports
an argument B attacking a proper non-strict sub-argument of A. That an
argument A is undercut by S means that we can show that some premises
of A cannot be proved if we accept the arguments in S.
Example 2.13 For the theory D in Example 2.11, the arguments A and B
attacks each other. The argument A is undercut by the set S = {⇒ f}:
• S supports the argument B
• B attacks a proper sub-argument Asub = [⇒ d⇒ ¬b] of A.
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The main purpose of argumentation semantics is to find out the justified
arguments/conclusions. Given the notion of “acceptable”, which we will
define later, we can define justified arguments and justified conclusions.
Definition 2.59 (Justified Argument) Let D be a defeasible theory. We
define JDi as follows.
• JD0 = ∅
• JDi+1 = {a ∈ ArgsD|a is acceptable w.r.t. JDi }.
The set of justified arguments in a defeasible theory D is JArgsD = ∪∞i=1JDi .
A literal p is justified if it is the conclusion of a supportive argument in
JArgsD.
That an argument is justified means that it is provable using the underlying
logic (+ tag). However, defeasible logic is more expressive, it is able to say
when a conclusion is non-provable (− tag). This is capture by the concept
rejected. Given the notion of “rejectable”, which we will define later, we can
define rejected arguments and rejected conclusions.
Definition 2.60 (Rejected Argument) Let D be a defeasible theory and
T be a set of arguments. We define RDi (T ) as follows.
• RD0 (T ) = ∅
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• RDi+1(T ) = {a ∈ ArgsD|a is rejectable by RDi (T ) and T}.
The set of rejected arguments in a defeasible theory D w.r.t. T is RArgsD(T ) =
∪∞i=1RDi (T ). We say that an argument is rejected if it is rejected w.r.t.
JArgsD. A literal p is rejected by T if there is no argument in ArgsD −
RArgsD(T ), the top rule of which is a strict or defeasible rule with head p.
A literal is rejected if it is rejected by JArgsD.
Note that it is possible for a literal to be neither justified nor rejected. The
situation is similar to defeasible logic, where we may have both D 6` +∂p
and D 6` −∂p.
Now we show how to modify Dung’s definition of acceptable argument in
order to suit defeasible logic with ambiguity propagation (grounded seman-
tic).
Definition 2.61 (Ambiguity Propagation Acceptable) An argument A
for p is “acceptable” w.r.t a set of arguments S if A is finite, and
1. A is strict, or
2. every argument attacking A is attacked by S.
A defeasible argument is assessed as valid if those arguments whose counter-
arguments have been undermined by arguments that have already been as-
sessed as valid. “Rejectable” is defined as
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Definition 2.62 (Ambiguity Propagation Rejectable) An argument A
is “rejectable” by sets of arguments S and T when A is not strict, and either
1. a proper sub-argument of A is in S, or
2. it is attacked by a finite argument.
Note that T is not used in this definition. An argument can be rejectable for
two reasons:
1. part of the argument has already been rejectable
2. there is a competing argument.
Example 2.14 For the theory D in Example 2.11, under grounded semantic,
the argument A is acceptable w.r.t. S = {⇒ d ⇒ ¬b} because S attacks B,
the only argument attacking A.
The argument ⇒ d ⇒ ¬b is rejectable by any sets S and T because it is
attacked by the argument B.
There is a match between justified/rejected conclusion and defeasible prov-
ability in ambiguity propagating defeasible logic.
Proposition 2.3 Let D be a defeasible theory, p be a literal, and T be a set
of arguments.
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1. D ` +∂app iff p is justified under grounded semantics.
2. D ` −∂app iff p is rejected by T under grounded semantics.
The following example demonstrate the concepts and the proposition.







RD0 (T ) = ∅
RD1 (T ) = {⇒ a,⇒ ¬a,⇒ b,⇒ a⇒ ¬b}
RD2 (T ) = R
D
1 (T ) = RArgsD(T ).
The conclusions a, ¬a, b ¬b are rejected, that corresponds to the non-derivability
results with the ambiguity propagating D ` −∂apa, D ` −∂ap¬a, D ` −∂apb
and D ` −∂ap¬b.
Next, we show how to modify Dung’s definition of acceptable argument in
order to suit defeasible logic with ambiguity blocking (defeasible semantic).
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Definition 2.63 (Ambiguity Blocking Acceptable) An argument A for
p is “acceptable” w.r.t a set of arguments S if A is finite, and
1. A is strict, or
2. every argument rebutting A is undercut by S.
A defeasible argument is assessed as valid if we can show that the premises of
all arguments attacking it cannot be proved if we consider valid the arguments
in S. The “rejectable” is defined as
Definition 2.64 (Ambiguity Blocking Rejectable) An argument A is
“rejectable” by sets of arguments S and T when A is not strict and
1. a proper sub-argument of A is in S, or
2. it is attacked by an argument supported by T .
The simple existence of a competing argument is not enough to state that an
argument is rejectable. The attacking argument must be supported by the
set of justified arguments.
Now the relation between justified/rejected conclusion and defeasible
provability in ambiguity blocking defeasible logic.
Proposition 2.4 Let D be a defeasible theory, p be a literal.
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1. D ` +∂p iff p is justified under defeasible semantics.
2. D ` −∂p iff p is rejected by JArgsD under defeasible semantics.
Again, we are using Example 2.8 to demonstrate the concepts and the propo-
sition.
Example 2.16 For the theory D in Example 2.8, under defeasible semantic,
we have
JD0 = ∅





RD0 (T ) = ∅
RD1 (T ) = {⇒ a,⇒ ¬a,⇒ a⇒ ¬b}
RD2 (T ) = R
D
1 (T ) = RArgsD(T ).
The conclusion b is justified, and a, ¬a, ¬b are rejected. That corresponds to
the results with the ambiguity blocking D ` −∂apa, D ` −∂ap¬a, D ` +∂apb
and D ` −∂ap¬b.
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It is worth noting the differences between defeasible semantics and grounded
semantics. In both cases the set of justified arguments is defined by Defini-
tion 2.59, but with different notions of acceptablility. Under the grounded
semantics, any argument attacking an acceptable argument A must be coun-
tered by an attack from S. Under the defeasible semantics the kind of counter
required is different: the counter-argument must attack a sub-argument, not
the conclusion, and the counter-argument need only be supported by S, not
be a member of S as in the grounded semantics.
There are similar differences in the definitions of rejected arguments. Un-
der the grounded semantics, an argument is rejected if it is attacked by any
finite argument. Under the defeasible semantics, an argument is rejected if
it is attacked by a (possibly infinite) argument supported by T .
The defeasible semantics justifies more arguments, but rejects fewer ar-
guments, than the grounded semantics. Thus, although both semantics are
fundamentally skeptical, the defeasible semantics can be considered more
credulous than the grounded semantics.
Proposition 2.5 Fix a defeasible theory D. Let A be an argument, and p
be a literal.
1. If A is justified under the grounded semantics then A is justified under
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the defeasible semantics.
2. If A is rejected under the defeasible semantics then A is rejected under
the grounded semantics.
3. If p is justified under the grounded semantics then p is justified under
the defeasible semantics.
4. If p is rejected under the defeasible semantics then p is rejected under
the grounded semantics.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, I have reviewed argumentation frameworks and non-monotonic
reasoning. Starting with abstract argumentation frameworks, I introduced
work on structured argumentation frameworks. In structured argumentation,
much of the focus is on the way that arguments are constructed from some
logic-based language. Early examples of such work are [47] and [52], and
the most influential argumentation structured system to date is ASPIC+,
as mainly discussed above. Within this broad categorization, one can dis-
tinguish three classes of argumentation system. First, there are systems like
[5] and [15] which are based on a variant of classical logic. Because the logic
defines the set of inference rules, an argument is defined as (just) a pair where
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the first item is a minimal consistent set of formula that proves the second
item (which is a formula). Attacks between arguments are then the result
of conflicts between propositions — for example where one argument asserts
that a proposition is true, and another asserts that it is false. The second
broad class of structured argumentation systems are those like DeLP [41],
ArgTrust [77] and ASPIC+ [60] where a logical language is augmented with
domain-specific inference rules. In such systems, the rules are considered
part of the argument, and in some systems it is possible to attack the appli-
cation of rules, recognizing another kind of conflict between arguments. The
final broad group of structured argumentation systems are assumption-based
systems, exemplified by [36], where some formula are explicitly identified as
assumptions that may turn out to be incorrect. Conflicts then center around
whether assumptions hold or not.
Gabbay [40] take the first step to characterize what a non-monotonic
system looks like. Kraus et al. [46], building on [40], identified a set of
axioms which characterize non-monotonic inference in logical systems, and
studied the relationships between sets of these axioms. Besides that, numbers
of non-monotonic systems have been introduced. Among those, defeasible
logic establishes significant links between reasoning in defeasible logic and
argumentation-based reasoning.
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In the following chapter, I will continue the line of work started in [23],




There has been increasing interest in formal argumentation in recent years.
While much work has concerned abstract argumentation, systems for rule-
based (or structured) argumentation are perhaps more interesting from a
knowledge representation perspective.
Work on structured argumentation similarly falls into two broad camps,
one which distinguishes strict and defeasible components and one which does
not. What has come to be known as “logic-based” argumentation, for ex-
ample [6, 15], builds the mechanism of argumentation on top of a classical
logic. Rather than encode defeasibility as in default logic, by stating the
exceptions to rules, logic-based argumentation allows any inference to be
questioned, for example by deriving the opposite conclusion. In contrast,
“rule-based” argumentation, including systems like ASPIC [67, 60] and de-
feasible logic programming [41] maintain the distinction between strict and
84
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defeasible knowledge, and handle those two kinds of rule differently. For ex-
ample, in ASPIC only the conclusions of defeasible rules can be challenged.
Amgoud et al. [3] was the original description of the ASPIC system,
which attempted to generalize existing structured argumentation systems.
As a result, most of the then existing systems could be considered to be spe-
cializations of ASPIC. However, the initial system was not without flaws.
Most importantly, [21] pointed out that ASPIC may lead to some non-
intuitive results, suggested that all argumentation frameworks must satisfy
three rationality postulates in order to avoid these anomalies, and showed
how ASPIC could be modified to satisfy them. [67] then presented an ex-
tension of ASPIC, called ASPIC+, which satisfies the rationality postulates
under a small number of restrictions. [2] and [69] provide further discussion
of the approach.
Modgil and Prakken [60] provided a modification of the ASPIC+ frame-
work, giving a more general structured framework for argumentation with
preferences. It is this version of ASPIC+ that is our starting point. [19] and
[84] presented some examples where ASPIC-like systems could lead to non-
intuitive results and gave solutions. Finally, [23] looked at a new variation
of ASPIC+ which still satisfies the rationality postulates while loosening
the restriction on rebutting attacks that ASPIC+ requires to satisfy the
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rationality postulates.
This dissertation can be seen as a continuation of the line of work started
in [23], one in which I study another variation of ASPIC+ in which only
defeasible elements are present. I call the defeasible only system as ASPIC+D.
There are two, related, reasons for our investigation. The first is to create a
simpler system than ASPIC+. As mentioned, the original ASPIC system
was intended [3] as a generalization of existing argumentation systems, and
this makes it complex. This complexity is inherited by ASPIC+. I believe
that all the complexity has its place, but is not always needed, and I wanted
to explore a system that was simpler to use and simpler to implement1.
Removing strict rules is one way to simplify ASPIC+, not only reducing the
number of different components of the system, but also removing constraints
like restricted rebut and the need to complete the knowledge base with the
transposition of every strict rule. The second reason is that strict rules are
exactly the component of ASPIC and ASPIC+ that lead to the anomalies
studied in papers like [21] and [23]. As a result, it seems worthwhile to try to
establish what exactly what one gains from including strict rules (and thus
having to deal with all the anomalies) by studying what one gives up by only
having defeasible rules.
1It is no accident that the system in [75] is exactly the system that I explore here.
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There are several research questions related to ASPIC+D argumentation
framework:
RQ1 Since ASPIC+D is an subset of ASPIC
+, do we lose any expressiveness
in removing the strict parts of ASPIC+ argumentation framework?
RQ2 Do the ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D versions of the same theory have the
same justified conclusions?
RQ3 What is the advantage, if any, of removing the strict elements from
ASPIC+D?
Modgil and Prakken [60] introduce the idea of well-defined ASPIC+ argu-
mentation frameworks. A well-defined ASPIC+ framework satisfies closure
under transposition/contraposition, axiom consistent and well-formed. All
well-defined ASPIC+ frameworks will satisfy the rationality postulates. Fur-
thermore, most research constrains ASPIC+ to be well-defined. Therefore, I
will start with well-defined ASPIC+ argumentation frameworks. Chapter 4
investigate the relationship between well-defined ASPIC+ argumentation
frameworks and its converted ASPIC+D argumentation framework, answer-
ing the three research questions when ASPIC+ is well-defined. Turning to
ill-defined theories, in general, ASPIC+ argumentation framework can not
handle the ill-defined cases. There are three sub-class of ill-defined cases: (1)
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not closed under transposition/contraposition; (2) axiom inconsistent; (3)
not well-formed. Chapter 5 investigates the first two cases in turn. For each
cases, I will give a way to make the ASPIC+ theories well-defined, and com-
pare the justified conclusions withASPIC+D theories, which will answer RQ2.
By investigating the relationship between ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D theories,
I will answer RQ1 and RQ3. The last cases will be discussed in Chapter 7.
After that, I answer the above research questions in a different way using
the non-monotonic axioms of [46]. As we know, reasoning argumentation
frameworks is non-monotonic. So I investigate whether or not the two argu-
mentation frameworks satisfy the non-monotonic axioms introduced in [46].
Chapter 6 considers a family of the consequence relation in the context of
argumentation-based reasoning, and describe which axioms are satisfied by
ASPIC+ theories and ASPIC+D theories under all of these consequence re-
lation.
Chapter 4
A Purely Defeasible System
In this chapter, we introduce a simpler system than ASPIC+, which only
contains the defeasible elements. By removing strict elements, we also remove
the constraints like restricted rebut and the need to complete the knowledge
base with the transposition of every strict rule. Intuitively, removing strict
elements may mean we lose expressiveness as well. In this chapter, we will
answer the question of whether we lose anything, and whether we have the
same justified conclusions under grounded semantics and other semantics, by
removing strict parts of a well-defined ASPIC+ system.
4.1 ASPIC+D: a purely defeasible system
In this section we introduceASPIC+D, a purely defeasible subset of ASPIC
+,
that is a subset of ASPIC+ which has no strict elements. The full definition
of ASPIC+D starts from a variation on the ASPIC
+ notion of an argumen-
89
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tation system where there are only defeasible elements:
Definition 4.1 (ASPIC+D Argumentation System) An argumentation sys-
tem is a triple ASD = 〈L,Rd, n〉 where:
• L is a logical language closed under negation ·¯.
• Rd is a set of defeasible inference rules of the form φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ φ
(where φi, φ are meta-variables ranging over wff in L).
• n : Rd 7→ L is a naming convention for defeasible rules.
Definition 4.2 (ASPIC+D Knowledge Base) A knowledge base in an ar-
gumentation system 〈L,Rd, n〉 is a set Kp of ordinary premises.
Definition 4.3 (ASPIC+D Argumentation Theory) An argumentation the-
ory ATD is a pair 〈ASD,Kp〉 of an argumentation system ASD and a set of
ordinary premises Kp.
Arguments in ASPIC+D are then defined as:
Definition 4.4 (ASPIC+D Argument) An argument A on the basis of an
argumentation theory 〈〈L,Rd, n〉,K〉 is:
1. φ if φ ∈ K with: Prem(A) = {φ}; Conc(A) = {φ}; Sub(A) = {A};
TopRule(A) = undefined.
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2. A1, . . . , An ⇒ φ if Ai are arguments such that there exists a defeasi-
ble rule Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An) ⇒ φ in Rd. Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪
. . . ∪ Prem(An); Conc(A) = φ; Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪
{A}; TopRule(A) = Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)⇒ φ.
Note the similarity to Definition 2.18, but also note that there are no strict
rules or axioms invoked in the definition, so there are no strict or firm
ASPIC+D arguments.
Since any ASPIC+D argumentation theory is an ASPIC
+ argumentation
theory with an empty set of strict rules and an empty set of axioms, we have:
Proposition 4.1 For a given language L, ATD, the set of all possible ASPIC+D
argumentation theories, is a subset of AT, the set of all possible ASPIC+
argumentation theories.
Proof Pick any ASPIC+D theory ATD ∈ ATD. By definition this is a pair
〈ASD,Kp〉 where ASD = 〈L,Rd, n〉. It is also an ASPIC+ theory AT ∈
AT where AT = 〈AS,Kp〉 (an ASPIC+ theory with no axioms) and AS =
〈L,Rd, n〉 (an ASPIC+ theory with no strict rules). Having made no specific
assumptions about the composition of ATD, the result holds for all possible
ASPIC+D theories. 
However, despite the fact that the set of all possible ASPIC+D theories is
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a subset of all possible ASPIC+ theories, we can translate any specific
ASPIC+ theory into a specific ASPIC+D theory. We demonstrate this by
defining a translation:
Definition 4.5 (Defeasible version) ASPIC+D theory ATD is the defea-
sible version of ASPIC+ theory AT = 〈AS,Kn ∪ Kp〉 where AS = 〈L,Rs ∪
Rp, n〉 iff:
• ASD = 〈L,Rd ∪ Rd′ , n′〉, where Rd′ = {φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ φ | φ1, . . . , φn →
φ ∈ Rs} and n′ is n extended to name all the rules in Rd′.
• ATD = 〈ASD,Kp ∪ Kp′〉, where Kp′ = {φ | φ ∈ Kn}
If ATD is the defeasible version of AT , we call ASD the defeasible version of
AS and write ATD = def(AT ) and ASD = def(AS). We call the set of rules
Rd′ that were strict in AT the set of converted rules, and the set of premises
Kp′ that were axioms in AT are the set of converted premises. The defeasible
version of an argument A ∈ A(AT ) is an argument AD ∈ A(ATD) such that
every axiom in A is replaced by the corresponding converted premise, and
every strict rule in A is replaced by the corresponding converted rule.
In other words, ATD is the defeasible version of AT , if every axiom of AT
becomes an ordinary premise of ATD, and every strict rule in AT becomes a
defeasible rule of AT , while all other components of AT are unchanged.
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Note that we will also use the term “translated rule” to mean “converted
rule”, as defined here, and the term “translated premise” to mean “converted
premise”. Note also that while the translation process allows for the naming
of the converted strict rules, so that they are treated exactly like any other
defeasible rule, no ASPIC+ theory AT will contain undercutters for such
rules, because they are strict, and so no ASPIC+D theory ATD that is the
result of translating AT will make use of the names.
Now, given a preference order  over the elements of an ASPIC+ theory
AT , we will need to specify the preference order D over the defeasible
version of the theory. One way to specify D is as follows in terms of the
pre-orderings over the rules and premises of ATD.
Definition 4.6 (Strict-first preference ordering) Given an ASPIC+ the-
ory AT = 〈〈L,Rs ∪ Rd, n〉,Kn ∪ Kp〉 and preference orders ≤ and ≤′ over
the defeasible rules and premises of that theory, the strict-first preference or-
derings ≤sf and ≤′sf over the rules and premises of the defeasible version of
AT , ATD = 〈〈L,Rd ∪Rd′ , n′〉,Kp ∪ Kp′〉 are such that:
• For every r, r′ ∈ Rd, r ≤sf r′ iff r ≤ r′, and for every k, k′ ∈ Kp,
k ≤′sf k′ iff k ≤′ k′.
• For any r ∈ Rd and any r′ ∈ Rd′, r <sf r′, and for every r′, r′′ ∈ Rd′,
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r′ =sf r′′.
• For any k ∈ Kp and any k′ ∈ Kp′, k <′sf k′, and for every k′, k′′ ∈ K′p,
k′ =′sf k
′′.
where r =sf r
′ if r ≤sf r′ and r′ ≤sf r, r <sf r′ if r ≤sf r′ and r′ 6≤sf r,
k =′sf k
′ if k ≤′sf k′ and k′ ≤′sf k, and k <′sf k′ if k ≤′sf k′ and k′ 6≤′sf k
In other words, all the elements of ATD that were defeasible in AT have the
same preference order as in AT , and all elements that were strict in AT are
strictly higher in the preference order than any element that was defeasible
in AT .
The notion of attack in ASPIC+D differs from that in ASPIC
+ in that
there is no restriction on rebut, and any rule can be undercut:
Definition 4.7 (ASPIC+D Attack) An argument A attacks an argument
B iff A undermines, rebuts or undercuts B, where:
• A undermines B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = φ for some B′ = φ ∈ Prem(B).
• A rebuts B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = φ for some B′ ∈ Sub(B).
• A undercuts B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = n(r) for some B′ ∈ Sub(B).
Of course, since there are no strict rules in ASPIC+D, were we to define rebut
as being restricted, it would make no difference to the attacks that were gen-
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erated. With these definitions, we can once again combine the definition of
arguments, attack relations and the preference ordering from Definition 2.21
to get notions of a structured argumentation framework and defeat that are
the same as for ASPIC+.
Now, much of this chapter is concerned with the relationship between
ASPIC+D and ASPIC
+. To begin to understand this relationship, consider
this version of Example 2.1:
Example 4.1 Consider the ASPIC+D argumentation system ASD which is
the defeasible version of the system AS in Example 2.1. We have the theory
AT4.1:
Rd = {a⇒ b; c⇒ d; e⇒ f ; a⇒ nd; d, f ⇒ b}
Kp = {a; c; e; e}
and n(c⇒ d) = nd. We can construct the arguments:
A1 = [a]; A2 = [A1 ⇒ b]; A3 = [A1 ⇒ nd];
B1 = [c]; B2 = [B1 ⇒ d];




1 ⇒ f ]; B = [B2, B′2 ⇒ b];
C = [e];
Compared with the attacks in Example 2.1, there is an additional attack here:
A2 rebuts B. With the same preference ordering  over arguments as in
Example 2.1 (A2 ≺ B;C ≺ B;C ≺ B′1;C ≺ B′2), the defeat relation remains
the same.
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Having introduced ASPIC+D and given some examples of its use, we now
consider some of the basic properties of the system.
4.2 Rationality postulates
Recall the rationality postulates introduced by Caminada and Amgoud [21].
The postulates are as follows:
Definition 4.8 (Rationality postulates) For an argumentation theory AT
and associated argumentation framework AF with a set of sceptical justified
conclusions C, and extensions, under a given semantics E1, . . . , En:
Postulate 1 (Closure) AF satifies closure, also called closure under strict
rules, iff:
1. Concs(Ei) = Cls(Concs(Ei)), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2. C = ClS(C)
Postulate 2 (Direct consistency) AF satifies direct consistency iff:
1. Concs(Ei) is consistent for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2. C is consistent
Postulate 3 (Indirect consistency) AF satifies indirect consistency iff:
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1. ClS(Concs(Ei)) is consistent for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2. ClS(C) is consistent
where Concs(·) denotes the conclusions of a set of arguments, and ClS(·)
denotes closure under strict rules.
Now we consider how ASPIC+D behaves with respect to the rationality
postulates. Without strict rules, two of the postulates follow immediately.
Proposition 4.2 (Closure under Strict Rules) The conclusions of any
extensions of an ASPIC+D theory are closed under strict rules.
Proof With no strict rules, the conclusion follows immediately. 
Proposition 4.3 (Direct Consistency) The conclusions of any extension
of an ASPIC+D theory are consistent.
Proof Suppose the conclusions of one of the extensions E are inconsistent,
i.e., there exist two arguments A,A′ ∈ E such that Conc(A) = Conc(A′). If
Conc(A) ∈ K, by Definition 4.7, then A′ undermines A. On the other hand,
if Conc(A) 6∈ K, by Definition 4.7, then A′ rebuts A. Either way, A′ attacks
A. Similarly, A attacks A′. According to Definition 2.28, at least one of the
attack relations is a defeat relation. Therefore, E is not conflict-free and thus
CHAPTER 4. A PURELY DEFEASIBLE SYSTEM 98
E is not an extension under Dung’s semantics. The contradiction defeats the
assumption of inconsistency and the result holds. 
Proposition 4.4 (Indirect Consistency) The closure under strict rules
of the conclusions of any extension of an ASPIC+D theory is consistent.
Proof With no strict rules, this follows immediately from Proposition 4.3.

Despite the triviality of two of the results, it is worth noting that there
are no restrictions on the semantics for which these results hold — they
hold for all the complete-based semantics. Thus ASPIC+D satisfies all three
rationality postulates without any limitation on the knowledge or rules in
a given theory. In contrast, while ASPIC+ satisfies all three rationality
postulates, this is under the condition that any argumentation theory is
well defined — that is it is axiom consistent and any strict rules that it
contains are closed under transposition. The requirement that strict rules are
closed under transposition means that, in order to ensure that the rationality
postulates are satisfied, anyone writing an argumentation theory in ASPIC+
has to carefully craft the set of strict rules to include all the rules implied
by closure under transposition1. There is no such restriction if ASPIC+D is
1Or must automatically complete the set of rules using some computer programs.
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used. Furthermore, since there is a defeasible version of any ASPIC+ theory,
translating that theory into ASPIC+D provides another route to ensuring
compliance with the rationality postulates. Thus in the sense of compliance
with the rationality postulates, we can argue that ASPIC+D extends what is
possible in ASPIC+2.
ASPIC+D has an additional advantage over ASPIC
+— since we don’t
have to modify ASPIC+D theories to make them conform to the rationality
postulates, we can avoid problems where ensuring rationality in ASPIC+
can change the conclusions of the original theory. Such a case is shown in
the following example:
Example 4.2 We start with theory AT4:
Rd = {a⇒ b; b′ ⇒ c; b⇒ d} Rs = {a′ → b′; b→ c}
Kn = {a; a′} Kp = {d}
We convert this theory into a rational one by making the strict rules closed
under transposition.
Rd = {a⇒ b; b′ ⇒ c; b⇒ d} Rs = {a′ → b′; b→ c; b′ → a′; c→ b}
Kn = {a; a′} Kp = {d}
2Of course, the validity of this extension hinges on the extent to which the ASPIC+D
version of an ASPIC+ theory generates the same conclusions, and we address this question
at length below.
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The arguments are:
A1 = [a] A2 = [A1 ⇒ b] A3 = [A2 → c]
B1 = [a
′] B2 = [B1 → b′] B3 = [B2 ⇒ c] B4 = [B3 → b]
C = [d]; C ′ = [B4 ⇒ d]
In the original theory, d was always a justified conclusion. However, in the
converted theory, d is a justified conclusion only if C ≺ C ′.
The point that this example illustrates is that making an arbitrary ASPIC+
theory rational — in the sense of making sure that it conforms to the ra-
tionality postulates — may require the addition of some strict rules. These
rules, in turn, may lead to conclusions that might be considered unintuitive
in the sense that they overturn conclusions of the unmodified theory. In the
example above, the addition of the strict rules means that under some circum-
stances d ceases to be a conclusion. We argue that even if ASPIC+ theories
are automatically completed to make them rational, this completion will en-
tail additional knowledge engineering to establish many conclusions and to
check that they make sense. Such work is not required when ASPIC+D is
used as the representation language.
4.3 Unrestricted rebut
Another issue to consider is the effect of moving to a system with only un-
restricted rebut. The original ASPIC framework [3] used unrestricted rebut
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— an argument could be rebutted by any argument no matter what the
TopRule was. However, [21] pointed out that unrestricted rebut may lead to
non-intuitive results — exactly those characterized by the rationality postu-
lates — and suggested using restricted rebut in order to make it possible to
apply complete-based semantics while maintaining rationality. Our results
show that in ASPIC+D one can use the complete-based semantics with unre-
stricted rebut, but before we examine how this is the case, let’s look at an
example that illustrates the problems with restricted rebut — this example
is taken from from [2].
Example 4.3 Consider the theory AT4.3 which makes use of the same lan-
guage L as before:
Rd = {a⇒ b; b′ ⇒ c} Rs = {a′ → b′; b→ c}
Kn = {a; a′} Kp = ∅
Note that this example is of an ASPIC+ theory that is ill-defined since it is
not closed under transposition. The arguments are:
A1 = [a] A2 = [A1 ⇒ b] A3 = [A2 → c]
B1 = [a
′] B2 = [B1 → b′] B3 = [B2 ⇒ c]
Because of the use of restricted rebut, A3 rebuts B3, but not vice versa, and
we get the attack and defeat in Figures 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) respectively.
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One can argue, as in [2], that the behavior that one sees in this example is
unintuitive since with one strict and one defeasible rule each, both arguments
might be considered to be in some sense equally strong, in which case pre-
ferring one over the other at the purely syntactic level is questionable3. The
next example shows how this problem goes away when using unrestricted
rebut in ASPIC+D:
Example 4.4 Now, consider the ASPIC+D version of AT4.3 from the previ-
ous example which we will call AT4.4. This is:
Rd = {a⇒ b; b′ ⇒ c} R′d = {a′ ⇒ b′; b⇒ c}
K′p = {a; a′} Kp = ∅
The arguments are the defeasible versions of the arguments of AT4.3 (note
that we give them the same names as their strict counterparts to simplify the
following discussion):
A1 = [a] A2 = [A1 ⇒ b] A3 = [A2 ⇒ c]
B1 = [a
′] B2 = [B1 ⇒ b′] B3 = [B2 ⇒ c]
The attacks and defeats between these arguments depend on the preference
3The idea that the two arguments are equally strong assumes that the strength of an
argument is affected by the strength of all of its components — for example by sum-
ming/averaging the strength of the rules, or using the weakest link approach — while
preferring the argument with the strict last rule is closer to a last link approach in having
a single rule determine the strength of the argument. Of course for strength to be a de-
termining factor, we have to be discussing which of two attacking arguments defeat one
another, and ASPIC+ does not even recognize an attack between A3 and B3.
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order over the arguments. Using a strict-first preference ordering and the
weakest link principle, the defeat relation will depend on the relative prefer-
ence of the two rules a⇒ b and b′ ⇒ c. There are three possible scenarios: (i)
(a ⇒ b) = (b′ ⇒ c)4, (ii) (a ⇒ b) < (b′ ⇒ c), and (iii) (b′ ⇒ c) < (a ⇒ b).
The results in all three cases are shown in Figure 4.1, attack relation in Fig-
ure 4.1(c), then the defeats in cases (i), (ii) and (iii) in Figures 4.1(d), 4.1(e)
and 4.1(f) respectively.
The point we want to make here is not that ASPIC+ is wrong in the way
it handles the example, but that the requirement to use restricted rebut
(which is required to meet the rationality postulates) forces a particular
outcome to the conflict between A3 and B3, and therefore restricts what can
be represented. ASPIC+D, since it adopts unrestricted rebut, is more flexible
and allows for a wider range of scenarios to be represented. Adjusting the
preference order over the rules makes it possible for either of A3 and B3 to
not defeat the other. Thus we can model situations in which c, c or neither
is a justified conclusion.
Next consider another example, from [23], of the consequences of using
restricted rebut.
Example 4.5 John: “Bob will attend conferences A and I this year, as he
4If r and r′ are two rules, r = r′ is defined as r ≤ r′ and r′ ≤ r
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(f) Defeat relation for
AT4.4, case (iii)
Figure 4.1: Attack and defeat relations for AT4.3 and AT4.4 from Examples 4.3
and 4.4.
has papers accepted at both.” Mary: “That won’t be possible, as his budget
of $1000 only allows for one foreign trip.” Formally, this discussion could be
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modeled using the argumentation theory AT4.4:
Rd = {accA⇒ attA; accI ⇒ attI; budget⇒ both} Rs = {attA, attI → both}
Kn = {accA; accI; budget} Kp = ∅
The statements translate into
John :[accA; accA⇒ attA; accI; accI ⇒ attI; attA, attI → both]
Mary :[budget; budget⇒ both]
In ASPIC+ or any other formalism based on restricted rebut, Mary’s ar-
gument does not attack John’s argument, since the conclusion Mary wants
to attack, both, is the consequent of a strict rule. As [23], points out, in
ASPIC+, if Mary wants to attack John’s argument, she can only do so by
attacking the consequent of a defeasible rule. That is, she would be forced
to choose to attack either attA or attI, meaning she essentially has to utter
one of the following two statements:
1. Mary’: “Bob will attend I, so can’t attend A; his budget doesn’t allow
him to attend both.”
2. Mary”: “Bob will attend A, so can’t attend I; his budget doesn’t allow
him to attend both.”
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The respective formal counter arguments are as follows:
Mary′ :[budget; budget⇒ both; accI; accI ⇒ attI; both, attI → attA]
Mary′′ :[accA; accA⇒ attA; budget; budget⇒ both; both, attA→ attI]
Critically [23], Mary does not know which of the two conferences Bob will
attend, yet using restricted rebut forces her to make concrete statements
about this. From the perspective of commitment in dialogue [83], this is
unnatural — one should not be forced to commit to things one has insufficient
reasons to believe in. This problem would go away if rebut was allowed to
be unrestricted since Mary’s argument:
budget; budget⇒ both
would attack John’s argument.
As the provenance of the previous examples shows, the issue of restricted
versus unrestricted rebut has been studied for a while. [24] raised three open
questions related to the use of unrestricted rebut:
1. Are there any non-admissibility based semantics whose entailment sat-
isfies the rationality postulates?
2. Are there any abstract argumentation semantics, apart from grounded,
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that satisfy the rationality postulates when applying unrestricted re-
butting?
3. In which way can the approach of value-based argumentation be re-
paired in order to yield consistent conclusions?
At the time [24] was published, none of these questions could be answered.
The work that has subsequently come closest to answering them is [23]. [23]
presented a system called ASPIC- which allows unrestricted rebut and can
satisfy all three rationality postulates. However, ASPIC- only satisfies the
rationality postulates when using the grounded semantics — using other
semantics causes the rationality conditions to be violated.
In contrast, ASPIC+D has no problems with satisfying the rationality
postulates with unrestricted rebut. Since rebutting is unrestricted natively
in ASPIC+D, Propositions 4.2–4.4 give us the following:
Proposition 4.5 (Unrestricted Rebut) Any ASPIC+D theory satisfies the
rationality postulates for all complete-based semantics when using unrestricted
rebut.
Proof Since, as discussed above, all rebutting in ASPIC+D is unrestricted,
Propositions 4.2–4.4 demonstrate that the rationality postulates hold for all
complete-based semantics when using unrestricted rebut. 
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ThusASPIC+D goes further thanASPIC- in extending the scope of reasoning
possible with unrestricted rebut.
Of course, the results in Propositions 4.2–4.5 are achieved by giving up
strict rules, and it is natural to ask what the consequence is for what can be
represented in anASPIC+D theory. We have already seen in Example 4.4 that
the use of unrestricted rebut in ASPIC+D gives some additional flexibility in
terms of what can be represented when compared withASPIC+. However, it
is equally important to ask whether using ASPIC+D, and hence being limited
to defeasible rules, means any restriction on what can be represented? This
is the subject of the next section.
4.4 The expressiveness of ASPIC+D
The results in this section begin to investigate the relationship between
ASPIC+D and ASPIC
+ with regard to what conclusions can be drawn from
theories expressed in both formalisms. In particular, we identify the condi-
tions under which we can take an arbitrary ASPIC+ theory and construct
an ASPIC+D theory with the same justified conclusions. This section begins
the work by limiting consideration to ASPIC+ theories that are well-defined
and hence rational.
We start, however, with results that hold for any ASPIC+ theory, ob-
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serving that:
Proposition 4.6 For a given language L, there is a defeasible version ATD
of any ASPIC+ argumentation theory AT .
Proof Consider the clauses of Definition 4.5 as a series of rewrite rules.
Any AT can be converted into its defeasible version by turning every axiom
into an ordinary premise and every strict rule into a defeasible rule. 
This means that whatever information we have in an ASPIC+ theory, we
can capture it in an ASPIC+D theory — we don’t lose the ability to repre-
sent information about the world by using ASPIC+D rather than ASPIC
+.
However, it is not just representing information that is important. The set
of arguments that can be constructed from a theory, and, in particular, the
justified conclusions of a theory are also important. We have:
Proposition 4.7 Given an ASPIC+ theory AT and its defeasible version
ATD, |A(AT )| = |A(ATD)| and for every A ∈ AT there is exactly one AD ∈
A(ATD) such that AD is the defeasible version of A.
Proof We show there is a 1-to-1 map between A(AT ) and A(ATD). For
each argument that is just a premise or an axiom A = [φ], we have AD = [φ]
that is just a premise; for each argument A = [A1, . . . , An ⇒ φ], we have
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AD = [A1D , . . . , AnD ⇒ φ]; for each argument A = [A1, . . . , An → φ], we
have AD = [A1D , . . . , AnD ⇒ φ]. 
Thus anyASPIC+ theory can be turned into anASPIC+D theory, and we can
generate the same number of arguments, but arguments that had strict com-
ponents will now only have defeasible components. Furthermore, there are
preference orderings such that the same preferences exist between ASPIC+D
arguments as between the corresponding ASPIC+ arguments:
Proposition 4.8 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT and its defeasible ver-
sion ATD where the preference ordering over ATD is the strict-first version
of the ordering over AT . Using the elitist weakest link principle, for any
A,B ∈ A(AT ), and AD, BD ∈ A(ATD), where AD, BD are the defeasible
versions of A and B , AD D BD iff A  B.
Proof Let AT = 〈AS,Kn ∪ Kp〉 and ATD = 〈ASD,Kp′ ∪ Kp〉. Consider
the preference order ≤ over rules in AT , and the preference order ≤′ over
premises. Let 〈≤D,≤′D〉 contain all the relations in 〈≤,≤′〉. Since AFD
has more defeasible elements than AF , we need to determine where these
elements fit in the ordering. With a strict-first ordering, the translated strict
rules/axioms have the highest preference ordering, and so the weakest links
in A(ATD) are not the translated strict rules/axioms. Furthermore, all the
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remaining rules/premises in ATD have the same preference ordering as in
AT . Therefore, under the elitist weakest link principle, ATD and AT have
the same preference ordering over arguments. 
Note that under the democratic weakest link principle, the defeasible versions
of arguments that contain strict rules are all equally preferred and are strictly
preferred to any argument that does not contain strict rules.
What the above result tells us is that using the elitist weakest link princi-
ple, we can take a set of ASPIC+ arguments, create the defeasible versions
of those arguments, and still have the same preference ordering as over the
original set of arguments. This allows us to work towards our first important
result: that if we adopt the grounded semantics we can construct a defeasible
version of a given well-defined ASPIC+ framework such that the justified
conclusions of both theories are the same. Note the focus on well-defined
ASPIC+theories — for the rest of this section, well-defined ASPIC+ theo-
ries will be our starting point:
Lemma 4.1 Consider a well-defined ASPIC+ theory AT and its defeasible
version ATD. If the preference order over A(AT ) and A(ATD) is the same,
then any extension of AT is an extension of ATD under the same semantics.
Proof From Proposition 4.7 we know that there is a one to one mapping
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between A(AT ) and A(ATD) such that for every argument in A(AT ) its
defeasible version is in A(AT ). In addition, we are told that the preference
order  over A(ATD) is the same as the preference order D over A(ATD).
Now, consider the attack relations att and attD over A(AT ) and A(ATD).
If (A,A′) ∈ att, then (AD, A′D) ∈ attD and there is an attack between the
defeasible versions of the arguments AD and A
′
D. However, attD can contains
more attacks. (AD, A
′
D) can be in attD when (A,A
′) 6∈ att iff (1) A′ is (just)
an axiom in AT or (2) A′ has a strict TopRule and the attack is not permitted
by restricted rebut. We now show, in turn, that these additional attacks do
not affect the extensions.
First, if A′ is an axiom, then A′D, which as alone premise that is the
defeasible version of an axiom, has the highest possible preference. Thus
it can only be defeated by an AD that has the highest level of preference.
Such an argument is the defeasible version of a strict and firm argument.
However, if A was strict and firm, AT would be ill-defined (it would have
two strict elements in conflict). Therefore, we have the same defeat relations
over A(AT ) and A(ATD) and hence the same extensions for AT and ATD.
Second, if TopRule(A′) is strict, there are two sub-cases that concern
us. (a) If AD ≺ A′D, the attack does not become a defeat. Thus AFD and
AF have the same defeat relation, therefore they have the same extensions.
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(b) If A′D  AD, then there is one more defeat relation over A(ATD) than
over A(AT ). We will show that this additional defeat relation has no effect.
Consider applying all the defeat relations except this additional one — there
are three possibilities for the labelling of A′D (that will be mirrored by the
labelling of A′ which does not have to contend with this additional defeat)
and for each of these, we have to consider all three possibilities for the status
of AD.
1. A′D is labeled IN. If AD is labeled IN, then AT has two IN arguments,
A and A′, and the conclusions of these arguments are in the set of
justified conclusions. However, since AD and A
′
D rebut one another, the
conclusions of A and A′ are contradictory, violating direct consistency.
Thus A and A′ cannot both be IN, and so neither can A′D and AD before
the application of the new defeat. If AD is labeled OUT then adding the
defeat relation (AD, A
′
D) has no effect. If AD is labeled IN, the situation
is more complicated. We start by noting that A will also be UNDEC, and
then consider how this can be the case. A has a strict top rule, so
A′ = [A′1, . . . , A
′
n → a] where the top rule is p1, . . . , pn → a. Similarly,
A = [A1, . . . , An ⇒ a] with a top rule q1, . . . , qn ⇒ a. By closure under
transposition, there exists a strict rule p1, . . . , pi−1, a, pi+1, . . . , pn → pi
in AT . Since A′D  AD, it is not possible for A′ to be strict, so A′ has
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at least one defeasible sub-argument, and hence a sub-argument with
a defeasible top rule. Lets assume that this is one of the A′1, . . . , A
′
n
that combine with the strict top rule, and call it A′i. Using the strict
rule from the transposition of the top rule, we get an argument B =




i+1. . . . , A
′
n → pi] which rebuts A′. B is A plus the
A′j, j 6= i, and the transposed strict rule. If A′1, . . . , A′n do not have
defeasible top rules, then we chain the corresponding transposed strict
top rule(s) to B to build an argument that attacks A′ further down the
argument tree until we get an argument, call it B′, which rebuts A′ on
its defeasible sub-argument. Now, A′  B′ since A′  A and B′ is A
plus some sub-arguments of A′ and a sequence of strict (transposed)
rules. Therefore B′ defeats A′. Moreover, any defeater of B′ must be a
defeater of A or A′. Next we consider the labeling. Since A′ is labeled
IN, all the defeaters of A′ are labeled OUT. Since A is labeled UNDEC, all
the defeaters of A are labeled OUT or UNDEC. Therefore, the defeaters of
B, which are the defeaters of A or A′, are labelled OUT or UNDEC. Thus
B is labeled IN or UNDEC. Since B defeats A′, A′ can not be labeled IN,
contradicting what we started with.
2. A′D is labeled OUT. Adding one more defeat relation (AD, A
′
D) has no
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effect.
3. A′D is labeled UNDEC. If AD is labeled OUT or UNDEC, then adding the
defeat relation (AD, A
′
D) has no effect. However, if AD is labeled IN,
then applying the last defeat relation means that A′D will now be labeled
OUT while A′, which does not have to contend with (A,A′), will be UNDEC.
So A′D cannot be initially labeled IN. If it is labelled OUT, the status of A
′
D
cannot change as a result of the additional defeat. If A′D is initially labeled
UNDEC, the status of A′D can change. However, by showing that A
′
D does not
defeat any other arguments we can show that this change does not affect the
justified conclusions. Consider an argument B ∈ A(ATD) that is attacked by
A′D. A
′
D cannot undercut B since the conclusion of A
′
D is not a “rule” (if
it were a rule, there would be no rebut between AD and A
′
D and there would
be no new defeat relation to consider). A′D can not undermine B since the
conclusion of A′D is not a premise because we know that A
′ and hence A′D has
a TopRule. So we can only be dealing with a rebut, and since we already know
that AD rebuts AD, B has to be an argument of which AD is a sub-argument.
Since A′D ≺ AD, A′D does not defeat B.
Thus, in all of these three sub-cases of (b), the additional defeat (AD, A
′
D)
has no effect on the status of the arguments in A(ATD), again there is no
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difference between the extensions of AT and ATD, and the result holds. 
What this tells us is that if we translate an ASPIC theory AT into its de-
feasible version ATD and then compute extensions, we will get all of the
extensions of the original theory. However, Lemma 4.1 leaves open the pos-
sibility that, in general, we will get some additional extensions beyond those
that we would obtain from AT . If we restrict ourselves to the grounded
extension, the extension of ATD (since it is the grounded semantics there is
exactly one) is also the extension of AT :
Proposition 4.9 Consider a well-defined ASPIC+ theory AT and its de-
feasible version ATD. If the preference order over A(AT ) and A(ATD) is the
same, then the grounded extension of ATD is the grounded extension of AT .
Proof Lemma 4.1 tells us that any extension of AT is an extension of ATD.
Since ATD can have at most one grounded extension, this must be the same
as the grounded extension of AT . 
We can also show this result directly. Moreover, the proof explains why the
extensions only coincide under the grounded semantics:
Proposition 4.10 Consider a well-defined ASPIC+ theory AT and its de-
feasible version ATD. If the preference order over A(AT ) and A(ATD) is the
same, then the grounded extension of ATD is the grounded extension of AT .
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Proof This is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.1. Consider the attack rela-
tions att and attD over A(AT ) and A(ATD). attD may contain more rela-
tions than att, and these relations have the following properties:
• (A,A′) ∈ att and (AD, A′D) ∈ attD
• TopRule(A) is a strict rule
• (A′D, AD) ∈ att, but (A′, A) 6∈ att
As the proof of Lemma 4.1 shows, if A′D < AD, then the additional at-
tack relation (A′D, AD) is not a defeat relation. Therefore, any extension of
ATD is an extension of AT . If A
′
D ≥ AD, ATD has more defeat relations
than AT , namely, (A′D, AD), and we have to show that taking out this de-
feat has no effect under the grounded semantics. Let AD = [A1, . . . , An ⇒
φ], Conc(A′D) = φ. Note that TopRule(A) is a strict rule, we can assume
Bi = [A1, . . . , Ai−1, A′D, Ai+1, . . . , An ⇒ Conc(Ai)]. So every two arguments
in {AD, B1, . . . , Bm} attack each other, and Bi  AD (since AD is a sub-
argument of Bi). There are three possibilities for the status of AD, we are
considering the three possibilities one by one:
1. AD is labeled IN. Then taking out the defeat (A
′
D, AD) has no effect.
2. AD is labeled UNDEC. If A
′
D is labeled IN or OUT, then taking out the
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defeat (A′D, AD) has no effect. If A
′
D is labeled UNDEC, and at least
one of the other defeaters of AD is labeled UNDEC, then taking out the
defeat (A′D, AD) has no effect. If A
′
D is labeled UNDEC, and all the other
defeaters of AD are labeled OUT, then it is impossible for AD to be labeled
UNDEC, and Bi to be labeled OUT(since Bi  AD and AD defeats Bi).
3. AD is labeled OUT. It is impossible for A
′
D labeled UNDEC. If A
′
D is labeled
OUT, taking out the defeat (A′D, AD) has no effect. If A
′
D is labeled
IN, then it may be possible that Bi are all labeled OUTunder preferred
semantic. And in this case, all AD and A
′
D are equally preferred, so
under the grounded semantics, they are all labeled UNDEC.
Overall, any extension of ATD is the extension of AT under the grounded
semantics. 
Let’s take a look at an example to see why ATD may contain more extensions
than AT under, for example, the preferred semantics. The following example
is based on Caminada’s tandem example [13], but is simplified to the case of
two, rather than three, conflicting arguments. (So, rather than being about
the impossibility of three people riding on a tandem, it could be about two
people riding on a bicycle with one seat.) The advantage of the simpler
example here is that it makes it clear than any conflict can lead to this kind
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of problem when translating into from ASPIC+ into ASPIC+D, it does not
have to be a three-way interaction.
Example 4.6 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT4.6:
Kn = {wa,wb} Kp = ∅
Rs = {a→ b; b→ a} Rd = {wa⇒ a;wa⇒ b}
where all the defeasible rules have the same preference ordering. Now we can
construct arguments:
A1 = [wa]; A2 = [A1 ⇒ a]; A3 = [A2 → b];
B1 = [wb]; B2 = [B1 ⇒ b]; B3 = [B2 → a];
And all the attacks are defeats. The defeat relations are shown in Fig-
ure 4.2(a). Now, let’s translate AT4.6 to the ASPIC
+
D theory AT4.6′:
K′p = {wa,wb} Kp = ∅
R′d = {a⇒ b; b⇒ a} Rd = {wa⇒ a;wa⇒ b}
Now we can construct arguments:
A1 = [wa]; A2 = [A1 ⇒ a]; A3 = [A2 ⇒ b];
B1 = [wb]; B2 = [B1 ⇒ b]; B3 = [B2 ⇒ a];









Figure 4.2: Defeat relations for ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D versions of the same
theory, as in Example 4.6.
With strict-first preference ordering, there are more defeats in AT4.6′ than
AT4.6 — the defeat relations for Both theories are shown in Figure 4.2(b).
As a result, there is a preferred extension {A2, B2} for AT4.6′ which is not an
extension for AT4.6.
Together Propositions 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 give us:
Proposition 4.11 Consider a well-defined ASPIC+ theory AT and its de-
feasible version ATD where the preference ordering over ATD is the strict-first
version of the ordering over AT . Using the elitist weakest link principle and
the grounded semantics, AT and ATD have exactly the same set of justified
conclusions.
Proof Proposition 4.8 tells us that the preference orders over the arguments
A(AT ) and A(ATD) will be the same, and then 4.9 and 4.10 tell us that AT
and ATD will have the same grounded extension. With the same extension,
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the justified conclusions of the two theories will be the same. 
In other words, there is a way of creating a defeasible version ATD of any
ASPIC+ theory AT so that the grounded extension of AT will coincide with
the grounded extension of ATD and the two theories will have exactly the
same set of justified conclusions. This situation is illustrated by the following
example:
Example 4.7 Consider that we start with the following theory AT4.7 which
uses the same language as before. This is AT4.3 closed under transposition
and hence well-defined:
Rd = {a⇒ b; b′ ⇒ c} Rs = {a′ → b′; b→ c; b′ → a′; c→ b}
Kn = {a; a′} Kp = ∅
Then we can construct the following arguments:
A1 = [a] A2 = [A1 ⇒ b] A3 = [A2 → c]
B1 = [a
′] B2 = [B1 → b′] B3 = [B2 ⇒ c] B4 = [B3 → b]
The attack relation is shown in Figure 4.3(a). Now we translate this frame-
work to the ASPIC+D theory AT4.7′:
Rd = {a⇒ b; b′ ⇒ c} R′d = {a′ ⇒ b′; b⇒ c; b′ ⇒ a′; c⇒ b}
K′n = {a; a′} Kp = ∅
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Then we can construct the following arguments:
A1 = [a] A2 = [A1 ⇒ b] A3 = [A2 ⇒ c]
B1 = [a
′] B2 = [B1 ⇒ b′] B3 = [B2 ⇒ c] B4 = [B3 ⇒ b]
The attack relations are shown in Figure 4.4(a). Now let’s consider the
different possible preference orderings over rules:
i) a ⇒ b = b′ ⇒ c5. Under the elitist weakest link principle, all the at-
tack relations are defeat relations, see Figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) and
Figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b). Here AT4.7′ has additional defeat relations,
but they are directed at arguments that are already defeated. Under
the grounded semantics, the set of arguments in the extension of both
theories is {A1, B1, B2}.
ii) a ⇒ b < b′ ⇒ c. Under the elitist weakest link principle, the defeat
relations are shown in Figure 4.3(c) and 4.4(c). Again AT4.7′ has an
additional defeat relation, but again it has no effect on the extensions.
Under the grounded semantics, the set of arguments in the extension
of both theories is {A1, B1, B2, B3, B4}.
iii) a ⇒ b > b′ ⇒ c. Under the elitist weakest link principle, the defeat
relations are shown in Figure 4.3(d) and 4.4(d). As before AT4.7′
5As before, A = B is defined as A ≤ B and B ≤ A
CHAPTER 4. A PURELY DEFEASIBLE SYSTEM 123
A1 A2 A3
B2B1 B3 B4




(b) The defeat relation for
AT4.7 in case i)
A1 A2 A3
B2B1 B3 B4
(c) The defeat relation for
AT4.7 in case ii)
A1 A2 A3
B2B1 B3 B4
(d) The defeat relation for
AT4.7 in case iii)
Figure 4.3: Attack and defeat relations for AT4.7 in Example 4.7
has additional defeats, but they have no effect. Under the grounded
semantics, the set of arguments in the extension of both theories is
{A1, A2, A3, B1, B2}.
For all the cases above, the justified conclusions of AT4.7 and AT4.7′ are ex-
actly the same.
The example shows exactly what Propositions 4.9 and 4.10 prove for
the general case. If we take an ASPIC+ theory AT , then we can convert
it — under the assumption of a strict-first ordering — into an ASPIC+D
theory ATD which — under the elitist weakest link principle — will have
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A1 A2 A3
B2B1 B3 B4




(b) The defeat relation for
AT4.7′ in case i)
A1 A2 A3
B2B1 B3 B4
(c) The defeat relation for
AT4.7′ in case ii)
A1 A2 A3
B2B1 B3 B4
(d) The defeat relation for
AT4.7′ in case iii)
Figure 4.4: Attack and defeat relations for AT4.7′ in Example 4.7
exactly the same grounded extension as AT . Hence ATD will have exactly
the same justified conclusions as AT under these conditions. As a result, we
can reasonably claim that ASPIC+D is capable of capturing exactly the same
information as ASPIC+— we can represent knowledge in such a way that it
gives the same conclusions
This equivalence does not hold for the preferred semantics for allASPIC+
theories (it only holds for a subset of all possible theories, for example those
with a single extension). A simple corollary of Proposition 4.10 is that:
Corollary 4.1 Consider a well-defined ASPIC+ theory AT and its defea-
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sible version ATD where the preference ordering over ATD is the strict-first
version of the ordering over AT . Using the elitist weakest link principle and
the preferred semantics, AT and ATD have the exactly same extensions iff
there is no argument A such that:
• TopRule(A) is a strict rule φ1, . . . , φn → φ; and
• ∃ A = {A1, . . . , An}, where Ai ∈ A and Conc(Ai) = φi; and
• ∀i, j such that Ai, Aj ∈ A, Ai  Aj and Aj  Ai.
This follows because the conditions in the Corollary are exactly those that
Proposition 4.10 identifies as the conditions under which ATD will not have
more extensions than AT .
What Corollary 4.1 states is that there is a way of creating a defeasible
version ATD of some ASPIC
+ theories AT so that the preferred extensions
of AT will be exactly the preferred extensions of ATD, and vice versa. These
will be the theories AT without arguments with strict top rules, or, theories
with arguments with strict top rules that have subarguments that are not
all equally preferred. However, the equivalence between an ASPIC+ theory
and its defeasible version that we established for grounded semantics does
not hold for all ASPIC+ theories under the preferred semantics6. So, it is
6Note that this is not what we argued in [50], though it does hold for some theories.
CHAPTER 4. A PURELY DEFEASIBLE SYSTEM 126
natural to wonder if we can recover this equivalence by altering some aspect
of the translation between an ASPIC+ theory and its defeasible counterpart.
Given the role of preference orders in the previous results, one way to do this
is by changing how we define the preference order over the resulting defeasible
theory.
The following definitions are extensions of the weakest link and last link
principles:
Definition 4.9 (Translated Weakest-Link Principle) Consider an ASPIC+
theory AT = 〈〈L,Rs ∪Rd, n〉,Kn ∪ Kp〉 and its defeasible version ASPIC+D
theory ATD = 〈〈L,Rd′ ∪ Rd, n′〉,Kp′ ∪ Kp〉. Let A and B be two arguments
in A(ATD). A  B iff:
• TopRule(A) 6∈ Rd′; and
• Premp(A)E Premp(B) and Rulesd(A)E Rulesd(B)
Definition 4.10 (Translated Last-Link Principle) Consider an ASPIC+
theory AT = 〈〈L,Rs ∪Rd, n〉,Kn ∪ Kp〉 and its defeasible version ASPIC+D
theory ATD = 〈〈L,Rd′ ∪ Rd, n′〉,Kp′ ∪ Kp〉. Let A and B be two arguments
in A(ATD). A  B iff:
In that paper we gave the result that taking an ASPIC+ theory AT , and converting it,
under the assumption of a strict-first ordering, into an ASPIC+D theory ATD would mean
that AT would have exactly the same justified conclusions as ATD under all semantics.
That result was wrong.
CHAPTER 4. A PURELY DEFEASIBLE SYSTEM 127
• TopRule(A) 6∈ Rd′; and
• Either
– LastDefRules(A) = LastDefRules(B) = ∅ and Prem(A)EPrem(B);
or
– LastDefRules(A)E LastDefRules(B).
In contrast to Definitions 2.23 and 2.25, which apply to any pair of arguments,
the above definitions are applicable to a theory which is the defeasible version
of an ASPIC+ theory. What Definitions 4.9 and 4.10 add is a check that
the final rule in A did not get translated from a strict rule7. This is not a
particularly elegant way to ensure that the justified conclusions of ATD are
identical to those of AT , but it is enough:
Proposition 4.12 Consider a well-defined ASPIC+ theory AT and its de-
feasible version ATD. Under either the translated weakest-link principle or
the translated last-link principle, and any complete-based semantics, AT and
ATD have the exactly same set of extensions.
7The way we have defined the translated weakest and last link principles are one way
to do this, there are others, but they all rely on being able to tell, somehow, that a given
rule is the translation of a strict rule so that any argument that ends with that rule can
be defeated.
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Proof From Proposition 4.7 we know that there is a one to one mapping
between A(AT ) and A(ATD) such that for every argument in A(AT ) its
defeasible version is in A(AT ). Now, consider the attack relations att and
attD over A(AT ) and A(ATD). If (A,A′) ∈ att, then (AD, A′D) ∈ attD and
there is an attack between the defeasible versions of the arguments AD and
A′D. However, attD can contain more attacks. (AD, A
′
D) can be in attD when
(A,A′) 6∈ att iff (1) A′ is (just) an axiom in AT or (2) A′ has a strict
TopRule and the attack is not permitted by restricted rebut. We now show,
in turn, that these additional attacks will not be defeats.
1. If A′ is an axiom in AT , then A ≺ A′, otherwise AT is ill-defined,
since the strict part is not consistent. Therefore, under the strict-first
version of the ordering over AT , AD ≺ A′D. Thus the additional attack
is not a defeat.
2. If TopRule(A′) is a strict rule, then the additional attacks are all re-
buttals — the result of turning strict rules into defeasible rules — and
so are preference dependent attacks. So we have to consider the pref-
erences of the arguments being attacked.
• if A ≺ A′, then A′D 6 AD under either the translated weakest-
link principle or the translated last-link principle, since the second
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condition of those principles are not met. Thus the additional
attacks will not become defeats.
• if A′  A, then A′D 6 AD under either the translated weakest-link
principle or the translated last-link principle, since the first con-
ditions are not met. Thus the additional attacks will not become
defeats.
Overall, the additional attacks relations will not be defeats. Therefore, AT
and ATD have the exactly same defeat relations, and hence the set of exten-
sions of AT and ATD will be the same. 
Because AT and ATD have the exactly same set of defeats, they will have the
same set of extensions under any semantics if we use the translated weakest
link principle or the translated last link principle, and hence the same justified
conclusions:
Corollary 4.2 Consider a well-defined ASPIC+ theory AT and its defea-
sible version ATD where the preference ordering over ATD is the strict-first
version of the ordering over AT . Under either the translated weakest link
principle or the translated last link principle, and any complete-based seman-
tics ATD and AT have the same justified conclusions.
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4.5 Summary
Now, what we have done in this chapter, is to introduce the purely defea-
sible system ASPIC+D and investigate the relations between ASPIC
+ and
ASPIC+D.
First, Propositions 4.6–4.8 show, in a straightforward way, that anyASPIC+
theory can be converted an ASPIC+D theory so that there is an equivalent set
of arguments, and this can be done in such a way that the same preference
ordering exists over the two sets of arguments. This answers the research
question RQ1.
Then, I investigate the relations between the conclusions that can be
drawn from a well-defined ASPIC+ theory AT and the ASPIC+D theory
ATD that is its defeasible version. We have
• For the grounded semantics, under the elitist weakest link principle and
strict-first preference ordering, AT and ATD have exactly the same ex-
tension and hence the same set of justified conclusions. This is formally
stated in Propositions 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11.
• For any complete-based semantics, under the elitist weakest link prin-
ciple and strict-first preference ordering, any extension of AT is an
extension of ATD. This is shown in Lemma 4.1. However, ATD may
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have more extensions than AT . An example of this situation is given
in Example 4.6.
• For any complete-based semantics, under either translated weakest link
principle or the translated last link principle, AT and ATD have the
exactly same set of extensions and hence the same set of justified con-
clusions. This is formally stated in Proposition 4.12 and Corollary 4.2.
Of these three results, I consider the first two the most important. The first
says that under the grounded and semantics and the (I think very reasonable)
notion of a strict-first preference ordering, the justified conclusions of an
ASPIC+ theory and its defeasible counterpart are the same. The second
says that under other semantics, while the defeasible version of a theory
will obtain all the extensions of the ASPIC+ original, it may also have
additional extensions. The, weaker, third result, shows how the extensions of
any well-defined ASPIC+ theory and its defeasible counterpart can be made
to coincide by placing additional conditions on the translation from original
to defeasible. This, then, means that the justified conclusions of the theories
will be the same. I consider this result to be weaker because, as noted above,
the last of these three results requires us to adopt a very specific preference
order, one that recalls which rules in ATD were strict rules in AT , effectively
CHAPTER 4. A PURELY DEFEASIBLE SYSTEM 132
recapturing the notion of strict rules whilst also making them defeasible8.
This answers the research question RQ2.
There are two points that should be bourne in mind when considering
this last result. First, there is no need for such a preference order if we adopt
the grounded semantics — under the grounded semantics AT and ATD will
have the same set of justified conclusions with a simple strict-first preference
order. Second, if we deal with semantics other than grounded, what we are
doing is replacing the special handling of strict rules that ASPIC+ requires
when identifying attacks (using restricted rebut) with the special handling
of some instances of attack when mapping them to defeat by manipulating
the preference order. Both are somewhat awkward. We would argue that
neither is more awkward than the other. And, of course, ASPIC+ needs to
use restricted rebut even when adopting the grounded semantics. Finally, we
argued that one of the advantages that ASPIC+D has over ASPIC- is that
ASPIC+D obeys the rationality postulates for all semantics while permitting
unrestricted rebut whereas ASPIC- only obeys the rationality postulates
with unrestricted rebut for the grounded semantics. This advantage is miti-
8Note that we do not show that this restriction is necessary to ensure that the justified
conclusions of any well-defined ASPIC+ theory and its defeasible counterpart are the
same, merely that this is a sufficient condition. We could not find a way of making the
justified conclusions of the two theories to coincide without this condition, but that does
not mean for sure that a weaker condition can’t be found.
CHAPTER 4. A PURELY DEFEASIBLE SYSTEM 133
gated somewhat by the fact that ASPIC+D only provides the same justified
conclusions as ASPIC+ for the grounded semantics unless one imposes the
special handing of once-strict rules which, in effect, re-restrict unrestricted
rebut. This answers the research question RQ3.
I will deal with case where the theory is ill-defined in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
Theories that are ill-defined
The previous chapter investigated the relationship between the conclusions
obtained from a theory expressed in ASPIC+ and that from the same theory
expressed in ASPIC+D. The results depend on the initial theory being well-
defined. We studied well-defined ASPIC+ theories because those are the
ones that “make sense” in ASPIC+, in terms of being guaranteed to con-
form to the rationality postulates. However, in restricting ourselves to only
consider ASPIC+D theories that correspond to well-defined ASPIC
+ theo-
ries sells ASPIC+D short. After all, all ASPIC
+
D theories are “well-defined”
in the sense that they satisfy rationality postulates. So, in this chapter,
we study ASPIC+D theories that correspond to ASPIC
+ theories that are
ill-defined. Since we already know the most important thing about these
ASPIC+D theories — that they are rational — we will continue to analyse
their performance against the corresponding ASPIC+ theories, especially in
134
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the case of ASPIC+ theories that are not closed under transposition, by
considering versions of those ASPIC+ theories have been made well-defined.
Given an ASPIC+ theory AT that is ill-defined, we will investigate the
relationship between the conclusions of a version of AT that has been made
well-defined, and the defeasible version of AT obtained by converting it into
ASPIC+D (which, as we also showed above, is always rational). Note that in
looking at the results of these two approaches to handling a theory that is
ill-defined theory, we are asking a lot of ASPIC+D— for the two approaches
to have the same conclusions, ASPIC+D must somehow obviate the effect of
the transposed strict rules. Looking at the differences, though, helps expose a
lot about what it means to make an arbitrary ASPIC+ theory well-defined.
Note also, that there is a simple way to ensure that an ASPIC+ theory
that is ill-defined does not have different conclusions from a corresponding
ASPIC+D theory. That is to first make the ASPIC
+ theory well defined
(for example by adding transposed strict rules), and then converting it into
ASPIC+D. In such a case, as Proposition 4.11 showed, under the grounded
semantics the justified conclusions of the two theories will be the same.
Given the definition of “well-defined”, there are two classes of ASPIC+
theory that are ill-defined, and which we study here; those that are not
axiom-consistent, and those which do not have a full set of transposed strict
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rules. Before doing that we note, in passing, that there are ASPIC+ theories
that are ill-defined but are rational, as in the following example.
Example 5.1 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT5.1, which is ill-defined:
Kn = ∅ Kp = {a, b}
Rs = {a→ b} Rd = ∅
where the two premises have the same preference. Now we can construct
arguments:
A = [a]; B = [A→ b]; C = [b]
Because of restricted rebut, the only defeat is (B,C), which is shown
in Figure 5.1(a). Therefore, the justified conclusions are {a, b} under any
semantics. This demonstrates that the theory is directly consistent, and,
since all the strict rules have been applied in arriving at these conclusions,
the theory is also indirectly consistent and closed under strict rules. Let’s
compare these results to those of the well-defined theory AT ′5.1 created by
closing AT5.1 under transposition:
Kn = ∅ Kp = {a, b}
Rs = {a→ b; b→ a} Rd = ∅
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Now we can construct arguments:
A = [a]; B = [A→ b]; C = [b]; D = [C → a]
The defeat relation is shown in Figure 5.1(b). The justified conclusion is
∅ under the grounded semantics, and {{a, b}, {a, b}} under the preferred se-
mantics. Finally, let’s consider the ASPIC+D version of AT
′′
5.1:
Kn = ∅ Kp = {a, b}
Rs = {a⇒ b} Rd = ∅
Now we can construct arguments:
A = [a]; B = [A⇒ b]; C = [b]
The defeat relation is shown in Figure 5.1(c). The justified conclusion is
{a} under the grounded semantics, and {{a, b}, {a, b}} under the preferred
semantics.
Despite the fact that theories like the one above can be rational while not
being well-defined, we will not consider this to be a separate class of theories
for the purposes of our work. Rather, they will be considered along with
irrational theories that are ill-defined.













Figure 5.1: Defeat relations for various versions of the same theory, as in
Example 5.1.
5.1 Theories that are not closed under trans-
position
Example 4.7 contains an ASPIC+ theory that is closed under transposition,
and so there is a guarantee that there is no inconsistency in the conclusions.
This is one situation in which the results in the previous section will hold, and
a situation in which an ASPIC+ theory and its ASPIC+D counterpart have
the same justified conclusions. This section looks deeper into the relationship
between ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D investigating what can be said about this
relationship for ASPIC+ theories that are closed under transposition.
5.1.1 The problem
We start with an example of a theory that is not closed under transposition:
Example 5.2 Again we consider the example in [60] which gives us the fol-
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lowing ASPIC+ theory. Here we will call this AT5.2:
Rs = {t, q → p}
Rd = {s⇒ t; r ⇒ q; a⇒ p}
Kn = ∅
Kp = {a; r; r; s}
then we can construct the arguments:
A′ = [a]; A = [A′ ⇒ p];
B1 = [s]; B
′
1 = [B1 ⇒ t];
B2 = [r]; B
′
2 = [B2 ⇒ q];




The attack relations are: C attacks B2, C attacks B
′
2, C attacks B; B2 attacks
C; B attacks A. Now, let’s assume the preference over defeasible rules and
premises as follow:
r ⇒ q < a⇒ p; r <′ r
a =′ r; s <′ r
By applying the weakest link principle, the defeat relations reduce to: B2
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defeats C. The justified conclusions are {a; p; s; t; r; q, p}, and these are not
consistent.
This problem, of course, is exactly the one that was pointed by [21], and which
led to the definition of the rationality postulates. As discussed above, the
solution suggested by [21] and implemented in ASPIC+ is to close theories
under transposition.
Let’s consider what happens when we do this to the example above:
Example 5.3 Add two more strict rules to the ASPIC+ theory AT5.2 of
Example 5.2, to get a theory we will call AT5.3. The new rules are:
p, t→ q
p, q → t
By applying the two new strict rules, we have two new arguments
A+1 = [B
′
1, A→ q]; A+2 = [A,B′2 → t]













2 . If the preference ordering is reasonable,





1 ; B2 defeats C; B defeats A
+
1 . The justified conclusions are then
{a; p; s; t; r; q} which are now consistent.
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These examples show how closing a theory under transposition “fixes” it,
making sure that the set of justified conclusions are consistent. However,
there is a downside to doing this, and before we continue, we will explore
this. In Example 5.2, we have an argument B whose TopRule is a strict
rule t, q → p, and another argument A is rebutted by B. By introducing
transposed strict rules, as in Example 5.3, we have two more arguments A+1
and A+2 , whose conclusions are q and t. Moreover, every pair of arguments of
A+1 , A
+





forms a complete graph.Therefore, at most one is justified. We can generalize
this to the following:
Proposition 5.1 In any well-defined ASPIC+ framework, for any argu-
ment A with a strict TopRule a1, . . . , an → a, if there exists an argument B
with conclusion a, then at most one of a1, . . . , an, a is justified.
Proof We denote
A = [A1, . . . , An → a]
Since the strict rule is closed under transposition, and there is a strict rule
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a1, . . . , an → a, therefore, we have the following strict rules:
a, a2, . . . , an → a1
a1, a, a3, . . . , an → a2
. . .
a1, . . . , an−1, a → an
Moreover, we can construct the following arguments:
C1 = [B,A2, . . . , An → a1]
C2 = [A1, B,A3, . . . , An → a2]
. . .
Cn = [A1, . . . , An−1, B → an]
We note that Ci rebuts Ai (and thus A and Cj, i 6= j ), A rebuts B (and thus
Ci). Thus every pair of arguments in A,C1, . . . , Cn attack each other. Thus,
at most one is in the extension. Therefore, at most one of a1, . . . , an, a is
justified. 
The reason we consider this to be a downside is that if we consider a1, . . . , an →
a in propositional logic, it means that a1∨, . . . ,∨an ∨ a. Thus, at least
one of a1, . . . , an, a must be true. In contrast, in ASPIC
+, at most one of
a1, . . . , an, a is justified, and so strict rules in ASPIC
+ clearly behave rather
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differently from the way that propositional logic handles material implica-
tion, which is the widely considered to be the natural way to model strict
rules in propositional logic.
5.1.2 Under the grounded semantics
Returning to the issue of handling ASPIC+ theories that are ill-defined, an
alternative method of ensuring that a theory is rational, rather than relying
on closure under transposition, is to translate the theory into ASPIC+D:
Example 5.4 Now consider the theory AT5.4, the defeasible version of AT5.2:
Rs = {}
Rd = {s⇒ t; r ⇒ q; a⇒ p; t, q ⇒ p}
Kn = ∅
Kp = {a; r; r; s}
From this theory, we can construct the arguments:
A′ = [a]; A = [A′ ⇒ p];
B1 = [s]; B
′
1 = [B1 ⇒ t];
B2 = [r]; B
′
2 = [B2 ⇒ q];
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where all the arguments except B are exactly the same as the arguments of
AT5.2, and B is the defeasible version of argument B from AT5.2. As a result,
this theory has all the attacks of AT5.2 — that is C attacks B2, C attacks B
′
2,
C attacks B; B2 attacks C; B attacks A — and one additional attack: A
attacks B. By applying the weakest link principle, the defeat relations are
B2 defeats C and A defeats B (in AT5.2 we only have B2 defeats C). The
justified conclusions are then the consistent set: {a; p; s; t; r; q}.
The two sets of justified conclusions of AT5.3 and AT5.4 (the two rational
versions of AT5.2) are not exactly same because AT5.3 has more rules than
AT5.4. (AT5.3 has the transposed strict rules and AT5.4 does not.) However,
if we translate AT5.3 into ASPIC
+
D— that is we create the defeasible version
of AT5.3 — the justified conclusions of AT5.3 and its defeasible version will be
exactly same under the conditions established in the previous section. The
attack and defeat relations are shown in Figure 5.3.
Examples 5.2–5.4 show the relationship between an ASPIC+ theory that
is ill-defined and two ways to make it rational (adding the transposition of
the strict rules and translating it into ASPIC+D) for a specific example. The
general situation is summarized in Figure 5.2 — given an ASPIC+ theory
that is ill-defined, the two mechanisms for ensuring1 it is rational have sets of
1We say “ensuring” advisedly — as Example 5.1 shows, a theory that is ill-defined







Figure 5.2: The relationship between the conclusions of ASPIC+ and
ASPIC+D theories. AT denotes an ASPIC
+ theory. Heavy arrows denote
inference from a given theory. Dashed arrows denote the creation of a de-
feasible version of a theory. The dotted arrow denotes the creation of the
transposed version of a theory.
justified conclusions that overlap, but which are not equivalent. In the rest
of this section, we characterize the arguments that will have the same status
whichever mechanism is used to rationalize an ASPIC+ theory. Once we
know which arguments have the same status, we can easily establish when
the sets of justified conclusions will agree.
To answer this question, we first need the following definition:
Definition 5.1 (Transposed version) ASPIC+ theory ATtr is the trans-
posed version of ASPIC+ theory AT = 〈AS,Kn∪Kp〉 where AS = 〈L,Rs∪
Rd, n〉 iff:
• AStr = 〈L,Rs∪Rd∪Rtr, n〉, whereRtr =
⋃
φ1,...,φn→φ∈Rs transpose(φ1, . . . , φn →
might be rational.




























































(f) Defeat relation for AT5.4
Figure 5.3: Attack and defeat relations for the argumentation theories AT5.2
from Example 5.2 (top row), AT5.3 from Example 5.3 (AT5.2 closed under
transposition, middle row) and AT5.4 from Example 5.4 (the defeasible ver-
sion of AT5.2, bottom row).
.
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φ) where:
transpose(φ1, . . . , φn → φ) = φ, φ2, . . . , φn → φ1
∪ φ1, φ, φ3, . . . , φn → φ2
...
∪ φ1, . . . , φn−1, φ→ φn
• ATtr = 〈AStr,Kn ∪ Kp〉.
If ATtr is the transposed version of AT , we write ATtr = tr(AT ). Note that
there are some ASPIC+ theories AT that are their own transposed version,
so that ATtr = AT . Such theories will be those with no strict rules, and
those which include all the transposed versions of every strict rule that they
contain.
Now, consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed under trans-
position. The defeasible version of AT+ is ATD, and the transposed version
of AT+ is ATtr. The defeasible version of ATtr is ATtrD. For any argument
A+ ∈ A(AT+), the corresponding arguments in ATD, ATtr and ATtrD are de-
noted AD, Atr and AtrD respectively. We then consider, in turn, the different
arguments that might be in ATtr and their relationship with the arguments
in ATD.
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Considering basic arguments which consist of only premises, we have the
following result:
Lemma 5.1 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed under
transposition, its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over
ATD is the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and its transposed
version ATtr. Under the elitist weakest link principle, for any argument
Atr ∈ A(ATtr) with defeasible version AD, if TopRule(Atr) = undefined and
Conc(Atr) is not the conclusion of any rule in ATtr, then AD and Atr have
the same status.
Proof Since there is no TopRule(Atr), the only possible attack on Atr is a
rebut. However, there is no rule with conclusion Conc(Atr) by definition, and
the only difference between ATD and ATtr is the existence of rules that were
added to ATtr to close it under transposition, therefore, AD and Atr have the
same status. 
This means that if the conclusion of Atr is a justified conclusion of ATtr, then
it is a justified conclusion of AD. Next, we consider arguments with strict
TopRules.
Lemma 5.2 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed under
transposition, its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over
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ATD is the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and its transposed
version ATtr. Under the elitist weakest link principle, for any argument Atr ∈
A(ATtr) with defeasible version AD, if TopRule(Atr) is a strict rule, and
Sub(AD) and Sub(Atr) have the same status, then AD and Atr have the same
status.
Proof Before proving the proposition, we need to define some additional
notation. We will write:
A+ :A
+















1 , . . . , A
trD
n ⇒ a
TopRule(A+) = a1, . . . , an → a
TopRule(AD) = a1, . . . , an ⇒ a
TopRule(Atr) = a1, . . . , an → a
TopRule(AtrD) = a1, . . . , an ⇒ a
Since ATtr is a well-defined ASPIC
+ theory, from Corollary 4.1, we know
that AtrD and Atr have the same status. Therefore, in the rest of proof, we
will only consider the status of ATtrD instead of ATtr. The only difference
CHAPTER 5. THEORIES THAT ARE ILL-DEFINED 150
between ATD and ATtrD is that ATtrD has more transposed rules like:
a1, . . . , ai−1, a, ai+1, . . . , an ⇒ ai
If we have no arguments with the conclusion a, then these transposed rules
cannot be used to generate attacks on AtrD, and so AD and AtrD, and hence
ATtr, have the same status. Now, we consider the case where we have an



















1 , . . . , B
trD
n ⇒ a
TopRule(B+) = b1, . . . , bn → a
TopRule(BD) = b1, . . . , bn ⇒ a
TopRule(Btr) = b1, . . . , bn → a
TopRule(BtrD) = b1, . . . , bn ⇒ a
Combining these with the transposed rules indicated above, we have a number
of additional arguments Ci:
CtrDi : A
trD
1 , . . . , A
trD
i−1 , BtrD, A
trD
i+1 , . . . , A
trD
n ⇒ ai
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Furthermore, the attack relations of ATtrD and ATtr are shown in Figure
5.4(a) and 5.4(b). Consider the 3 preference orderings in ATtrD and ATtr:
1. BtrD ≺ AtrD, from Proposition 4.1, we know that CtrDi ≺ AtrD as well.
The defeat relations for ATtrD and ATD are shown in Figure 5.4(c) and
5.4(d). The additional defeat relation (AtrD, C
tr
i ) has no effect.
2. AtrD ≺ BtrD, from Proposition 4.1, we know that AtrD ≺ CtrDi as
well in ATtrD. The defeat relations for ATtrD and ATD are shown in
Figure 5.4(e) and 5.4(f). If BtrD is labeled IN, the additional defeat
(CtrDi , AtrD) has no effect. If BtrD is labeled OUT or UNDEC, then C
trD
i
must be labeled OUT or UNDEC (BtrD is a sub-argument of C
trD
i , so all the
arguments which defeat BtrD defeat C
trD
i ). Thus the additional defeat
(CtrDi , AtrD) has no effect.
3. AtrD ∼ BtrD 2. The defeat relations for ATtrD and ATD are the same
as the attack relations, shown in Figure 5.4(a) and 5.4(b). If BtrD is
labeled IN in ATtrD, then AtrD must be labeled OUT in ATtrD. If BtrD
is labeled UNDEC in ATtrD, then AtrD cannot be labeled IN in ATtrD.
Therefore, neither AtrD nor BtrD is in the extension. If BtrD is labeled
OUT in ATtrD, then C
trD
i must be labeled OUT (for the same reason as
2AtrD  BtrD and BtrD  AtrD













Figure 5.4: Attack and defeat relations for ATtrD and ATD from the proof
of Proposition 5.2. (a) Attack relations for ATtrD and Defeat relations for
ATtrD in case 3, (b) Attack relations for ATD and Defeat relations for ATD
in case 3, (c) Defeat relations for ATtrD in case 1, (d) Defeat relations for
ATD in case 1, (e) Defeat relations for ATtrD case 2, (f) Defeat relations for
ATD case 2
the previous case). Therefore, the additional defeats (CtrDi , AtrD) and
(AtrD, C
trD
i ) have no effect.
Therefore, in all cases, AtrD and AD have the same status provided their
sub-arguments have the same status, and the same holds for Atr and AD. 
Finally — since arguments are either premises, or end with a strict rule or
end with a defeasible rule — we consider arguments with defeasible TopRule.
This case is similar to Lemma 5.1.
Lemma 5.3 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed under
transposition, its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over
ATD is the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and its transposed
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version ATtr. Under the elitist weakest link principle, for any argument Atr,
if TopRule(Atr) is a defeasible rule, Sub(AD) and Sub(Atr) have the same
status, and Conc(Atr) is not the conclusion of any rule in ATtr, then AD and
Atr have the same status.
Proof Since all the arguments in Sub(AD) have the same status as the cor-
responding arguments in Sub(Atr), there are no additional defeats on the
sub-argument of Atr. Therefore, the only possible additional defeat is due
to a rebut on the conclusion. However, there are no rules with conclusion
Conc(Atr), so AD and Atr have the same status. 
These results allow us to identify arguments from ATtr and ATD that have the
same status. Next, we will work through some examples where arguments
from these theories do not have the same status. First, let’s consider an
example in which an argument that only contains a single premise may not
have the same status in both the defeasible and transposed versions of the
underlying theory.
Example 5.5 Consider three theories, AT 5.5+ with premises Kp and rules
R, its defeasible version AT 5.5D with premises KpD and rules RD, and its
transposed version AT 5.5tr with premises Kptr and rules Rtr:
Kp = {a, c} KpD = {a, c} Kptr = {a, c}
R = {b→ c; b⇒ a} RD = {b⇒ c; b⇒ a} Rtr = {b→ c; b⇒ a; c→ b}
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We have the following arguments:
A = [a]; AD = [a]; Atr = [a];
B = [c]; BD = [c]; Btr = [c];
Ctr = [Btr → b]
Dtr = [Ctr ⇒ a]
In this example, BD and Btr have the same status, however, AD and Atr
do not have the same status if Atr ≺ Dtr. This illustrates a case where two
corresponding arguments with no TopRule, one from AT 5.5D and one from
AT 5.5tr , do not have the same status.
Next, we consider an example in which the TopRule is a strict rule, and the
two corresponding arguments do not have the same status.
Example 5.6 Consider three theories, AT 5.6+ with premises Kp and rules
R, its defeasible version AT 5.6D with premises KpD and rules RD, and its
transposed version AT 5.6tr with premises Kptr and rules Rtr:
Kp = {a, d} KpD = {a, d} Kptr = {a, d}
R = {a→ c; a→ d} RD = {a⇒ c; a⇒ d} Rtr = {a→ c; a→ d; c→ a; d→ a}
We have the following arguments:
A = [a]; AD = [a]; Atr = [a];
B = [A→ c]; BD = [AD ⇒ c]; Btr = [Atr → c];
C = [A→ d]; CD = [AD ⇒ d]; Ctr = [Atr → d];
D = [d]; DD = [d]; Dtr = [d];
Etr = [Dtr → a]
Assume a <′ d, then CD ≺ DD; Ctr ≺ Dtr; Atr ≺ Etr; Ctr ≺ Etr. Therefore,
BD is labeled IN, however, Btr is labeled OUT. This illustrates a case where
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two corresponding arguments, one from AT 5.6D and one from AT
5.6
tr , do not
have the same status and the TopRule of the argument from AT 5.6tr is strict.
Finally, we have two examples illustrating the case where the TopRule is a
defeasible rule.
Example 5.7 Consider three theories, AT 5.7+ with premises Kp and rules
R, its defeasible version AT 5.7D with premises KpD and rules RD, and its
transposed version AT 5.7tr with premises Kptr and rules Rtr:
Kp = {a, c} KpD = {a, c} Kptr = {a, c}
R = {a⇒ b; b→ c} RD = {a⇒ b; b⇒ c} Rtr = {a⇒ b; b→ c; c→ b}
We have the following arguments:
A = [a]; AD = [a]; Atr = [a];
B = [A⇒ b]; BD = [AD ⇒ b]; Btr = [Atr ⇒ b];
C = [B → c]; CD = [BD ⇒ c]; Ctr = [Btr → c];
D = [c]; DD = [c]; Dtr = [c];
Etr = [Dtr → b]
If a <′ c, then BD is IN, however, Btr is OUT. If c <′ a, then both BD and
Btr are IN. This illustrates a case where two corresponding arguments with
a defeasible TopRule, one from AT 5.7D and one from AT
5.7
tr , have the same
status and do not have the same status, respectively.
Example 5.8 Consider three theories, AT 5.8+ with premises Kp and rules
R, its defeasible version AT 5.8D with premises KpD and rules RD, and its
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transposed version AT 5.8tr with premises Kptr and rules Rtr:
Kp = {a, b, d, e, f} KpD = {a, b, d, e, f} Kptr = {a, b, d, e, f}
R = {a, b⇒ c; d⇒ b; RD = {a, b⇒ c; d⇒ b; Rtr = {a, b⇒ c; d⇒ b;
d→ e; a→ f} d⇒ e; a⇒ f} d→ e; e→ d; a→ f ; f → a}
We have the following arguments:
A = [a]; AD = [a]; Atr = [a];
B = [b]; BD = [b]; Btr = [b];
C = [A,B ⇒ c]; CD = [AD, BD ⇒ c]; Ctr = [Atr, Btr ⇒ c];
D = [d]; DD = [d]; Dtr = [d];
E = [D ⇒ b]; ED = [DD ⇒ b]; Etr = [Dtr ⇒ b];
F = [D → e]; FD = [DD ⇒ e]; Ftr = [Dtr → e];
G = [e]; GD = [e]; Gtr = [e];
H = [f ]; HD = [f ]; Htr = [f ];
I = [A→ f ]; ID = [AD → f ]; Itr = [Atr → f ];
Jtr = [Gtr → d];
Ktr = [Htr → a];
Assume that the labeling of AD, BD, CD is IN, OUT, OUT. If Atr, Btr, Ctr are
IN, IN, IN, then CD and Ctr do not have the same labeling. However, if
Atr, Btr, Ctr are OUT, OUT, OUT, then CD and Ctr do have the same labeling.
This illustrates a case where two corresponding arguments with a defeasible
TopRule, one from AT 5.8D and one from AT
5.8
tr , may or may not have the
same status.
Taking Lemmas 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 together, we have:
Proposition 5.2 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed un-
der transposition, its defeasible version ATD, where the preference order-
ing over ATD is the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and its
CHAPTER 5. THEORIES THAT ARE ILL-DEFINED 157
transposed version ATtr. Under the weakest link principle, for any argument
Atr ∈ A(ATtr) with defeasible version AD, we have the following:
1. If TopRule(Atr) = undefined,
(a) If Conc(Atr) is an axiom, then AD and Atr have the same status.
(b) If Conc(Atr) is an ordinary premise,
i. If Conc(Atr) is not the conclusion of any rule in ATtr, then
AD and Atr have the same status.
ii. If Conc(Atr) is the conclusion of a rule in ATtr, then AD and
Atr may not have the same status.
2. If TopRule(Atr) is a strict rule,
(a) If all the arguments in Sub(AD) have the same labeling as the
corresponding arguments in Sub(Atr), then AD and Atr have the
same status.
(b) If not all the arguments in Sub(AD) have the labeling as the corre-
sponding arguments in Sub(Atr), then AD and Atr may not have
the same status.
3. If TopRule(Atr) is a defeasible rule,
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(a) If all the arguments in Sub(AD) have the same status as the cor-
responding arguments in Sub(Atr),
i. If Conc(Atr) is not the conclusion of any rule in ATtr, then
AD and Atr have the same status.
ii. If Conc(Atr) is the conclusion of a rule in ATtr, then AD and
Atr may not have the same status.
(b) If not all the arguments in Sub(AD) have the same status as the
corresponding arguments in Sub(Atr), then AD and Atr may not
have the same status.
Proof The proof follows from the previous propositions and examples. 1(a)
follows because in a well-defined theory, every axiom is in the set of justified
conclusions; 1(b)(i) follows from Lemma 5.1; and 1(b)(ii) follows from Ex-
ample 5.5 which shows a case in which the status is different. 2(a) follows
from Lemma 5.2. 2(b) follows from Example 5.6 which shows a case in which
the status is different. Finally, 3(a)(i) follows from Lemma 5.3; 3(a)(ii) fol-
lows from Example 5.7 which shows a case in which the status is different.
and 3(b) follows from Example 5.8 which shows a case in which the status is
different. 
A more compact, but less explicit, way of stating the result in Proposition 5.2
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is:
Corollary 5.1 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed under
transposition, its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over
ATD is the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and its transposed
version ATtr. Under the weakest link principle, for any argument Atr ∈
A(ATtr) with defeasible version AD, then:
• If Conc(Atr) or any Conc(Sub(Atr)) is the conclusion of a rule in ATtr,
then Atr may not have the same status as AD;
• Otherwise, Atr will have the same status as AD.
Between them, Proposition 5.2 and Corollary 5.1 allow us to say for sure
which arguments will definitely have the same status inA(ATtr) andA(ATD),
and which may not. That is all arguments that neither have a conclusion
that is the negation of the conclusion of a transposed strict rule, nor include
a sub-argument with such a conclusion, will have the same status in A(ATtr)
and A(ATD), while any argument which does not meet these conditions may
not have the same status in A(ATtr) and A(ATD).
However, we can only make use of these results once we have constructed
the set of arguments A(ATtr). To try to improve on this, we can go a step fur-
ther and identify which subset of ATtr we can be sure will generate arguments
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that will have the same status as those from ATD. As the details of the proofs
of Lemmas 5.1–5.3 show, the reason that Atr and AD may have different sta-
tus is that Atr may be the subject of an attack by a transposed strict rule.
Bearing this in mind, we adapt notation from [22], defining AtomsR(R) to be
the atoms in a set of rules R but unlike [22] we distinguish between atoms
and their negations when we do this. Thus, if R = {a, b→ c; a, c→ d} then
AtomsR(R) = {a, a, b, c, d}. Similarly, we can define AtomsK(K) to be the set
of atoms in the knowledge-base K, and we can further define AtomsT (AT ) for
an argumentation theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉 to be AtomsR(R)∪AtomsK(K).
Then:
Definition 5.2 (Safety) Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ = 〈〈L,R+, n〉,K+〉
with a transposed version ATtr. We say that ATS = 〈〈L,RS, n〉,KS〉, such
that RS ⊆ R+ and KS ⊆ K+, is safe with respect to AT+ if AtomsT (ATS) ∪
{Conc(r)|r ∈ (Rtr −R+)} is consistent.
Thus a subset ATS of an argumentation theory AT+ is safe if the knowledge
base and rules of ATS are such that closing AT+ under transposition does
not lead to the knowledge base of AT+ having any rules added to it with
conclusions that are the negation of any atoms in ATS and which thus might
lead to attacks on arguments constructed from ATS. In other words, ATS
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is safe if closing AT+ under transposition does not open up any possible
new lines of attack on arguments from ATS because there are no atoms in
ATS that can be the subject of an attack from a transposed rule. Since
no argument in A(ATS) can be subject to any more attacks after closing it
under transposition, every AS ∈ A(ATS) will have the same status in the
transposed and defeasible versions of AT+. (That is the essence of a safe
subset.) This gives us:
Proposition 5.3 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ = 〈〈L,R+, n〉,K+〉
with a transposed version ATtr and a safe subset ATS. Any argument AS ∈
A(ATtr) will have the same status as its defeasible version AD.
Proof As established in Proposition 5.2, AS and AD have the same status as
long as AS is not attacked by one of the transposed strict rules. Now, since
ATS is safe, it does not include the contrary atoms that feature in any of the
transposed strict rules that are added to AT+ to close it. Thus AS cannot
suffer any additional attacks, and so must have the same status as AD. 
This leaves us in the following position. We use Proposition 5.3 to define
which parts of theory AT , which is ill-defined, will give use the same results
(the same arguments with the same status, and hence the same set of justified
conclusions) whether it is made well-defined by transposition or by creating
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its defeasible version. This will give us a rather conservative answer which
amounts to “you can’t have strict rules which reference any other propositions
in the theory”. Alternatively, we could use Proposition 5.2 or Corollary 5.1
which only flag up potential differences in status when there is an argument
that clashes with a transposed strict rule. As a result, there will be situations
in which Proposition 5.3 suggests a difference in status might exist when in
fact none exists and one would not be predicted by Proposition 5.2 and
Corollary 5.1. Such a situation is shown in Example 5.9. This will also be
the case for any theory which contains strict rules and is its own transposed
version because it already contains the transposed versions of every strict
rule. (We considered such a case above.) However, to apply Proposition 5.2
and Corollary 5.1, we need to construct all the arguments from the theory
which is unappealing from a computational perspective. Despite these issues,
we have done what we set out to: we have characterized exactly when our
two approaches to making a ASPIC+ theory well-defined — translating into
ASPIC+D and completing the theory under the transposition of strict rules
— will differ in terms of the conclusions that one can draw from the resulting
theories under the grounded semantics.
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Example 5.9 First consider the following theory AT 5.9+ :
Kp = {a, c} R = {a⇒ b; b→ c; a⇒ d}
In this case a safe subset of AT 5.9+ is AT
5.9
s where:
KpS = {a, c} Rs = {b→ c, a⇒ d}
The rule a⇒ b is not included because it conflicts with the conclusion of the
rule c→ b which is the rule that would be introduced were AT 5.9+ closed under
transposition. The result, as we want from a safe theory, is that A(ATs)
includes no arguments that will have a different status than the corresponding
arguments in A((ATtr)). A(ATs) makes sense in this case because the c in
the knowledge base might combine with the rule c → b to change the status
of the argument for b that uses a⇒ b. In the very similar theory AT 5.9:
Kp = {c} R = {a⇒ b; b→ c; a⇒ d}
a safe subset of AT 5.9 is AT 5.9s′ where:
Kp,S′ = {a} Rs′ = {b→ c; a⇒ d}
In this theory, a⇒ b is still excluded because it conflicts with the conclusion
of c → b, despite the fact that there is no way — given the knowledge base
— that an argument with conclusion b could be constructed. But there is no
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way of knowing this without constructing all the arguments. Of course, there
is another safe subset of AT ′, one which includes a⇒ b and excludes b→ c.
5.1.3 Under the preferred semantics
We have already established the relationship between the conclusions of
ASPIC+ theories that are ill-defined andASPIC+D theories under the grounded
semantics. In this section, we will discuss the relationship under the preferred
semantics and discuss how the results we give can be extended to other com-
plete semantics.
We start by considering a special case of the preferred semantics, when
the argumentation framework is relatively grounded. As described in Sec-
tion 2.1.1, if a framework is relatively grounded, the grounded extension
coincides with the intersection of the preferred extensions, and hence with
the sceptical preferred extension. For a structured argumentation system, we
can describe theories as being relatively grounded. As Section 2.1.2 shows,
from a structured argumentation theory, we can derive an argumentation
framework by constructing arguments and looking for attacks between them.
Then we can define a theory AT as being relatively grounded if the corre-
sponding framework AF = 〈A(AT ), att,〉 is relatively grounded. Then:
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Corollary 5.2 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed under
transposition, its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over
ATD is the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and its transposed
version ATtr. Under the weakest link principle, if ATtr and ATD are rela-
tively grounded, then for any argument Atr ∈ A(ATtr) that is in the sceptical
preferred extension with defeasible version AD also in the sceptical preferred
extension, it is the case that:
• If Conc(Atr) or any Conc(Sub(Atr)) is the conclusion of a rule in ATtr,
then Atr may not have the same status as AD;
• Otherwise, Atr will have the same status as AD.
Proof By definition, the sceptical preferred extension coincides with the
grounded extension, and by Corollary 5.1, the above conditions hold for the
grounded extension. Thus the conditions hold for the sceptical preferred ex-
tension. 
In other words, we can easily show that Corollary 5.1 holds for relatively
grounded theories under the preferred semantics.
Extending the results to more general theories is hard. Using the same
notation of AT+, ATtr and ATD, Example 4.6 has already shown that ATD
CHAPTER 5. THEORIES THAT ARE ILL-DEFINED 166
may have more preferred extensions than ATtr when AT+ is well-defined.
This makes it hard to compare the justified conclusions of the theories be-
cause such a comparison only makes sense between extensions that bear some
relation to one another (the same issue limited our ability to extend our re-
sults beyond the grounded extension in the previous section). We make a
slight change to Example 4.6 to show the same result for an AT+ that is
ill-defined:
Example 5.10 Consider three theories, AT 5.10+ with premises Kp and rules
R, its defeasible version AT 5.10D with premises KpD and rules RD, and its
transposed version AT 5.10tr with premises Kptr and rules Rtr:
Kp = {a, b} KpD = {a, b} Kptr = {a, b}
R = {a→ b; b→ a; c→ a} RD = {a⇒ b; b⇒ a; c⇒ a} Rtr = {a→ b; b→ a; c→ a; a→ c}
We have the following arguments:
A = [a]; AD = [a]; Atr = [a];
B = [b]; BD = [b]; Btr = [b];
C = [A→ b] CD = [A⇒ b] Ctr = [A→ b]
D = [B → a] DD = [B ⇒ a] Dtr = [B → a]
Etr = [A→ c]
In this example, there are two preferred extensions for AT 5.10tr — {Atr, Ctr, Etr}
and {Btr, Dtr}. However, there are three preferred extensions for AT 5.10D —
{AD, BD}, {AD, CD} and {BD, DD}.
In this case, then, the ASPIC+D version of AT+ has more extensions. Note
that there are two preferred extensions which, in some sense, correspond.
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That is {Atr, Ctr, Etr} corresponds to {AD, CD} because the justified conclu-
sions overlap, and {Btr, Dtr} corresponds to {BD, DD} because they have the
same justified conclusions. The following example demonstrates that ATtr
may have more preferred extensions than ATD.
Example 5.11 Consider three theories, AT 5.11+ with premises Kp and rules
R, its defeasible version AT 5.11D with premises KpD and rules RD, and its
transposed version AT 5.11tr with premises Kptr and rules Rtr:
Kp = {a, c} KpD = {a, c} Kptr = {a, c}
R = {b→ c; b⇒ a} RD = {b⇒ c; b⇒ a} Rtr = {b→ c; b⇒ a; c→ b}
We have the following arguments:
A = [a]; AD = [a]; Atr = [a];
B = [c]; BD = [c]; Btr = [c];
Ctr = [Btr → b]
Dtr = [Ctr ⇒ a]
In this example, if Atr and Dtr are equally preferred, there are two preferred
extensions for AT 5.11tr — {Atr, Btr, Ctr} and {Btr, Ctr, Dtr}. However, there
is only one preferred extension for AT 5.11D — {AD, BD}.
In this case, there is one pair of preferred extensions that correspond since
{Atr, Btr, Ctr} corresponds to {AD, BD}.
The above examples demonstrate that the number of preferred extensions
in ATD may be greater than or less than the number of preferred extensions
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in ATtr. Thus, in general, it is not the case that every extension of ATD has
a corresponding extension in the set of extensions of ATtr, and vice versa.
This, in turn, makes it hard to say anything about whether a particular
argument will be sceptically or credulously justified in both the defeasible
and transposed versions of some AT+. The best we can do is to give the
following results to illustrate the relations between particular members of
the set of the preferred extensions of ATD and ATtr.
Lemma 5.4 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed un-
der transposition, its defeasible version ATD, where the preference order-
ing over ATD is the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and its
transposed version ATtr. Under the weakest link principle, for any argument
Atr ∈ A(ATtr) with defeasible version AD, if TopRule(Atr) = undefined and
Conc(Atr) is not the conclusion of any rule in ATtr, then there exists a pre-
ferred extension ED of ATD and a preferred extension Etr of ATtr such that
AD and Atr have the same status.
Proof Since there is no TopRule(Atr), the only possible attack on Atr is a
rebut. However, there is no rule with conclusion Conc(Atr) by definition,
and the only difference between ATD and ATtr is the existence of rules that
were added to ATtr to close it under transposition, therefore there can be no
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additional attacks in ATtr beyond those in ATD and so AD and Atr have
exactly same defeaters. Thus, whatever the extensions are, there exists at
least one preferred extension ED of ATD and at least one preferred extension
Etr of ATtr such that AD and Atr have the same status. 
Lemma 5.5 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed under
transposition, its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over
ATD is the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and its transposed
version ATtr. Under the weakest link principle, for any argument Atr ∈
A(ATtr) with defeasible version AD, if TopRule(Atr) is a strict rule, and
Sub(AD) and Sub(Atr) have the same status, then there exists a preferred
extension ED of ATD and a preferred extension Etr of ATtr such that AD
and Atr have the same status.
Proof Recall that the difference between ATD and ATtr is that ATD has more
attacks generated by unrestricted rebut, while ATtr has more transposed rules,
which may generate more arguments, and these arguments will generate more
attacks. Thus either set of arguments may include attacks that the other does
not (which, in turn, is why we find it so hard to relate the status of arguments
from those two sets of arguments.) Recall also the notation in the proof of
Proposition 5.2. Here we are comparing ATD with ATtr. The attack relations
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of ATtr and ATD are shown in Figure 5.5(a) and 5.5(b). Consider the 3
preference orderings in ATtr and ATD.
1. Btr ≺ Atr. As in the proof of Proposition 5.2, since Btr is a sub-
argument of Ctri we know that C
tr
i ≺ Atr. The defeat relations for ATtr
and ATD are shown in Figure 5.5(c) and 5.5(d). The additional defeats
(Atr, C
tr
i ) have no effect.
2. Atr ≺ Btr. As in the proof of Proposition 5.2, since Ctri is constructed
from A and B we know that Atr ≺ Ctri . The defeat relations for ATtr
and ATD are shown in Figure 5.5(e) and 5.5(f). If Btr is labeled IN in
Etr, then the attackers of C
tr
i are:
• the attackers of Atr (attacks from Atri ); or
• Ctrj (i 6= j) (Conc(Ctrj ) is aj); or
• defended in Etr (Btr is labeled IN).
In all cases, either {Atr, Ctr1 , . . . , Ctrn } are all labeled OUT in Etr or there
are several preferred extensions where Atr is labeled OUT in at least one
of them. If Btr is labeled OUT or UNDEC in Etr, then all C
tr
i are labeled
OUT in Etr since Btr is a sub-argument of C
tr
i . The additional defeats
(Ctri , Atr) have no effect.



















Figure 5.5: Attack and defeat relations for ATtr and ATD from the proof of
Proposition 5.4. (a) Attack relations for ATtr and Defeat relations for ATtr
in case 3, (b) Attack relations for ATD and Defeat relations for ATD in case
3, (c) Defeat relations for ATtr in case 1, (d) Defeat relations for ATD in case
1, (e) Defeat relations for ATtr case 2, (f) Defeat relations for ATD case 2
3. Atr ∼ Btr. The defeat relations for ATtr and ATD are the same as the
attack relations, shown in Figure 5.5(a) and 5.5(b). If Btr is labeled IN
in Etr, then Atr must be labeled OUT in Etr. If Btr is labeled UNDEC in
Etr, then Atr cannot be labeled IN in Etr. Therefore, neither Atr nor
Btr is in the extension Etr. If Btr is labeled OUT in Etr, then C
tr
i must
be labeled OUT (for the same reason as the previous case). Therefore,
the additional defeats (Ctri , Atr) and (Atr, C
tr
i ) have no effect.
Therefore, in all cases, there exists at least one preferred extension ED of
ATD and at least one preferred extension Etr of ATtr where Atr and AD have
the same status provided their sub-arguments have the same status. 
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Lemma 5.6 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed under
transposition, its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over
ATD is the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and its transposed
version ATtr. Under the weakest link principle, for any argument Atr, if
TopRule(Atr) is a defeasible rule, Sub(AD) and Sub(Atr) have the same sta-
tus, and Conc(Atr) is not the conclusion of any rule in ATtr, then there exists
a preferred extension ED of ATD and a preferred extension Etr of ATtr such
that AD and Atr have the same status.
Proof Since all the arguments in Sub(AD) have the same status as the cor-
responding arguments in Sub(Atr), there are no additional defeats on the
sub-argument of Atr. Therefore, the only possible additional defeat is due
to a rebut on the conclusion. However, there are no rules with conclusion
Conc(Atr), so AD and Atr have exactly same defeaters. Therefore, there ex-
ists at least one preferred extension ED of ATD and at least one preferred
extension Etr of ATtr such that AD and Atr have the same status. 
Combining these results we have:
Proposition 5.4 Consider an ASPIC+ theory AT+ which is not closed un-
der transposition, its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering
over ATD is the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and its trans-
CHAPTER 5. THEORIES THAT ARE ILL-DEFINED 173
posed version ATtr. Under the weakest link principle, there exists a preferred
extension ED of ATD and a preferred extension Etr of ATtr such that for any
argument Atr ∈ Etr with defeasible version AD, we have the following:
1. If TopRule(Atr) = undefined,
(a) If Conc(Atr) is an axiom, then AD and Atr have the same status.
(b) If Conc(Atr) is an ordinary premise,
i. If Conc(Atr) is not the conclusion of any rule in ATtr, then
AD and Atr have the same status.
ii. If Conc(Atr) is the conclusion of a rule in ATtr, then AD and
Atr may not have the same status.
2. If TopRule(Atr) is a strict rule,
(a) If all the arguments in Sub(AD) have the same labeling as the
corresponding arguments in Sub(Atr), then AD and Atr have the
same status.
(b) If not all the arguments in Sub(AD) have the labeling as the corre-
sponding arguments in Sub(Atr), then AD and Atr may not have
the same status.
3. If TopRule(Atr) is a defeasible rule,
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(a) If all the arguments in Sub(AD) have the same status as the cor-
responding arguments in Sub(Atr),
i. If Conc(Atr) is not the conclusion of any rule in ATtr, then
AD and Atr have the same status.
ii. If Conc(Atr) is the conclusion of a rule in ATtr, then AD and
Atr may not have the same status.
(b) If not all the arguments in Sub(AD) have the same status as the
corresponding arguments in Sub(Atr), then AD and Atr may not
have the same status.
Proof The proof follows from the previous propositions and examples. 1(a)
follows because in a well-defined theory, every axiom is in the set of justified
conclusions; 1(b)(i) follows from Lemma 5.4; and 1(b)(ii) follows from Ex-
ample 5.5 which shows a case in which the status is different. 2(a) follows
from Lemma 5.5. 2(b) follows from Example 5.6 which shows a case in which
the status is different. Finally, 3(a)(i) follows from Lemma 5.6; 3(a)(ii) fol-
lows from Example 5.7 which shows a case in which the status is different.
and 3(b) follows from Example 5.8 which shows a case in which the status is
different.

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What this means is that, for any extension Etr in ATtr, if Etr does not contain
any arguments constructed using transposed rules, then there is an extension
ED in ATD, such that ED and Etr satisfy Proposition 5.4. The reason is
that any additional preferred extensions of ATtr are created by additional
transposed rules, and if all the arguments constructed by transposed rules
are labeled OUT, then there is a corresponding extension ED in ATD which
satisfies the conditions in Proposition 5.4. Similarly, for any extension ED
in ATD, if any subset of ATD is not one of the cases shown in Example 4.6,
then there is an extension Etr in ATtr, such that ED and Etr satisfy the
conditions in Proposition 5.4. The reason is that the only situation in which
ATD may have more preferred extension than ATtr is shown in Example 4.6.
If none of the subsets of ATtr contain this case, we know that every preferred
extension in ATD has a corresponding extension Etr in ATtr which satisfies
Proposition 5.4.
As any stable extension is a semi-stable extension, and any semi-stable
extension is a preferred extension, an analogous result to Proposition 5.4
holds for semi-stable extensions and stable extensions. Note that, the stable
extension does not always exist. Furthermore, it is possible that every pre-
ferred extension is a stable extension, so we cannot say anything more than
Proposition 5.4.
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5.2 Theories that are axiom inconsistent
Under the definition of a well-defined ASPIC+ theory, Definition 2.31, a
theory will be well-defined iff it is closed under transposition, and axiom
consistent. The previous section investigated the relationship between the
ways in which ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D handle theories that are not closed
under transposition. In this section, we will consider the other case that
makes ASPIC+ theories ill-defined — when they are axiom inconsistent.
An ASPIC+ theory is axiom inconsistent iff its strict part is not consis-
tent. In other words, there will be at least two strict and firm arguments
such that the conclusion of one is the negation of the conclusion of the other.
There are four ways that this can occur:
Definition 5.3 (Axiom Inconsistent Theory) Consider an ASPIC+ the-
ory AT . AT is axiom inconsistent iff there exist two strict and firm argu-
ments A and B in A(AT ), such that Conc(A) = Conc(B). This will be the
case iff one of the following cases holds:
1. Both A and B only consist of an axiom, i.e., TopRule(A) = undefined
and TopRule(B) = undefined
2. A consists of an axiom, B is constructed using axioms and strict rules,
i.e., TopRule(A) = undefined and TopRule(B) 6= undefined
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3. Both A and B are constructed using axioms and strict rules, i.e.,
TopRule(A) 6= undefined and TopRule(B) 6= undefined
Since strict and firm arguments cannot be attacked, the inconsistent axiom
and its negation will be justified conclusions of the theory. Thus the set of
justified conclusions will not be consistent, and so the theory is not rational.
However, if we convert the theory to its defeasible version, it will become
rational, since all ASPIC+D theories are rational. The main question for
us, which is analagous to the question we answered in Section 5.1, is the
following. Given an ASPIC+ theory AT+, which is axiom inconsistent, when
and how the justified conclusions differ between ATD, the ASPIC
+
D version
of AT+, and ATC , the version of AT that has been made axiom consistent?
Naturally this depends on how the inconsistency is resolved. We consider
three simple approaches which remove elements of AT+ that lead to the
inconsistency. Clearly any operator from the belief revision literature [42]
could be used here. The ones we choose, as we shall see, have the property
of aligning, in some sense, with the use of ASPIC+D.
Considering Definition 5.3, the first of these approaches is formalised as
follows:
Definition 5.4 (Belief Revision 1) The function BR1(·) converts an ax-
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iom inconsistent theory AT+ into an axiom consistent theory ATC = BR1(AT+)
if for every pair of strict and firm arguments A and B in A(AT+), such that
Conc(A) = Conc(B):
1. If TopRule(A) = undefined and TopRule(B) = undefined, then ATC =
AT+\{Prem(A), Prem(B)}
2. If TopRule(A) = undefined and TopRule(B) 6= undefined, then ATC =
AT+\{Prem(A), TopRule(B)}
3. If TopRule(A) 6= undefined and TopRule(B) 6= undefined, then ATC =
AT+\{TopRule(A), TopRule(B)}
Thus BR1(·) makes an axiom inconsistent theory AT consistent by removing
the elements that directly clash. If there is an axiom that is the negation
of the conclusion of a strict and firm argument, that axiom is removed. If
there is a strict rule with a conclusion that is the negation of a strict and
firm argument, then that rule is removed. Now:
Proposition 5.5 Consider an axiom inconsistent ASPIC+ theory AT+ and
its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over ATD is the
strict-first version of the ordering over AT+. Under the elitist weakest link
principle, for every pair of conflicting strict and firm arguments A, B ∈
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A(AT+), the corresponding defeasible arguments AD, BD ∈ A(ATD) will not
be justified under the grounded semantics.
Proof Call any two of the conflicting strict and firm arguments of A(AT+) A
and B. Without loss of generality, we assume there is no argument attacking
the strict sub-argument of A and B. (Such an argument would have to be
strict and firm since a defeasible or plausible argument cannot attack a strict
and firm argument.) If there is an argument C, where C attacks A′, and A′
is a strict sub-argument of A, then rename C as B and A′ as A, and continue
until neither A nor B has a attacking sub-argument. In ATD, we have the
defeasible versions of these arguments AD and BD, which attack each other,
and there are no other arguments attacking AD or BD. In addition, AD and
BD are equally preferred. Therefore, the only defeater of AD is BD and the
only defeater of BD is AD. Under the grounded semantics, therefore, both
AD and BD are labeled UNDEC. Furthermore, any argument that contains
AD as a sub-argument is defeated by BD, and any argument that contains
BD as sub-argument is defeated by AD. Since both AD and BD are labeled
UNDEC, the arguments with either AD or BD as sub-arguments are labeled
UNDEC or OUT3. The same holds for any other conflicting pairs of strict and
3If there are no IN attackers, the argument is labeled UNDEC, otherwise it is labeled
OUT.
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firm arguments A′ and B′. Thus the defeasible versions of all the conflicting
strict and firm arguments of A(AT+) will not be justified under the grounded
semantics. 
So any arguments in A(ATD) that are the defeasible version of conflicting
strict and firm arguments in A(AT+) won’t be justified. This establishes a
relationship between A(AT+) and A(ATD). We can go further:
Proposition 5.6 Consider an axiom inconsistent ASPIC+ theory AT+, its
defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over ATD is the strict-
first version of the ordering over AT+, and ATC = BR1(AT+). Under the
elitist weakest link principle, for every argument A in AT+ for which there is a
p ∈ Prem(A) but p 6∈ ATC, or for which there is a r ∈ R(A) but r 6∈ ATC, the
corresponding defeasible argument AD will not be justified under the grounded
semantics.
Proof Consider an argument AD which has a premise p ∈ Prem(AD) such
that p 6∈ ATC. This must be an element that was removed from AT+ by ap-
plying BR1. Thus, by Definition 5.4, ATD either contains p or an argument
with conclusion p. Both premise and argument, if they exist, will be at the
highest preference level (because in AT+ they were strict and firm), and so
AD will be UNDEC under the grounded semantics, and thus will not be justified.
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Now consider that AD includes a rule r 6∈ ATC. Again, since this was re-
moved by BR1, there is an attacking argument at the highest preference level
which rebuts AD on r. This time AD may be OUT (if it contains elements that
are not at the highest preference level), but whether it is UNDEC or OUT it will
not be justified. 
This says that although ATD includes the defeasible version of the knowledge
that made AT+ axiom inconsistent, this knowledge cannot be used to create
any arguments that are justified. So the effects of the inconsistency are
isolated — the result is the creation of some new UNDEC arguments. Indeed,
we can show:
Proposition 5.7 Consider an axiom inconsistent ASPIC+ theory AT+, its
defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over ATD is the strict-
first version of the ordering over AT+, and ATC = BR1(AT+). Under the
elitist weakest link principle and the grounded semantics, the justified conclu-
sions of ATD are the same as the justified conclusions of ATC.
Proof We know, from Proposition 4.7 that A(ATD) includes exactly one ar-
gument AD for each argument A+ of A(AT+), such that AD is the defeasible
version of A+. Furthermore, together Definition 5.3 and 5.4 tell us that the
difference between AT+ and ATC is that ATC does not contain the elements
CHAPTER 5. THEORIES THAT ARE ILL-DEFINED 182
necessary to create the conflicting strict and firm arguments of AT+ that lead
to AT+ being axiom inconsistent. So the difference between A(AT+) and
A(ATC) will be that A(ATC) does not include any A ∈ A(AT+) that includes
one of the elements that is in AT+ but not ATC. These elements are exactly
the premises and rules removed by BR1. Thus A(ATD) will include defea-
sible versions of all the arguments in A(ATC) and defeasible versions of all
the arguments in A(AT+) which include elements removed by BR1. Let’s
call the set of arguments which are the defeasible versions of the arguments
in A(AT+) − A(ATC) by the name ABR. Now, consider the justified con-
clusions of A(ATD) and A(ATC). Proposition 5.6 tells us that none of the
arguments in ABR will be justified under the grounded semantics, so they
won’t be responsible for any additional justified conclusions of ATD beyond
those of ATC. In other words, ATD has no justified conclusions that are
not justified conclusions of ATC. Furthermore, since all of the arguments in
ABR will be labelled OUT or UNDEC, any attacks that they make on other ar-
guments in A(ATD), arguments that are the defeasible version of arguments
in A(ATC), cannot prevent those arguments being IN. Thus ATC has no jus-
tified conclusions that are not justified conclusions of ATD. Thus the result
holds. 
Thus, under the grounded semantics, the justified conclusions of ATD are
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exactly same as the justified conclusions of ATC . This means that if we use
ASPIC+D there is no need to worry about axiom inconsistent theories — we
get exactly the same justified conclusions as if we had removed the source of
the inconsistency (albeit if the removal was done by BR1).
Now let’s consider the the sceptically preferred conclusions:
Proposition 5.8 Consider an axiom inconsistent ASPIC+ theory AT+ and
its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over ATD is the
strict-first version of the ordering over AT+. Under the elitist weakest link
principle, for every pair of conflicting strict and firm arguments A, B ∈
A(AT+), the corresponding defeasible arguments AD, BD ∈ A(ATD) will not
be in the sceptically preferred extension.
Proof This proof proceeds like the proof of Proposition 5.5. The only differ-
ence is that AD and BD will not be labelled UNDEC, rather there will be pairs
of extensions in one of which AD is IN and BD is OUT, and in the other of
which AD is OUT and BD is IN. This, of course, means that neither AD nor
BD will be in the sceptically preferred extension. 
Proposition 5.9 Consider an axiom inconsistent ASPIC+ theory AT+, its
defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over ATD is the strict-
first version of the ordering over AT+, and ATC = BR1(AT+). Under the
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elitist weakest link principle, for every argument A in AT+ for which there is a
p ∈ Prem(A) but p 6∈ ATC, or for which there is a r ∈ R(A) but r 6∈ ATC, the
corresponding defeasible argument AD will not be in the sceptically preferred
extension.
Proof This proof proceeds just like that of Proposition 5.6, except that cases
in which AD was UNDEC under the grounded semantics will now become cases
in which there are multiple extensions under the preferred semantics such
that AD is IN in some extensions and OUT in others. However, this means
that AD will not be in the sceptically preferred extension. 
Thus we have analogues of Propositions 5.5 and 5.6, and we can show that
none of the elements that cause the axioms to be inconsistent can be involved
in arguments that lead to sceptically preferred conclusions. We cannot, how-
ever, show that the sceptically preferred conclusions are the same for ATC
and ATD. Rather we can show that:
Proposition 5.10 Consider an axiom inconsistent ASPIC+ theory AT+,
its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over ATD is the
strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and ATC = BR1(AT+). Under
the elitist weakest link principle the sceptically justified conclusions of ATD
are a subset of the sceptically preferred conclusions of ATC.
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Proof As in the proof of Proposition 5.7, A(ATD) will include defeasible
versions of all the arguments in A(ATC) and defeasible versions of all the
arguments in A(AT+) which include elements removed by BR1. Again, we
will call the set of arguments which are the defeasible versions of the argu-
ments in A(AT+) − A(ATC) by the name ABR. Now, consider the justified
conclusions of A(ATD) and A(ATC). Proposition 5.9 tells us that none of
the arguments in ABR will be in the sceptically justified extension. In other
words, ATD has no arguments in its sceptically justified extension that are not
in the sceptically justified extension of ATC. Now (and here we diverge from
the line of proof of Proposition 5.7), the arguments in ABR will be labelled
IN in some preferred extensions. (As we know from before, such arguments
come in mutually attacking pairs, and each one will be IN in at least one
preferred extension.) When such arguments are IN, any attacks that they
make on other arguments in A(ATD), arguments that are the defeasible ver-
sion of arguments in A(ATC), may make those arguments OUT when their
counterparts in all the preferred extensions of ATC are IN. Thus there may
be arguments in A(ATD) that are not in the sceptically justified extension
of ATD but whose counterparts are in the sceptically justified extension of
ATC. Thus the sceptically justified conclusions of ATD are a subset of the
sceptically justified conclusions of ATC. 
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Thus, unlike the case for the grounded semantics, if we translate a theory
with inconsistent axioms, AT+, into the ASPIC
+
D theory ATD, we will get a
different set of (sceptically) justified conclusions than if we revise the theory
with BR1(·) to remove the inconsistency. Given what we already know about
justified conclusions and ASPIC+D, this is not a surprise, but it is helpful to
know that the difference arises because while ATD will not have any more
justified conclusions than the revised theory (which we might take as a form
of soundness result), it might not be able to draw all the same conclusions
(a kind of incompleteness).
However, if we use a different function for belief revision, it turns out that
we will be able to draw the same sceptically justified conclusions from AT+
and ATD. We define:
Definition 5.5 (Belief Revision 2) The function BR2(·) converts an ax-
iom inconsistent theory AT+ into an axiom consistent theory ATC = BR2(AT+)
if for every pair of strict and firm arguments A and B in A(AT+), such that
Conc(A) = Conc(B), ATC = AT+\(RA ∪RB ∪ KA ∪ KB):
1. RA = {r ∈ R|conc(r) = Conc(A)}
2. RB = {r ∈ R|conc(r) = Conc(B)}
3. KA = {p ∈ K|p = Conc(A)}
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4. KB = {p ∈ K|p = Conc(B)}
where conc(r) denotes the conclusion of the rule r.
The difference between BR2(·) and BR1(·) is that BR1(·) removes just the
strict elements that conflict, whereas BR2(·) is less conservative and also
removes any defeasible elements (premises or rules) with the same conclusion
as either of the strict elements. We then have:
Proposition 5.11 Consider an axiom inconsistent ASPIC+ theory AT+,
its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over ATD is the
strict-first version of the ordering over AT+, and ATC = BR2(AT+). Under
the elitist weakest link principle, the sceptically justified conclusions of ATD
are same as the sceptically justified conclusions of ATC.
Proof The proof again starts like that of Proposition 5.7. We know, from
Proposition 4.7 that A(ATD) includes exactly one argument AD for each
argument A+ of A(AT+), such that AD is the defeasible version of A+. Fur-
thermore, together Definition 5.3 and 5.5 tell us that the difference between
AT+ and ATC is that ATC does not contain the strict elements necessary to
create the conflicting strict and firm arguments of AT+ that lead to AT+ being
axiom inconsistent, or any defeasible elements that have the same conclusions
as these strict elements. The difference between A(AT+) and A(ATC) will be
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that A(ATC) does not include any A ∈ A(AT+) that includes one of the ele-
ments that is in AT+ but not ATC. These elements are exactly the premises
and rules removed by BR2. Thus A(ATD) will include defeasible versions
of all the arguments in A(ATC) and defeasible versions of all the arguments
in A(AT+) which include elements removed by BR2. Clearly any differences
between the sceptically justified conclusions of ATD and ATC are going to be
down to the arguments that are constructed from these elements. Consider,
then an argument AD which has a premise p ∈ Prem(AD) such that p 6∈ ATC.
This premise p must be an element that was removed from AT+ by applying
BR2. Thus, by Definition 5.5, ATD either contains at least one premise p
or at least one argument with conclusion p (there may be several, because
BR2(·) removes all such premises and rules). Now, of these premises and
arguments that are not in ATC but whose defeasible version(s) are in ATD,
at least one will be at the highest preference level (because in AT+ it was
included in a strict and firm argument), and so AD will be defeated and thus
will not be in the sceptically justified conclusions. The same holds for an AD
which includes a rule r that is not in ATC. In other words, ATD has no
arguments in its sceptically justified extension that are not in the sceptically
justified extension of ATC.
That gives us one half of the result. To get the other half we have to con-
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sider whether there are any arguments in the sceptically justified conclusions
of ATC that are not in the sceptically justified conclusions of ATD. If we,
as before, call the set of arguments which are the defeasible versions of the
arguments in A(AT+)−A(ATC) by the name ABR, then we are considering
if any of the arguments in ABR defeat any of the arguments in the defeasible
version of A(ATC). In theory, this might happen (as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 5.10) because there are arguments ABR in ABR which are labeled IN in
some preferred extensions and so force some other arguments A′D, that are
not in ABR, to be OUT in those extensions, while there are also extensions in
which ABR are OUT, and so A
′
D are IN. (In such a case, neither the ABR
nor the A′D will be in the sceptically preferred extension of ATD, but the non-
defeasible versions of the A′D will be in the sceptically preferred extension of
ATC . However, in this case, we can show that any argument in ABR will
not attack any argument in A(ATD), since:
• for any argument ABR ∈ ABR, there is no argument in A(ATC) which
has the conclusion Conc(ABR), since BR2(·) removed any such ABR
from ATC. So ABR does not rebut or undermine any argument in the
defeasible version of A(ATC).
• for any argument ABR ∈ ABR, Conc(ABR) is not the name of a defeasi-
CHAPTER 5. THEORIES THAT ARE ILL-DEFINED 190
ble rule since names are not subject to the revision function. Thus ABR
does not undercut any argument in the defeasible version of A(ATC).
Thus there are no sceptically justified conclusions of ATC that are not scep-
tically justified conclusions of ATD, and the result holds. 
So the advantage of using the less conservative revision operator BR2(·)
is that the revised theory ATC has exactly the same sceptically justified
conclusions as the defeasible version of the original theory ATD.
Given the above, we have revision operators for an axiom inconsistent
theory AT+ that will create axiom consistent theories ATC which have the
same justified conclusions as the defeasible version of AT+ whether “justified
conclusion” is determined using the grounded extension or the sceptically
preferred extension. A natural question to ask is whether there is a revi-
sion function that has a similar alignment with the preferred extensions. It
turns out that there is. We call the function BR3(·). Whereas BR1(·) and
BR2(·) revise AT+ by removing all the conflicting elements to create a single
axiom-consistent theory, the idea is that for each conflicting pair of elements
BR3(·) creates a pair of theories, each of which contains one of the conflicting
elements:
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Definition 5.6 (Belief Revision, Pairwise) The function BR∗(·) converts
an axiom inconsistent theory AT+ into a pair of theories AT
′ and AT ′′:
BR∗(AT+) = {AT ′, AT ′′}
such that for a pair of strict and firm arguments A and B in A(AT+), where
Conc(A) = Conc(B):
1. If TopRule(A) = undefined and TopRule(B) = undefined, then AT ′ =
AT\{Prem(A)} and AT ′′ = AT\{Prem(B)}
2. If TopRule(A) = undefined and TopRule(B) 6= undefined, then AT ′ =
AT\{Prem(A)} and AT ′′ = AT\{TopRule(B)}
3. If TopRule(A) 6= undefined and TopRule(B) 6= undefined, then AT ′ =
AT\{TopRule(A)} and AT ′′ = AT\{TopRule(B)}
Of course, AT+ may be axiom inconsistent in such a way that just resolving
one conflict between two strict arguments is not enough to render it axiom
consistent, so we need to apply BR∗(·) to the source of every conflict:
Definition 5.7 (Belief Revision 3) The function BR+(·) : AT 7→ AT,
where AT denotes a set of argumentation theories, is defined as:
BR+(AT ) =
{
BR∗(AT ) if AT is axiom inconsistent,
{AT}, otherwise
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BR3(·) is then the fixpoint combinator for BR#:
BR3(AT ) = BR#(BR#(BR#(. . . BR#({AT}) . . .)))
Thus BR+(AT ) returns AT if AT is axiom consistent, otherwise it returns
the two argumentation theories generated by BR∗(·); BR#(·) applies BR+(·)
to every argumentation theory in a set of argumentation theories; and BR3(·)
applies BR+(·) until one element from each of the conflicts caused by axiom
inconsistency has been removed. (At this point applying BR+(·) will not
cause the ouput to change and the fixpoint will have been reached.) After
BR3(·) has been applied to an axiom inconsistent theory AT+ with n con-
flicts, the result will be a set of 2n theories {ATi}, such that A(ATi) contains
one strict argument from each of the n conflicts.
Given this definition of BR3(·), we can relate the extensions of ATD and
ATC . However, since ATD is the defeasible version of AT+, their extensions
(and by extension, the extensions of ATC) do not involve the same arguments
— the extensions of ATD will involve the defeasible versions of the arguments
in the extensions of AT+. As a result, to make comparisons, we need the
notion of one extension ED being the defeasible version of an extension E.
CHAPTER 5. THEORIES THAT ARE ILL-DEFINED 193
This idea follows from Definition 4.5 and associated definitions of the term
“defeasible version” applying to theories and arguments:
Definition 5.8 (Defeasible Version of an Extension) Given two exten-
sions, E and ED, ED is the defeasible version of E, iff for every argument
A ∈ E, there is an argument AD ∈ ED such that AD is the defeasible version
of A, and there are no arguments AD ∈ ED such that AD is not the defeasible
version of an argument A ∈ E.
In other words ED is the defeasible version of E if ED is exactly the set of
arguments that are the defeasible versions of the arguments in E. Then we
have:
Lemma 5.7 Consider an axiom inconsistent ASPIC+ theory AT+, such
that A(AT+) includes one pair of conflicting strict and firm arguments, and
its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over ATD is the
strict-first version of the ordering over AT+. Let ATC and AT
′
C be the result
of applying BR∗ to AT+, BR∗(AT+) = {ATC , AT ′C}. Then the preferred







and E ′′D are the defeasible versions of E
′ and E ′′, and E ′ are the preferred
extensions of ATC and E
′′ are the preferred extensions of AT ′C.
Proof Call the two conflicting strict and firm arguments are A and B. With-
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out loss of generality, we assume there is no argument attacking any of the
strict sub-arguments of A and B. From the proof of Proposition 5.5, we know
that, in ATD, the only defeater of AD is BD and the only defeater of BD is
AD. Under the preferred semantics, either AD is labeled IN and B is labelled
OUT, or AD is labelled OUT and BD is labelled IN. Thus, in the absence of
any other pairs of mutually defeating arguments, there will be exactly two
preferred extensions, one including AD and one including BD. If there is an-
other pair of mutually attacking arguments in ATD which are not the result
of conflicting strict and first arguments in AT+, call them CD and DD, then
there will be four preferred extensions. Each extension will correspond to one
of the labellings:
AD : IN, BD : OUT, CD : IN, DD : OUT
AD : IN, BD : OUT, CD : OUT, DD : IN
AD : OUT, BD : IN, CD : IN, DD : OUT
AD : OUT, BD : IN, CD : OUT, DD : IN
Given the way that BR∗(·) works, ATC and AT ′C will each contain one of
A and B. WIthout loss of generality, let us assume that ATC contains A,
and AT ′C contains B. The extensions of ATC will then correspond to the
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labellings:
A : IN, C : IN, D : OUT
A : IN, CD : OUT, DD : IN
while the extensions of AT ′C will correspond to the labellings:
B : IN, C : IN, D : OUT
B : IN, CD : OUT, DD : IN
Thus for this specific case, the preferred extensions of ATD can be split into
two disjoint sets E ′ and E ′′, where E ′ is the preferred extensions of ATC
and E ′′ is the preferred extensions of AT ′C — and the result holds. Since we
made no assumptions about the other arguments in AT+ and ATD, nor about
the other extensions, we can see that whatever the extensions of ATD, half
will contain AD and half BD. Further, the half that include AD will exactly
correspond to the extensions of whichever of ATC and AT
′
C contains A, and
the other half of the extensions will exactly correspond to the extensions of
whichever of ATC and AT
′
C contains B. Since A and B were arbitrary names
for the pair of strict and firm arguments in AT+, the result holds in the
general case. 
This deals with the case where AT+ contains 2 conflicting strict and firm
arguments only. This result easily generalises:
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Proposition 5.12 Consider an axiom inconsistent ASPIC+ theory AT+,
and its defeasible version ATD, where the preference ordering over ATD is
the strict-first version of the ordering over AT+. Let AT
1
c , . . . , AT
m
c be the
result of applying BR+ to AT+, BR3(AT+) = {AT 1c , . . . , ATmc }. Then the
preferred extensions of ATD can be split into m disjoint sets E
1, . . . , Em,
where Ei are the defeasible versions of the preferred extensions of AT ic .
Proof We know from Lemma 5.7 that if AT+ includes a pair of conflicting
arguments, then the extensions of ATD can be split into two disjoint sets of
extensions E1 and E2, such that each Ei corresponds to the set of extensions
of the two argumentation theories AT ic created by BR∗(AT+). Since BR3(·)
is the fixpoint combinator of BR∗(·), and since each application of BR∗(·)
will further split the set of extensions of AD into two disjoint sets, the result
follows. 
As noted above, if we start with n pairs of conflicting strict and firm argu-
ments in A(AT+), then the m in the statement of Proposition 5.12 will be
2n.
Now, what BR3(·) does, in effect, is to provide us with a number (2n)
of different choices about how to resolve the conflicts that arise from the
incionsistent axioms. Making these choices picks a particular (sub)theory
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AT ic , with an associated set of extensions. What Proposition 5.12 tells us
is that that set of extensions corresponds exactly to a set of the preferred
extensions of ATD, and that these extensions are disjoint from those produced
by any other set of choices about how to resolve the conflicts in AT+. In
addition, should we want to recover the set of extensions of ATD which
correspond to a specific set of choices, that is easy to do. As the proof of
Proposition 5.12 shows, if we want the extensions of ATD that correspond to
the extensions of the AT ic that we get when we prefer A to B, we just pick
all the extensions of ATD that include A not B
4.
5.3 Summary
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 considered ASPIC+D versions of ASPIC
+ theories that
are ill-defined, and answer the three research question raised in Chapter 3
in term of the ill-defined ASPIC+ theory. Here we summarize the results of
that investigation.
Section 5.1 looked at theories that are not closed under transposition.
Given an ASPIC+ theory AT+ that is not closed under transposition, with
transposed version ATtr and defeasible version ATD:
• Under the grounded semantics, we can identify which arguments in
4Of course, which arguments stem from the inconsistent axioms may not immediately
be apparent.
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A(ATtr) and A(ATD) will have the same status, and so represent con-
clusions that hold whichever means we use to make the original theory
well-defined. These arguments are identified by Proposition 5.2 and
Corollary 5.1.
• The results in Proposition 5.2 and Corollary 5.1 work at the level of
arguments — given an argument we can tell whether its status may
be different between A(ATtr) and A(ATD). Proposition 5.3 extends
this to identify which sub-theories AT ′+ of AT+ will produce arguments
with the same status in both the transposed version A(AT ′tr) and the
defeasible version A(AT ′D).
• Under all other semantics, there is no way to establish any general
relationship between the members of A(ATtr) and A(ATD). The best
we can to is to state, as Proposition 5.4 does, relationships that hold
between arguments in at least one pair of extensions of ATtr and ATD.
As we pointed out above, these are not particularly strong results. Propo-
sition 5.2 and Corollary 5.1 give us a way to vet individual arguments un-
der the grounded semantics, but we have to construct them before we can
tell whether they may have different status between A(ATtr) and A(ATD).
Proposition 5.3 extends this to be able to predict which theories AT+ will
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generate arguments that will have the same status whether or not AT+ is
made well-defined by completing it with by transposing strict rules or by
converting it into its defeasible counterpart.
Finally, once we step away from the grounded semantics, we can say very
little in general about the relationship between the members of A(ATtr) and
A(ATD). Indeed, we are only able to give conditions, as in Proposition 5.4,
under which arguments in at least one pair of extensions, one from A(ATtr)
and one from A(ATD), have the same status. However, given the results for
defeasible theories under semantics other than the grounded semantics, this
is not surprising. This answers the research question RQ2.
Of course, these results do not say thatASPIC+D is bound to give different
results from ASPIC+ when handling theories that are ill-defined. What we
have shown is that making an ASPIC+ theory rational by translating it into
ASPIC+D may (where “may” is explained in detail in Section 5.1) produce
different results to making an ASPIC+ theory well-defined by adding all
the transposed strict rules. Of course, if we take that well-defined ASPIC+
theory and translate it into ASPIC+D, we are back in the scenario studied
in Section 4.4, where under the grounded semantics both the ASPIC+ and
ASPIC+D versions of the theory will have the same justified conclusions.
The results of Section 5.2 are stronger than those of Section 5.1. They
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show that ASPIC+D provides a natural way to deal with axiom inconsistency.
Propositions 5.5 and 5.6 show that, under the grounded semantics, inconsis-
tent axioms cannot lead to any justified conclusions. That is no inconsis-
tent axiom can be part of an argument with a justified conclusion under
the grounded semantics. Propositions 5.8 and 5.9 show the same for the
sceptically preferred semantics. (Naturally, under the preferred semantics,
inconsistent axioms lead to more preferred extensions.)
The results also show that the results obtained from ASPIC+D theories
align with some simple ways to revise the inconsistency, thus illuminating the
way that ASPIC+D handles inconsistency. If we have an axiom inconsistent
ASPIC+ theory AT+, with defeasible counterpart AD, then we identified
three simple ways to revise ATC to create an axiom consistent theory ATC .
For one such revision, Proposition 5.7 shows us that the grounded extension
of ATC is the same as the grounded extension of ATD. For a second revision,
Proposition 5.10 shows us that the sceptically preferred extension of ATC is
the same as the sceptically preferred extension of ATC . And for the third
revision, Proposition 5.12 proves that the union of the preferred extensions of
the ATC are preferred extensions of ATD. This answers the research questions
RQ2 and RQ3.
Having investigated the theories that are both well-defined and ill-defined,
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The previous chapters introduced the defeasible subset of ASPIC+ frame-
work — the ASPIC+D framework, and investigated the similarity and differ-
ence between the two frameworks with respect to the justified conclusions.
In this chapter, we continue considering the link between the two framework,
but from another perspective — non-monotonic axioms. As we already know,
both ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D are non-monotonic reasoning frameworks. By
investigating the non-monotonic axioms, we can understand the exact nature
of this non-monotonicity and get the underlying connection between the two
frameworks.
In this chapter, I will investigate the links between instantiated argumen-
tation systems and the axioms for non-monotonic reasoning described in [46]
with the aim of characterizing the nature of argument based reasoning. It
will answer the first and second research questions. In doing so, we consider
202
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two possible interpretations of the consequence relation, and describe which
axioms are satisfied by three different kinds of ASPIC+ theory 1 under each
of these interpretations. The three kinds of ASPIC+ theory that we will
consider are: (1) ASPIC+ theories which contain only strict information,
axioms and strict rules; (2) ASPIC+ theories that contain strict and defea-
sible information, axioms ordinary premises, strict rules and defeasible rules;
and (3) ASPIC+ theories that contain only defeasible information, ordinary
premises and defeasible rules. We will call these kinds of theory strict the-
ories, regular theories and defeasible theories, respectively. At the end, we
will compare the difference between an ASPIC+ theory and an ASPIC+D
theory.
6.1 Axiomatic Reasoning and ASPIC+
Kraus et al. [46], building on earlier work by Gabbay [40], identified a set of
axioms which characterise non-monotonic inference in logical systems, and
studied the relationships between sets of these axioms. Their goal was to
characterise different kinds of reasoning; to pin down what it means for a
logical system to be monotonic or non-monotonic; and — in particular —
to be able to distinguish between the two. Table 6.1 presents the axioms of
1All theories in this chapter are well-defined.
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Abbr. Axiom Name
Ref α |∼ α Reflexivity
LLE |= α ≡ β α |∼ γ
β |∼ γ
Left Logical Equivalence
RW |= α ↪→ β γ |∼ α
γ |∼ β
Right Weakening
Cut α ∧ β |∼ γ α |∼ β
α |∼ γ
Cut
CM α |∼ β α |∼ γ
α ∧ β |∼ γ
Cautious Monotonicity
M |= α ↪→ β β |∼ γ
α |∼ γ
Monotonicity
T α |∼ β β |∼ γ
α |∼ γ
Transitivity
CP α |∼ β
β |∼ α
Contraposition
Table 6.1: The axioms from [46] that we will consider.
[46], which we will use to characterise reasoning in ASPIC+. The symbol |∼
encodes a consequence relation, while |= identifies the statements obtainable
from the underlying theory. We have altered some of the symbols used in [46]
to avoid confusion with the notation of ASPIC+. Equivalence is denoted ≡
(rather than↔), and ↪→ (rather than→) denotes the existence of a strict or
defeasible rule.
Consequence relations that satisfy Ref, LLE, RW, Cut and CM are said
to be cumulative, and [46] describes them as being the weakest interesting
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logical system. Cumulative consequence relations which also satisfy CP are
monotonic, while consequence relations that are cumulative and satisfy M are
called cumulative monotonic. Such relations are stronger than cumulative
but not monotonic in the usual sense.
To determine which axioms ASPIC+ does or does not comply with, we
must decide how different aspects of the axioms should be interpreted. We
interpret the consequence relation |∼ in two ways that are natural in the
context of ASPIC+— describing these in detail later — and which fit with
the high level meaning of “if α is in the knowledge base, then β follows”, or
“β is a consequence of α”.
Assuming such an interpretation of α |∼ β we can consider the meaning
of the axioms. Some axioms are clear. For example, axiom T says that if β
is a consequence of α, and γ is a consequence of β, then γ is a consequence
of α. Other axioms are more ambiguous. Does α ∧ β |∼ γ in Cut mean
that γ is a consequence of the conjunction α ∧ β, or a consequence of α and
β together? In other words is ∧ a feature of the language underlying the
reasoning system, or a feature of the meta-language in which the properties
are written? Similarly, given the distinction between strict and defeasible
rules, is α ↪→ β a strict rule in ASPIC+, a defeasible rule, or some statement
in the property meta-language?
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We interpret the symbols found in the axioms as follows:
• |= α means that α is an element of the relevant knowledge base.
• α∧β means both α and β, in particular in Cut and CM, ∧ means that
both α and β are in the knowledge base.
• α ≡ β is taken — as usual — to abbreviate the formula (α ↪→ β)∧(β ↪→
α). We assume α ↪→ β and β ↪→ α have the same interpretation, i.e.,
both or neither are strict.
• α ↪→ β has two interpretations. We have the strict interpretation
in which α ↪→ β denotes a strict rule α → β in ASPIC+, and the
defeasible interpretation in which α ↪→ β denotes either a strict or
defeasible rule. We denote the latter interpretation by writing α β.
To evaluateASPIC+, we have to be a bit more precise about exactly what
we are evaluating. We start by saying that we assume an arbitrary ASPIC+
argumentation theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉, in the sense that we say nothing
about the contents of the knowledge base, or what domain-specific rules it
contains. However, we distinguish between two classes of theory, with respect
to the base logic that the theory contains.
The idea we capture by this is that in addition to domain specific rules
— rules, for example, about birds and penguins flying — an ASPIC+ theory
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might also contain rules for reasoning in some logic. For example, we might
equip an ASPIC+ theory with the axioms and inference rules of classical
logic. Such a theory would be able to construct arguments using all the
rules of classical logic, as well as all the domain-specific rules in the theory.
The two base logics that we consider are classical logic, and what we call the
“empty” base logic, where the ASPIC+ theory only contains domain-specific
rules. (We make some observations about other base logics — intuitionistic
logic and defeasible logic [16], but show no formal results for them.)
For each of the base logics, we consider the two different interpretations
of the non-monotonic consequence relation |∼ described above, identifying
which axioms each interpretation satisfies. For our theory AT , we write ATx
to denote an extension of this augmentation theory also containing propo-
sition x: ATx = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K ∪ {x}〉. An argument present in the latter,
but not former, theory is denoted Ax. In the following, I will compare the
strength of several systems. By saying system A is stronger than system B,
I mean that A satisfies more non-monotonic axioms than B.
6.2 Argument Construction
We begin by considering the consequence relation as representing argument
construction. In other words, we interpret α |∼ β as meaning that if α is in
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the axioms or ordinary premises of a theory, we can construct an argument
for β. More precisely:
Definition 6.1 We write α |∼T,B,a β, if for every T ASPIC+ argumentation
theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉 with base logic B such that β 6∈ Concs(A(AT )),
it is the case that β ∈ Concs(A(ATα)), where T = {S,R,D}, representing
strict, regular and defeasible ASPIC+ argumentation theories respectively;
and B = {∅, c}, representing empty and classical base logics respectively.
Proposition 6.1 Ref, LLE, RW, Cut and CM hold for |∼T,∅,a where T =
{S,R,D}.
Proof Consider an arbitrary theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉.
[Ref] Given a theory ATα, we have an argument A
α = [α], so Ref holds
for |∼T,∅,a.
[LLE] Since α |∼T,∅,a γ, ATα contains a chain of arguments Aα1 , Aα2 , . . . , Aαn
with Aα1 = [α] and Conc(A
α
n) = γ. Given |= α ≡ β, we have that both α β
and β  α are in the theory AT , so are in the theory ATβ. Within ATβ,




0  α], Aβ2 , . . . , Aβn. That
is β |∼T,∅,a γ. Therefore, both strict and defeasible versions of LLE hold for
|∼T,∅,a.
[RW] Since γ |∼T,∅,a α in theory ATγ, there is a chain of arguments
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Aγ1 , A
γ




1 = [γ] and Conc(A
γ
n) = α. Given |= α ↪→ β, theory
AT must contain α  β, so must in ATγ. In ATγ, we have a chain of






n  β]. Thus, γ |∼T,∅,a β, and both strict
and defeasible versions of RW hold for |∼T,∅,a.
[Cut] Since α∧β |∼T,∅,a γ, there is a chain of arguments Aα,β1 , Aα,β2 , . . . , Aα,βn
with Aα,β1 = [α], A
α,β
2 = [β] in theory ATα,β, and Conc(A
α,β
n ) = γ. In the-
ory ATα, since α |∼T,∅,a β, there is a chain of arguments Bα1 , Bα2 , . . . , Bαm
with Bα1 = [α] and Conc(B
α
m) = β. There is also a chain of arguments
Bα1 , B
α




3 , . . . , A
α
n in ATα. That is α |∼T,∅,a γ. Therefore, cut
holds for |∼T,∅,a.
[CM] Since α |∼T,∅,a γ, ATα has a chain of arguments Aα1 , . . . , Aαn with
Aα1 = [α] and Conc(A
α
n) = γ. ATα,β has a similar chain of arguments
Aα,β1 , . . . , A
α,β
n , so α ∧ β |∼T,∅,a γ. CM thus holds for |∼T,∅,a. 
Since Ref, LLE, RW, Cut and CM hold, |∼T,∅,a is cumulative where T =
{S,R,D}.
Proposition 6.2 M and T hold for |∼T,∅,a where T = {S,R,D}.
Proof Consider an arbitrary theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉.
[M] Since β |∼T,∅,a γ, in the theory ATβ, there is a chain of arguments
Aβ1 , A
β




1 = [β] and Conc(A
β
n) = γ. Given |= α ↪→ β, we
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have α  β in the theory AT , and also in the theory ATα. In the latter,




0  β], Aα2 , . . . , Aαn. That
is α |∼T,∅,a γ. Therefore, both strict and defeasible versions of M hold for
|∼T,∅,a.
[T] Since β |∼T,∅,a γ, in ATβ, there is a chain of arguments Bβ1 , Bβ2 , . . . , Bβm
with Bβ1 = [β] and Conc(B
β
m) = γ. Similarly, since α |∼T,∅,a β, in ATα, there
is a chain of arguments Aα1 , A
α




1 = [α] and Conc(A
α
n) = β.
Combining this with Bα1 , B
α
2 , . . . , B
α
m, we obtain the combined chain of argu-
ments Aα1 , A
α




2 , . . . , B
α
m. That is α |∼T,∅,a γ. Therefore, T holds
for |∼T,∅,a. 
Thus |∼T,∅,a is cumulative monotonic where T = {S,R,D}. It is not, how-
ever, monotonic.
Proposition 6.3 CP does not hold for any |∼T,∅,a where T = {S,R}.
Proof Consider an ASPIC+ theory which contains: K = {c}, Rs = {α, c→
d;α, d → c; c, d → α;α → e; e → α; d, e → β; d, β → e; β, e → d} We have
α |∼T,∅,a β but not β |∼T,∅,a α. Therefore, CP does not hold for |∼T,∅,a. 
Proposition 6.4 CP does not hold for any |∼D,∅,a.
Proof Consider the counter-example from Proposition 6.3 where all rules are
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defeasible. It shows that CP does not hold for any |∼D,∅,a. 
Having characterised |∼T,∅,a, we consider |∼T,c,a. Clearly this will satisfy all
the properties that are satisfied by |∼T,∅,a, since it includes all the inference
rules of |∼T,∅,a. In addition, we have the following.
Proposition 6.5 CP holds for |∼S,c,a.
Proof Any strict ASPIC+ theory with a classical base logic will generate the
same set of consequences as classical logic. Furthermore, we know that CP
is satisfied under classical logic. Therefore, the consequence relation |∼S,c,a
satisfies CP. 
Thus |∼S,c,a is monotonic. However:
Proposition 6.6 CP does not hold for |∼T,c,a where T = {R,D}.
Proof Consider the counter-example from Proposition 6.3 where all rules are
defeasible. Since the defeasible portion of the theory does not contain a rule
of the form β → d ∨ e, CP will not be satisfied. 
In this section, we have investigated the non-monotonic axioms under the
argument construction interpretation. The results are shown in Table 6.2.
Recall from Section 6.1 that a consequence relation which satisfies axioms
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Table 6.2: Summary of axioms satisfied under the argumentation construc-
tion interpretation.
|∼S,∅,a |∼R,∅,a |∼D,∅,a |∼S,c,a |∼R,c,a |∼D,c,a
Ref Y Y Y Y Y Y
LLE Y Y Y Y Y Y
RW Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cut Y Y Y Y Y Y
CM Y Y Y Y Y Y
M Y Y Y Y Y Y
T Y Y Y Y Y Y
CP N N N Y N N
Ref, LLE, RW, Cut and CM is said to be “cumulative”, a cumulative con-
sequence relation that also satisfies M is said to be “cumulative monotonic”,
and a consequence relation that satisfies CP is monotonic. From the table,
we can see that all three kinds of ASPIC+ theory with empty base logic
satisfy the same axioms, therefore, in term of inference under the argument
construction interpretation, all three theories are of equal strength. As we
can see from the table, all the three consequence relations |∼S,∅,a, |∼R,∅,a,
|∼D,∅,a are cumulative monotonic, but none of them are monotonic, this is
because none of them satisfies CP. However, as we know, in any argumen-
tation framework, the argument construction process is monotonic — the
new constructed argument does not affect the existing arguments. In order
to strengthen the three consequence relations, we added classical logic as
base logic. This makes |∼S,c,a monotonic, and therefore as strong as classical
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logic. However, neither |∼R,c,a nor |∼D,c,a is monotonic, since the defeasible
inference rules are not closed under transposition.
6.3 Justified Conclusions
Next we interpret α |∼ β as meaning that if α is in a theory, we can construct
an argument for β such that β is in the set of justified conclusions. We will
consider only the grounded and preferred semantics, but, as we will see, we
have to bring in the ideas from Definition 2.30 since different kinds of justified
conclusion lead to α |∼ β satisfying different properties. We start with:
Definition 6.2 Let AF = 〈A,Defeats〉 be an abstract argumentation frame-
work, we define
Justg(A(AT )) = {φ|φ is a grounded justified conclusion}
Justcp(A(AT )) = {φ|φ is a preferred credulously justified conclusion}
Justsp(A(AT )) = {φ|φ is a preferred sceptically justified conclusion}
Justup(A(AT )) = {φ|φ is a preferred universally justified conclusion}
Note that we don’t have to distinguish between different classes of grounded
justified conclusion because, since there is exactly one grounded extension,
the three different classes of grounded justified conclusion coincide. Then:
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Definition 6.3 We write α |∼gT,B,j β, if for every T ASPIC+ argumen-
tation theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉 with the B base logic such that β 6∈
Justg(A(AT )), it is the case that β ∈ Justg(A(ATα)), where T = {S,R,D}
and B = {∅, c}.
Definition 6.4 We write α |∼p,SemT,B,j β, if for every T ASPIC+ argumen-
tation theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉 with the B base logic such that β 6∈
JustSemp (A(AT )), it is the case that β ∈ JustSemp (A(ATα)), where T =
{S,R,D}, B = {∅, c} and Sem = {c, s, u}.
It is worth noting the following result.
Proposition 6.7 If α |∼gT,B,j β or α |∼p,SemT,B,j β then α |∼T,B,a β where Sem =
{c, s, u}.
Proof Follows immediately from the definitions — for β to be a justified
conclusion, there must first be an argument with β as a conclusion. 
Since there are, in general, less justified conclusions of a theory than there
are arguments, |∼gT,∅,j and |∼p,SemT,∅,j are more restrictive notions of consequence
than |∼T,∅,a. Similarly, |∼gT,c,j and |∼p,SemT,c,j are more restrictive notions of
consequence than |∼T,c,a. It is therefore no surprise to find that fewer of the
axioms from [46] hold.
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6.3.1 Justified Conclusions in Strict ASPIC+ Theories
We start with strict ASPIC+ theories.
Proposition 6.8 Ref, LLE, RW, Cut, CM, M and T hold for |∼gS,∅,j and
|∼p,SemS,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
Proof If the theory is strict, then for any argumentation theory, all con-
clusions are justified. Therefore, for any strict theory, if α |∼T,∅,a β, then
α |∼gS,∅,j β and α |∼p,SemS,∅,j β. We know that |∼T,∅,a holds for Ref, LLE, RW,
Cut, CM, M and T, therefore, |∼gS,∅,j and |∼p,SemS,∅,j hold for Ref, LLE, RW,
Cut, CM, M and T. 
Proposition 6.9 CP does not hold for |∼gS,∅,j or |∼p,SemS,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
Proof Since CP does not hold for |∼S,∅,a, CP can not hold for |∼gS,∅,j or
|∼p,SemS,∅,j . 
This completes the characterisation of |∼gS,∅,j and |∼p,SemS,∅,j where Sem =
{c, s, u}. As we argued above, adding classical logic as a base logic will
create consequence relations that satisfy the same properties since they will
includes all the same inference rules. In addition, we have the following:
Proposition 6.10 CP holds for |∼gS,c,j and |∼p,SemS,c,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
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Table 6.3: Summary of axioms satisfied under the justified conclusion inter-
pretation for strict theories. Here Sem = {c, s, u}.
|∼gS,∅,j |∼p,SemS,∅,j |∼gS,c,j |∼p,SemS,c,j
Ref Y Y Y Y
LLE Y Y Y Y
RW Y Y Y Y
Cut Y Y Y Y
CM Y Y Y Y
M Y Y Y Y
T Y Y Y Y
CP N N Y Y
Proof As above, |∼S,c,a satisfies CP. Since the strict part of the theory is
always consistent, any conclusions from the argument construction are jus-
tified. Therefore, the consequence relation |∼gS,c,j and |∼p,SemS,c,j satisfies CP.

In this section, we have investigated the non-monotonic axioms under the
justified conclusions interpretation in strict ASPIC+ theories. The result is
shown in Table 6.3. Since all the elements are strict, all the conclusions
are justified. Therefore, it is not surprising that |∼gS,∅,j and |∼p,SemS,∅,j have the
exactly behaviors as |∼S,∅,a; |∼gS,c,j and |∼p,SemS,c,j has the exactly behaviors as
|∼S,c,a where Sem = {c, s, u}.
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6.3.2 Justified Conclusions in Regular ASPIC+ Theo-
ries
Next we will consider regularASPIC+ theories, namely, anyASPIC+ theory
which contains both strict and defeasible elements. Furthermore, all the
defeasible elements are equally preferred.
Proposition 6.11 The premise version of Ref, and the defeasible versions
of LLE and RW, do not hold for |∼gR,∅,j, |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
Proof [Ref (premise)] Consider an ASPIC+ theory that contains: Kn =
{α} and R = ∅. Here, we have an argument A = [α]. If a is in the knowledge
base Kp, we have another argument B = [a]. However, B is defeated by A,
but not vice versa. So B is not in any extension. Thus, Ref does not hold
for either |∼gR,∅,j or |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
[LLE (defeasible version)] Consider an ASPIC+ theory that contains
Kn = {c} and R = {α ⇒ β; β ⇒ α;α ⇒ γ; c → n1} where n(β ⇒ α) = n1.
Here, α |∼gR,∅,j γ and α |∼p,SemR,∅,j γ, but, β 6|∼gR,∅,j γ and β 6|∼p,SemR,∅,j γ. Therefore,
the defeasible version of LLE does not hold for either |∼gR,∅,j or |∼p,SemR,∅,j where
Sem = {c, s, u}.
[RW (defeasible version)] Consider an ASPIC+ theory that contains
β in its axioms. For such a theory, β will not appear in any justified conclu-
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sions. Therefore, the defeasible version of RW does not hold for either |∼gR,∅,j
or |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}. 
Proposition 6.12 The axiom version of Ref, and the strict version of LLE
and RW hold for |∼gR,∅,j and |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
Proof Consider an arbitrary theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉.
[Ref (axiom)] Consider the ASPIC+ theory ATα. Since α is an axiom
in ATα, A = [α] is always in any extension. Therefore, the axiom version of
Ref holds for |∼gR,∅,j and |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
[RW (strict version)] Consider the extension Eγ in ATγ containing
an argument Aγ with Conc(Aγ) = α. Since |= α β, under the strict inter-
pretation, we know that α → β is in ATγ. Therefore, we can construct an
argument Bγ = Aγ → β. Furthermore, the attackers of B are the attackers
of A because TopRule(B) is a strict rule. Since Aγ is in the extension Eγ,
Bγ is in the same extension Eγ. Therefore the strict version of RW holds for
|∼gR,∅,j and |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
[LLE (strict version)] Since |= α ≡ β, under the strict interpretation,
the rules β → α and α → β are in AT ,ATα, ATβ and ATα,β. Thus ATα,
ATβ, ATα,β have the same extensions, just as for RW(strict version). If
α |∼gR,∅,j γ, then β |∼gR,∅,j γ. If α |∼p,SemR,∅,j γ, then β |∼p,SemR,∅,j γ. Therefore, the
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strict version of LLE holds for |∼gR,∅,j and |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}. 
Proposition 6.13 Cut holds for |∼gR,∅,j and |∼p,sR,∅,j.
Proof Since α |∼gR,∅,j β, the grounded justified conclusions of ATα contain α
and β. By adding β into the knowledge base, the grounded justified conclu-
sions will not change – if the newly added β is not justified, then it has no
effect; if the newly added β is justified, it will remain in the justified conclu-
sions. The same argument applies for |∼p,sR,∅,j. 
Proposition 6.14 Cut does not hold for |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, u}.
Proof We will give a counter-example. Consider the ASPIC+ theory that
include K = ∅ and R = {a ⇒ c; c ⇒ b; b ⇒ c; c ⇒ r; }. The credulous or
universal justified conclusions of ATα are {a, b, c}. The credulous or univer-
sal justified conclusions of ATα,β are {a, b, c, r, c}. That is a ∧ b |∼p,SemR,∅,j r,
a |∼p,SemR,∅,j b, but a 6|∼p,SemR,∅,j r where Sem = {c, u}. Therefore Cut does not hold
for |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, u}. 
Proposition 6.15 CM holds for |∼gR,∅,j.
Proof Since α |∼gR,∅,j γ, the grounded justified conclusions of ATα contain α
and γ. By adding β into the knowledge base, the grounded justified conclu-
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sions will not change. The justification is same as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 6.13 
Proposition 6.16 CM does not hold for |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
Proof We will give counter-examples. Consider an ASPIC+ theory that
include K = ∅ and R = {a⇒ b; a⇒ r; b⇒ n1; r ⇒ n2; }, where n(a⇒ b) =
n1 and n(a ⇒ r) = n2. The credulous or universal justified conclusions of
ATα are {a, r, n1, b, n2}. And the credulous or universal justified conclusions
of ATα,β are {a, b, n2}. That is a |∼p,SemR,∅,j b, a |∼p,SemR,∅,j r, but a ∧ b 6|∼p,SemR,∅,j r
where Sem = {c, u}. Therefore CM does not hold for |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem =
{c, u}.
Now, consider an ASPIC+ theory that include K = ∅, R = {a⇒ r; r ⇒
b; b ⇒ r}. The sceptical justified conclusions of ATα are {a, b, r}. And
the sceptical justified conclusions of ATα,β are {a, b}. That is a |∼p,sR,∅,j b,
a |∼p,sR,∅,j r, but a ∧ b 6|∼p,sR,∅,j r. Therefore CM does not hold for |∼p,sR,∅,j. 
Proposition 6.17 M, T and CP do not hold for |∼gR,∅,j or |∼p,SemR,∅,j where
Sem = {c, s, u}.
Proof We will give counter-examples.
[M] Consider an ASPIC+ theory which includes Kn = {α} and R =
{α → β; β → α; β ⇒ γ}. Thus, β |∼gR,∅,j γ, but α 6|∼gR,∅,j γ; β |∼p,SemR,∅,j γ, but
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Table 6.4: Summary of axioms satisfied under the justified conclusion inter-
pretation for regular theories. Here Sem = {c, u}.
|∼gR,∅,j |∼p,sR,∅,j |∼p,SemR,∅,j |∼gR,c,j |∼p,sR,c,j |∼p,SemR,c,j
Ref
premise N N N N N N
axiom Y Y Y Y Y Y
LLE
defeasible rule N N N N N N
strict rule Y Y Y Y Y Y
RW
defeasible rule N N N N N N
strict rule Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cut Y Y N Y Y N
CM Y N N Y N N
M N N N N N N
T N N N N N N
CP N N N N N N
α 6|∼p,SemR,∅,j γ where Sem = {c, s, u}. Therefore, M does not hold for |∼gR,∅,j or
|∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
[T] Consider an ASPIC+ theory which includes K = ∅ and R = {α ⇒
β; β ⇒ c; c⇒ γ;α⇒ n1} where n(c⇒ γ) = n1. Thus, a |∼gR,∅,j b, b |∼gR,∅,j r,
but a 6|∼gR,∅,j r; a |∼p,SemR,∅,j b, b |∼p,SemR,∅,j r, but a 6|∼p,SemR,∅,j r where Sem = {c, s, u}.
Therefore, T does not hold for |∼gR,∅,j or |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
[CP] Since contraposition does not hold for |∼∅,a, by Proposition 6.3 it
cannot hold for |∼gR,∅,j or |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}. 
For regular theories, |∼gR,c,j behaves exactly same as |∼gR,∅,j; and |∼p,SemR,c,j
behaves exactly same as |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
In this section, we have investigated the non-monotonic axioms under
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the justified conclusion interpretation in regular ASPIC+ theories. The re-
sults are shown in Table 6.4. |∼R,∅,j is perhaps a more reasonable notions
of consequence for ASPIC+ than |∼T,∅,a or |∼S,∅,j, since it contains the in-
ference process using the full argumentation framework. |∼R,∅,j is quite a
restrictive notion of consequence in a representation that allows for conflict-
ing information, because in the strict only theories, there is no conflicting
information. As Table 6.4 makes clear, even |∼gR,∅,j, which is the strongest of
the consequence relations based on justified conclusions, is a relatively weak
notion of consequence in the sense that it obeys less of the axioms than the
non-monotonic logics analyzed in [46], for example.
|∼gR,∅,j is not cumulative, and only satisfies LLE and RW if the rules
applied in those axioms are strict. As we pointed out above, at the time that
[46] was published, cumulativity was considered the minimum requirement
of a useful logic2. Whether or not one accepts this, it is clear that |∼gR,∅,j is
weaker in the sense that it obeys less of the axioms. But is it too weak? To
answer this, we should consider reason why |∼gR,∅,j is not cumulative, which
as Table 6.4 shows is due to LLE, RW and Ref.
LLE and RW only hold in the case of strict rules. For both LLE and RW,
2This position was doubtless a side-effect of the fact that at that time there were no
logics that did not obey cumulativity. The subsequent discovery of logics of causality that
are not cumulative suggests that this view should be revised.
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the effect of the axiom is to extend an existing argument, either switching
one premise for another (LLE), or adding a rule to the conclusion of an
argument (RW). While having these axioms hold for defeasible rules would
allow |∼gR,∅,j to be cumulative, this is not reasonable. Using LLE or RW to
extend arguments with defeasible rules —by definition— means that the new
arguments created by this extension can be defeated. Thus their conclusions
may not be justified, and |∼gR,∅,j must not be cumulative for defeasible rules.
In other words |∼gR,∅,j is not cumulative for defeasible rules exactly because
it makes no sense for a system of defeasible rules to be cumulative.
A similar argument applies to Ref. If Ref were to hold for |∼gR,∅,j, α could
be a premise. But premises can be defeated, again by definition, so it is not
appropriate to directly conclude that any premise is a justified conclusion (it
is necessary to go through the whole process of constructing arguments and
establishing extensions to determine this).
Turning to the preferred semantics, since there may be more than one
preferred extension, we consider three different preferred justified conclusions
— sceptical, credulous and universal. Among them, credulous and universal
justified conclusion satisfy the exactly same axioms, therefore we will consider
them as a whole. From the Table 6.4, we can see that |∼p,sR,∅,j is strictly weaker
than |∼gR,∅,j, due to CM. And |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, u} is strictly weaker
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than |∼gR,∅,j due to CM and Cut.
CM expresses the fact that learning a new proposition, which has been
previously justified, should not invalidate previous conclusions. This is true
for grounded semantics, however, it is not true for sceptical preferred seman-
tics. The reason is that ASPIC+ allows self-attacking arguments. Under the
grounded semantics, self-attacking arguments are all labeled UNDEC, there-
fore any arguments attacked by self-attacking argument are not justified.
However, this is not true under the preferred semantics, since the preferred
semantics maximizes the number of justified conclusions, which may make
the arguments attacked by self-attacking argument justified3.
Next we will consider why the credulous/universal justified conclusions
interpretation is weaker than the grounded interpretation. This is because
adding a new proposition will introduce more arguments, and these argu-
ments may cause more attacks, and therefore lead to a smaller number of
preferred extensions. This is why CM fails under the credulous/universal jus-
tified conclusions interpretation — the newly added proposition may decrease
the number of preferred extensions4. Therefore, less justified conclusions will
3If the self-attacking argument A has an IN attacker, then A will be labeled OUT. Then
the argument B attacked by A can be labeled IN if B has no other IN attackers.
4As shown in the counter-example in the proof of Proposition 6.16, the number of
preferred extension change from two to one by adding a new proposition which is previously
justified.
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be obtained.
What is the difference between the sceptical justified conclusion inter-
pretation and the credulous/universal justified conclusion interpretation?
Again, from the Table 6.4, we can see that |∼p,SemR,∅,j where Sem = {c, u} is
strictly weaker than |∼p,sR,∅,j due to Cut. Cut expresses the reasoning that is
the opposite of CM, where removing a proposition, which has been previously
justified should not invalidate previous conclusions. Again, the reason why
Cut does not hold under the credulous/universal justified conclusion inter-
pretation is that removing a proposition may cause the number of preferred
extension to increase. Therefore, less justified conclusion will be obtained.
Overall, despite the fact that regular ASPIC+ is weaker in term of the
number of non-monotonic axioms that it conforms to than the minimum
requirements for a reasonable non-monotonic system proposed by [46], it is
reasonable to have these behaviors in terms of an argumentation framework
as discussed above. Again, this weakness raises the question of whether
reasoning in ASPIC+ can be strengthened. Adding a classical logic as base
logic does not help in strengthening conclusions — we gain nothing from
adding the classical base logic, as the results above show.
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6.3.3 Justified Conclusions in ASPIC+D Theories
Finally, we consider defeasible only ASPIC+ theories — that are the theories
of ASPIC+D which is introduced in previous chapters. We interpret all the
rules in the non-monotonic axioms as defeasible rules. But they can not
be undercut5. Again, as in regular theories, all the elements are equally
preferred.
Proposition 6.18 Ref, LLE, RW holds for |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, u}.
Proof [Ref] Consider any ASPIC+D theory AT , there is an argument Aα =
[α] in ATα. And the only possible attack of Aα is rebut. Since ATα is purely
defeasible, the rebut relation is symmetric. Therefore, Aα is in at least one
preferred extension. Thus, α |∼p,SemD,∅,j α in ATα where Sem = {c, u}. Hence,
Ref holds for |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, u}.
[LLE] Consider any ASPIC+D theory AT . Since β ⇒ α is a defeasible
rule in AT , we can construct arguments Aβ = [β] and Bβ = [A ⇒ α] in
ATβ. Since α |∼p,SemD,∅,j γ, there is a chain of arguments C1α = [α], . . . , Cnα,
where Conc(Cnα) = γ in a preferred extension Eα. Furthermore, there is an
argument Dα = [C
1
α ⇒ β] in ATα. Now, consider the chain of arguments
Aβ, Bβ, C
2
β, . . . , C
n
β . It is possible that there is a direct attack to Aβ or there is
5Otherwise, we can have a rule that undercut all the inference rules in the non-
monotonic axioms that makes them not hold
CHAPTER 6. NON-MONOTONIC PROPERTIES 227
a direct attack to B,C2β, . . . , C
n
β . The former is symmetric attacking, and the
latter is defended in Eα which contains argument with conclusion β. There-
fore, Aβ, Bβ, C
2
β, . . . , C
n
β is in at least one preferred extension in ATβ. Thus,
LLE holds for |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, u}.
[RW] Consider any purely defeasible ASPIC+ theory AT . Since γ |∼p,SemD,∅,j
α there is an argument Aγ with Conc(Aγ) = α in at least one preferred ex-
tension Eγ in ATγ. We know that there is a defeasible rule α ⇒ β which is
not undercut by any arguments. So can construct argument Bγ = [Aγ ⇒ β].
Furthermore, any argument attacking B either attacks A or directly rebuts
B. The former one is defended in Eγ, the latter one is a symmetric attack.
Therefore, B is in at least one preferred extension in ATγ. Thus, RW holds
for |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, u}. 
Proposition 6.19 Ref, LLE, RW do not hold for |∼gD,∅,j, |∼p,sD,∅,j.
Proof We will give counter-examples.
[Ref] Consider an ASPIC+ theory that includes Kp = {α}. The grounded
extension of ATα is ∅. Thus α 6|∼gD,∅,j α. The preferred extension of ATα is
{{α}, {α}}. Thus α 6|∼p,sD,∅,j α. Therefore, Ref does not hold for either |∼gD,∅,j
or |∼p,sD,∅,j. 
[LLE] Consider an ASPIC+ theory that includes Kp = {β} and R =
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{α ⇒ β; β ⇒ α;α ⇒ γ} . Here, α |∼gD,∅,j γ and α |∼p,sD,∅,j γ, but, β 6|∼gD,∅,j γ
and β 6|∼p,sD,∅,j γ. Therefore, LLE does not hold for either |∼gD,∅,j or |∼p,sD,∅,j.
[RW] Consider an ASPIC+ theory that includes K = {β} and R =
{α ⇒ β; γ ⇒ α}. Here γ |∼gD,∅,j α and γ |∼p,sD,∅,j α but γ 6|∼gD,∅,j β and
γ 6|∼p,sD,∅,j β. Therefore, RW does not hold for either |∼gD,∅,j or |∼p,sD,∅,j in
purely defeasible theory.
Proposition 6.20 Cut holds for |∼gD,∅,j and |∼p,sD,∅,j.
Proof The proof in Proposition 6.13 hold for ASPIC+D theory. 
Proposition 6.21 Cut does not hold for |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, u}.
Proof The counter-example is same as the counter-example given in the proof
of Proposition 6.14. 
Proposition 6.22 CM holds for |∼gD,∅,j.
Proof The proof in Proposition 6.15 hold for ASPIC+D theory. 
Proposition 6.23 CM does not hold for |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
Proof The counter-example is same as the counter-example given in the proof
of Proposition 6.16. 
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Proposition 6.24 M, T and CP do not hold for |∼gD,∅,j or |∼p,SemD,∅,j where
Sem = {c, s, u}.
Proof We will give counter-examples.
[M] Consider an ASPIC+ theory that contains Kp = ∅ and R = {α ⇒
β; β ⇒ c; c ⇒ γ;α ⇒ n1} where n(β ⇒ c) = n1. Thus, β |∼gD,∅,j γ and
β |∼p,SemD,∅,j γ, however, α 6|∼gD,∅,j γ and α 6|∼p,SemD,∅,j γ. Therefore, M does not
hold for |∼gD,∅,j or |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
[T] Consider an ASPIC+ theory the same as above. We have a |∼gD,∅,j b,
b |∼gD,∅,j r but a 6|∼gD,∅,j r; a |∼p,SemD,∅,j b, b |∼p,SemD,∅,j r, but a 6|∼p,SemD,∅,j r where
Sem = {c, s, u}. Therefore, T does not hold for |∼gD,∅,j or |∼p,SemD,∅,j where
Sem = {c, s, u}.
[CP] Since contraposition does not hold for |∼T,∅,a, by Proposition 6.3 it
cannot hold for |∼gD,∅,j or |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}. 
In the above interpretation, the non-monotonic axioms are interpreted as
referring to defeasible rules, which corresponds to the defeasible interpreta-
tion in regular ASPIC+ theories. However, we also investigate the strict in-
terpretation in regular ASPIC+ theories, in order to compare the connection
with regular ASPIC+ theories. To do this, we make the inference rules in the
non-monotonic axioms be “strict”, i.e., there is no argument directly attack-
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ing the relevant argument, the one for which TopRule is the rules referred to
in the non-monotonic axioms. For example, in LLE, we interpret |= α ≡ β
as α ⇒ β and β ⇒ α, and any argument A with TopRule(A) = α ⇒ β
or TopRule(A) = β ⇒ α can not be directly attacked.6 This interpretation
corresponds to the strict interpretation in regular ASPIC+ theories. We call
this the strict version interpretation.
Proposition 6.25 The strict version of Ref, LLE and RW hold for |∼gD,∅,j
and |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
Proof [Ref] Consider any ASPIC+D theory AT , there is an argument Aα =
[α] in ATα. The only possible attack of Aα is rebut. With strict interpretation,
Aα can not be defeated. So α |∼gD,∅,j α and α |∼p,SemD,∅,j α where Sem = {c, s, u}.
Therefore, Ref holds for |∼gD,∅,j and |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
[LLE] Consider any ASPIC+D theory AT . With strict interpretation,
ATα, ATα,β, ATβ have the same extensions. If α |∼p,SemD,∅,j γ, then β |∼p,SemD,∅,j γ
where Sem = {c, s, u}. If α |∼gD,∅,j γ, then β |∼gD,∅,j γ. Therefore, LLE holds
for |∼gD,∅,j and |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}.
[RW] Consider any ASPIC+D theory AT . Since γ |∼p,SemD,∅,j α there is an
argument Aγ with Conc(Aγ) = α in every preferred extension Eγ in ATγ. We
6But you can still attack the strict sub-argument of A.
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Table 6.5: Summary of axioms satisfied under the justified conclusion inter-
pretation for ASPIC+D theories. Here Sem = {c, u}.
|∼gD,∅,j |∼p,sD,∅,j |∼p,SemD,∅,j |∼gD,c,j |∼p,sD,c,j |∼p,SemD,c,j
Ref
premise N N Y N N Y
axiom Y Y Y Y Y Y
LLE
defeasible N N Y N N Y
strict Y Y Y Y Y Y
RW
defeasible N N Y N N Y
strict Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cut Y Y N Y Y N
CM Y N N Y N N
M N N N N N N
T N N N N N N
CP N N N N N N
know that there is a defeasible rule α ⇒ β which is a strict interpretation.
So we can construct argument Bγ = [Aγ ⇒ β]. Furthermore, any argument
attacking B either attacks A or directly rebuts B. The former one is defended
in Eγ, the latter is not successful due to the strict interpretation. Therefore,
B is in every preferred extension in ATγ. Thus, RW holds for |∼gD,∅,j and
|∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, s, u}. 
In this section, we have investigated the non-monotonic axioms under
the justified conclusion interpretation in ASPIC+D theories. The results are
shown in Table 6.5. In ASPIC+D theories, all the inference rules are defeasi-
ble, and therefore can be undercut. It is reasonable to set some constraints
that the rules in the non-monotonic axioms can not be undercut. In order to
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match the defeasible/strict version interpretation in regular ASPIC+ theo-
ries, we consider two interpretations. For the strict version interpretation, we
add the constraint that the argument whose TopRule is the rules referred to
in the non-monotonic axioms can not be directly attacked. Since ASPIC+D
is a subset of ASPIC+, and ASPIC+D has less constraints that ASPIC
+,
such as not requiring restricted rebut and that theories are not closed un-
der transposition, we see that more axioms hold in ASPIC+D theories than
































Table 6.6: Summary of axioms satisfied under justified conclusion for strict ASPIC+, regular ASPIC+ and
ASPIC+D theories with empty base logic. Here Sem = {c, u}.
|∼gS,∅,j |∼gR,∅,j |∼gD,∅,j |∼p,sS,∅,j |∼p,sR,∅,j |∼p,sD,∅,j |∼p,SemS,∅,j |∼p,SemR,∅,j |∼p,SemD,∅,j
Ref
premise N N N N N Y
axiom Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
LLE
defeasible N N N N N Y
strict Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
RW
defeasible N N N N N Y
strict Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cut Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
CM Y Y Y Y N N Y N N
M Y N N Y N N Y N N
T Y N N Y N N Y N N






























Table 6.7: Summary of axioms satisfied under justified conclusion for strict ASPIC+, regular ASPIC+ and
ASPIC+D theories with classical base logic. Here Sem = {c, u}.
|∼gS,c,j |∼gR,c,j |∼gD,c,j |∼p,sS,c,j |∼p,sR,c,j |∼p,sD,c,j |∼p,SemS,c,j |∼p,SemR,c,j |∼p,SemD,c,j
Ref
premise N N N N N Y
axiom Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
LLE
defeasible N N N N N Y
strict Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
RW
defeasible N N N N N Y
strict Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cut Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
CM Y Y Y Y N N Y N N
M Y N N Y N N Y N N
T Y N N Y N N Y N N
CP Y N N Y N N Y N N
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What are the difference between ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D argumentation
framework with respect to non-monotonic axioms in general? We will answer
this question by considering each of the consequence relations in turn.
Starting with the consequence relations where inference corresponds to
argument construction, it is no surprise that the three consequence relations,
|∼S,∅,a, |∼R,∅,a and |∼D,∅,a, have the same strength. They all cumulative
monotonic and satisfy the axiom M which captures a form of monotonicity.
It is clear from the detail of ASPIC+, and indeed any argumentation system,
that the number of arguments grows over time, and that once introduced,
arguments do not disappear. However, the fact that |∼S,∅,a, |∼R,∅,a and |∼D,∅,a
are not monotonic in the same strict sense as classical logic, and so are strictly
weaker, as a result of not satisfying CP, is a bit more interesting. This is, of
course, because arguments are not subject to the law of the excluded middle
— it is perfectly possible for neither α nor α to be the consequence of a given
theory.
When we add classical logic as base logic, |∼S,c,a satisfies CP and therefore
becomes monotonic. This is because we added the law of the excluded middle
into the theory, and therefore the theory is the same strength as classical
logic. However, |∼R,c,a and |∼D,c,a are still not monotonic even if we add the
law of the excluded middle. The reason is that the inference rules in regular
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ASPIC+ theories and ASPIC+D theories are not closed under transposition.
Overall, with respect to argument construction, regular ASPIC+ theories
and ASPIC+D theories behave exactly the same.
Turning to the various versions of consequence relations built around jus-
tified conclusions, we start by noting that they are perhaps more reasonable
notions of consequence relations than argument construction. If β is a justi-
fied conclusion of α, then there is an argument for β which holds despite any
attacks (in the scenario we have considered, where all attacks may be defeats
for some preference ordering — and therefore succeed — there can still be
attacks on the argument for β, but the attacking arguments must themselves
be defeated). Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 compares different consequence rela-
tions under three different theories, strict ASPIC+ regular ASPIC+ and
ASPIC+D.
Again, we are starting with the grounded semantics. Recall Chapter 4,
we have shown that ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D theories have the same expres-
siveness under grounded semantics. So it is quite reasonable that |∼gR,∅,j and
|∼gD,∅,j behave exactly the same. Neither of them is cumulative in general,
however, for the strict interpretation, both |∼gR,∅,j and |∼gD,∅,j are cumulative.
In comparison with |∼gS,∅,j, even with strict interpretation of non-monotonic
axioms, |∼gD,∅,j is strict weaker than |∼gS,∅,j. From the Table 6.6, we know
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that the weakness is coming from the axioms M and T, which capture a form
of monotonicity. For strict ASPIC+ theories, anything constructed will be
justified, which is somehow monotonic. However, for ASPIC+D theories, ev-
erything is defeasible, we can not guarantee that newly added arguments are
justified.
Now we turn to the preferred semantics. Recall Chapter 4, where we
have shown that any preferred extension of an ASPIC+ theory is a preferred
extension of the corresponding ASPIC+D theory, however, the ASPIC
+
D the-
ory may contain more preferred extensions than the corresponding ASPIC+
theory. This is caused by unrestricted rebut. Because of unrestricted rebut,
ASPIC+D satisfies more axioms than ASPIC
+. That is the defeasible ver-
sion of Ref, LLE and RW with respect to credulous and universal preferred
semantics, which is shown in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7.
Let’s see why the unrestricted rebut makes differences. By definition, Ref
means when we add something into the theory, it is justified. In ASPIC+
theory, the new added premise can be attacked by an axiom, but not vice
versa. However, in ASPIC+D theory, because of unrestricted rebut, the new
added premise can attack a justified argument, causing the justified argu-
ment to be unjustified in some preferred extensions. Therefore, Ref holds for
credulous and universal preferred semantics.
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Similarly, for both LLE and RW, the effect of the axiom is to extend an
existing argument. Again, for restricted rebut, the extended argument can
only be attacked by a strict argument, but not vice versa. However, under
unrestricted rebut, the extended arguments can attack a justified argument
causing it to become unjustified. This makes the extended arguments justi-
fied in some preferred extensions. Therefore, both defeasible LLE and RW
hold for |∼p,SemD,∅,j where Sem = {c, u}.
Overall, both ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D are weaker than the systems in-
troduced in [46]. This weakness raises the question of whether reasoning
in ASPIC+ or ASPIC+D can be strengthened. When we add classical logic
as a base logic, the results are shown in Table 6.7, we get a family of con-
sequence relations that satisfy CP. Thus |∼gS,c,j and |∼p,SemS,c,j are monotonic
where Sem = {c, s, u}. However, for theories with defeasible elements, even
the strongest consequence relations |∼gR,c,j and |∼gD,c,j can not guarantee that
CP will hold for arbitrary α and β. Adding a base logic that is weaker
than classical logic does not help in strengthening conclusions. If we add
intuitionistic logic, for example, we don’t get CP, because intuitionistic logic
explicitly rejects this pattern of reasoning.
From this we conclude that under the grounded semantics, ASPIC+ and
ASPIC+D have the same strength in terms of which axioms from [46] they sat-
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isfy. However, they are both weaker than non-monotonic logics like circum-
scription [55] and default logic [73] which, according to [46], is cumulative.
Under the preferred semantics, ASPIC+D is slightly stronger than ASPIC
+,
but again, they are both weaker than the above systems.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have examined the non-monotonic properties proposed
by [46] with respect to the ASPIC+ argumentation framework as well as
the ASPIC+D argumentation framework. We considered which of the ax-
ioms ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D satisfy based on two different interpretations
of the consequence relation — argumentation construction and justified con-
clusions.
Table 6.2 shows that |∼R,∅,a and |∼D,∅,a satisfy the same non-monotonic
axioms; |∼R,c,a and |∼D,c,a satisfy the same non-monotonic axioms. It means
that regular ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D have the same strength of constructing
arguments in the context of satisfying non-monotonic axioms. This provides
another answer to research question RQ1.
Table 6.6 shows that under the grounded semantics, |∼gR,∅,j and |∼gD,∅,j
satisfy the same non-monotonic axioms; Table 6.7 shows that under the
grounded semantics, |∼gR,c,j and |∼gD,c,j satisfy the same non-monotonic ax-
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ioms; It means that ASPIC+ theories and its defeasible version ASPIC+D
theories have the same justified conclusion under grounded semantics. This
provides another answer to research question RQ2 under the grounded se-
mantics.
Turning into the preferred semantics, Table 6.6 shows that under the
sceptical preferred justified conclusions, |∼p,sR,∅,j and |∼p,sD,∅,j satisfy the same
non-monotonic axioms. Under the credulous and universal preferred justified
conclusions, |∼p,SemD,∅,j is stronger than |∼p,SemR,∅,j in the context of satisfying non-
monotonic axioms, which means that ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D may not have
the same justified conclusions. By adding the classical logic as base logic, the
results are exactly same as empty base logic. This provides another answers
to research question RQ2 under the preferred semantics.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Summary of Contribution
The aim of this dissertation was to explore the reasoning that is possible using
just the defeasible portion of ASPIC+, the argumentation system that we
call ASPIC+D. In doing so, we provided the first in-depth investigation of
a purely defeasible argumentation system and drew a direct comparison to
what can be achieved in an equivalent system that distinguishes strict and
defeasible knowledge. Having provided a lengthy analysis, we have answered
the three research questions raised in Chapter 3. In this section we will recap
our justification for carrying out this work and summarize our investigation
into the properties of ASPIC+D.
First, we answer the three research questions from the details of the sys-
tem:
241
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RQ1 Since ASPIC+D is an subset of ASPIC
+, do we lose any expressiveness
in removing the strict parts of ASPIC+ argumentation framework?
Answer One might imagine that not having strict rules means thatASPIC+D
is unable to represent all of the knowledge that can be captured by
ASPIC+. However, Propositions 4.6–4.8 show, in a straightforward
way, that this is not the case. Any ASPIC+ theory can be converted
an ASPIC+D theory so that there is an equivalent set of arguments, and
this can be done in such a way that the same preference ordering exists
over the two sets of arguments. This means we do not lose anything by
removing strict elements of the ASPIC+ argumentation framework.
RQ2 Do the ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D versions of the same theory have the
same justified conclusions?
Answer The much bigger question is whether these two sets of arguments
have the same conclusions. Proposition 4.11 shows that under the
grounded semantics, and given some reasonable assumptions about the
way the conversion from ASPIC+ to ASPIC+D is carried out, the two
sets of arguments will, indeed, have the same conclusions. Under other
semantics, things are more complicated. Corollary 4.2 shows that it is
possible to ensure that the two sets of arguments will have the same
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conclusions under any complete semantics, but only at the cost of (in
effect) reinstating the notion of strict rules in ASPIC+D. The results
of Proposition 4.11 and Corollary 4.2 hold when we start with well-
defined ASPIC+ theories. Given that all ASPIC+D theories are well-
defined, the paper also investigated the question of whether, given an
ASPIC+ theory AT+ that is ill-defined, it is possible to ensure that the
conclusions of the ASPIC+D version of this theory, ATD, are the same
as those of the version of AT+ that has been made well-defined. When
AT+ is ill-defined because it is not closed under transposition of strict
rules, it turns out that relatively little can be said about the relationship
between the conclusions of ATD and ATtr, but Propositions 5.2, 5.4 and
5.3, lay down conditions under which particular arguments from the
two theories will have the same status. More can be said when AT+
is ill-defined because it is axiom inconsistent. Thanks to the ability
of argumentation to handle inconsistent information, it tuens out that
ATD will generate exactly the same conclusions as versions of AT+
which have been revised with some simple, but rather natural, belief
revision functions. Propositions 5.7, 5.11 and 5.12 detail when this
is the case. Overall, in general, we can ensure ASPIC+ theories and
their defeasible versions expressed in ASPIC+D have the same justified
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conclusion given reasonable assumptions. The assumptions differ in
different situations.
RQ3 What is the advantage, if any, of removing the strict elements from
ASPIC+D?
Answer With a system that only contains defeasible elements, we shed much
of the complexity of ASPIC+. This is natural since much of the com-
plexity of ASPIC+, in particular the need to restrict rebuttals, and the
need to transpose strict rules, is required in order to accommodate strict
rules. (Or, more precisely, they are required to ensure that ASPIC+
can both use strict rules and satisfy the rationality postulates of [21]).
As we show in Propositions 4.2–4.4, ASPIC+D conforms to the ratio-
nality postulates of [21], and hence meets the minimum requirements
of any reasonable argumentation system. ASPIC+D does this without
need to transpose strict rules (because it does not use strict rules),
and without needing restricted rebut. Furthermore, as highlighted in
Proposition 4.5, ASPIC+D conforms to the rationality postulates using
unrestricted rebut for all Dung semantics, a modest extension of what
was previously possible using unrestricted rebut [23]. Therefore, we
do have some advantages by removing strict elements — we obtain a
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simpler and more natural system with less restrictions.
Then we answer the first two research questions from another perspec-
tive — non-monotonic properties. we considered which of the axioms of [46]
ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D meet based on two different interpretations of the
consequence relation, argumentation construction and justified conclusions.
Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 shows that under the grounded semantics, |∼gR,∅,j and
|∼gD,∅,j behave exactly the same. Neither of them is cumulative in general,
however, for the strict interpretation, both |∼gR,∅,j and |∼gD,∅,j are cumula-
tive. Now we turn to the preferred semantics. Because of unrestricted rebut,
ASPIC+D satisfies more axioms than ASPIC
+. That is the defeasible ver-
sion of Ref, LLE and RW with respect to credulous and universal preferred
semantics, which is shown in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7.
Overall, the purely defeasible system ASPIC+D does not have any re-
strictions — you do not need to worry about whether the strict rules are
closed under transposition or whether the axioms are consistent. Therefore,
ASPIC+D is easier for a non-expert user, and on that basis it has been used
in ArgTrust [64] and Consult [45]. On the other hand, if you want a system
to distinguish between strict elements and defeasible elements, ASPIC+ is
the better choice. In addition, since any ASPIC+ theory has a defeasible
version which is an ASPIC+D theory, and since these two theories have the
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same justified conclusions under the grounded semantics, we can use either
of the two systems if we are considering the grounded semantics.
7.2 Limitations
As discussed in Section 2.1.2, [60] defines ASPIC+ in terms of a language
with two forms of negation — contradictories, which are symmetric, and con-
traries, which are asymmetric. For simplicity, we only considered symmetric
negation in our discussion of ASPIC+ and ASPIC+D. Here we consider how
our results would change were we to use asymmetric negation — contraries
— as well. In brief, our results would not change. The reason is as follows.
As discussed earlier in the dissertation, we start by considering anASPIC+
theory AT and its defeasible counterpart ATD. Both of these use a language
L that only includes symmetric negation. Now consider re-writing these using
a language L′ that includes asymmetric negation but is otherwise identical
to the language used for AT and ATD. Call these rewritten theories AT
′ and
AT ′D. Under the assumption that AT and ATD denote every conflict between
the propositions in L, then rewriting AT and ATD using contraries as well
as contradictories will lead to some of the contradictories being rewritten as
contraries1. Thus, the set of attacks Attacks′ between the arguments con-
1Our assumption therefore suggests that AT and ATD may have, due to the imprecision
L, have identified conflicts where there were none, by turning assymtric conflicts into
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structed from AT ′ will be a subset of the set of attacks Attacks between the
arguments constructed from AT , and the set of attacks between the argu-
ments Attacks′D constructed from AT
′
D will be a subset of the set of attacks
between the arguments AtatcksD constructed from ATD. However, the set
of attacks Attacks will be a subset of AttacksD, and Attacks
′ will be a sub-
set of Atatcks′D, since, just as in so many of our results above, the use of
unrestricted rebuts in ASPIC+D may lead to more attacks. Since the only
difference between AT and ATD, and between AT
′ and AT ′D are these dif-
ferent numbers of attacks, and since this difference is exactly what is taken
into account in our results, our results will not change.
Another way of looking at this is that our results hold between any
ASPIC+ theory and its ASPIC+D counterpart. The results all hinge upon
the fact that the set of arguments constructed from the ASPIC+D theory
includes a larger set of attacks (because of unrestricted rebut). Removing
some of the attacks from both the arguments from the ASPIC+ theory, and
the arguments from the ASPIC+D theory (and it will be the same attacks
from both) will not change anything.
symmetric ones.
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7.3 Future Work
There are a number of interesting avenues for future work around the topics
investigated in this dissertation. One line of future work is to continue in-
vestigating the properties of the ASPIC+D framework. As discussed above,
it is possible to ensure that the two sets of arguments will have the same
conclusions under any complete semantics, but only at the cost of (in effect)
reinstating the notion of strict rules in ASPIC+D. One question that one
might investigate is whether there is any other way to ensure that the two
sets of arguments will give the same justified conclusions under any complete
semantics.
Another potential line of future work is to relate ASPIC+D to other argu-
mentation systems. For example, [23] introduces the ASPIC- system, which
satisfies the rationality postulates using unrestricted rebut, but only under
the grounded semantics. Both ASPIC- and ASPIC+D systems satisfy the
rationality postulates using unrestricted rebut, and it would be interesting
to explore connections between the two systems.
Another area to investigate is applications. The ASPIC+D system has
been used in different applications, such as ArgTrust [64] and Consult [45].
In the future, it would be interesting to apply the ASPIC+D system in more
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areas, where its simplified representation, with respect to ASPIC+, is found
to be useful.
Aside from developing the theory itself, it would be interesting to inves-
tigate combining ASPIC+D with justification logic [10, 9, 11]. As we know,
argumentation can generate consistent results by reasoning in the domain
of the knowledge base, i.e., given the knowledge base, the argumentation
framework can make the correct conclusions. However, one would ask where
does the knowledge base itself come from? In general, the knowledge base is
a combination of observations and common knowledge, in the form of agent
A knows/believes x. Justification logic can be used in reasoning with the
knowledge, so that given information that agent A knows/believes x, justi-
fication logic can identify what should be included in the knowledge base.
Thus a combination of argumentation and justification logic might be able
to provide a more complete account of an agent’s reasoning, combining rea-
soning with knowledge from a knowledge base and reasoning about what
knowledge should be in the knowledge base.
Bibliography
[1] T. Alsinet, C. I. Chesnevar, L. Godo, and G. R. Simari. A logic pro-
gramming framework for possibilistic argumentation: Formalization and
logical properties. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 159(10):1208–1228, 2008.
[2] L. Amgoud. Five weaknesses of ASPIC+. Advances in Computational
Intelligence, pages 122–131, 2012.
[3] L. Amgoud, L. Bodenstaff, M. Caminada, P. McBurney, S. Parsons,
H. Prakken, J. van Veenen, and G. Vreeswijk. Final review and report
on formal argumentation system. deliverable d2. 6. Technical report,
ASPIC IST-FP6-002307, 2006.
[4] L. Amgoud and C. Cayrol. On the acceptability of arguments in
preference-based argumentation. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth con-
ference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pages 1–7. Morgan
Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 1998.
[5] L. Amgoud and C. Cayrol. A reasoning model based on the production of
acceptable arguments. Annals of Mathematics and Artifical Intelligence,
34(3):197–215, 2002.
[6] L. Amgoud and C. Cayrol. A reasoning model based on the production
of acceptable arguments. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelli-
gence, 34(1-3):197–215, 2002.
[7] L. Amgoud, C. Cayrol, M. C. Lagasquie-Schiex, and P. Livet. On bipo-




[8] G. Antoniou, D. Billington, G. Governatori, and M. J. Maher. A flexible
framework for defeasible logics. In Proceedings of American National
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 405–410, 2000.
[9] S. Artemov. Justification logic. In European Workshop on Logics in
Artificial Intelligence, pages 1–4. Springer, 2008.
[10] S. Artemov. The logic of justification. The Review of Symbolic Logic,
1(4):477–513, 2008.
[11] S. Artemov. Why do we need justification logic? In Games, Norms and
Reasons, pages 23–38. Springer, 2011.
[12] J. C. Augusto and G. R. Simari. Temporal defeasible reasoning. Knowl-
edge and Information Systems, 3(3):287–318, 2001.
[13] P. Baroni, M. Caminada, and M. Giacomin. An introduction to ar-
gumentation semantics. Knowledge Engineering Review, 26(4):365–410,
2011.
[14] T. Bench-Capon, H. Prakken, and G. Sartor. Argumentation in legal
reasoning. In Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, pages 363–382.
Springer, 2009.
[15] P. Besnard and A. Hunter. A logic-based theory of deductive arguments?
Artificial Intelligence, 128:203–235, 2001.
[16] D. Billington. Defeasible logic is stable. Journal of Logic and Compu-
tation, 3(4):379–400, 1993.
[17] A. Bondarenko, P. M. Dung, R. A. Kowalski, and F. Toni. An abstract,
argumentation-theoretic approach to default reasoning. Artificial Intel-
ligence, 93(1):63–101, 1997.
[18] I. Bratko, J. Zˇabkar, and M. Mozˇina. Argument-based machine learn-
ing. In Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, pages 463–482. Springer,
2009.
[19] M. Caminada. Contamination in formal argumentation systems. In
Proceedings of the 17th Belgium-Netherlands Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, 2005.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 252
[20] M. Caminada and L. Amgoud. An axiomatic account of formal argu-
mentation. In Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 608–613. AAAI Press, 2005.
[21] M. Caminada and L. Amgoud. On the evaluation of argumentation
formalisms. Artificial Intelligence, 171(5):286–310, 2007.
[22] M. Caminada, W. Carnielli, and P. E. Dunne. Semi-stable semantics.
Journal of Logic and Computation, 22:1207–1254, 2012.
[23] M. Caminada, S. Modgil, and N. Oren. Preferences and unrestricted re-
but. In Proceedings of the 5th Intenational Conference on Computational
Models of Argument, pages 209–220, 2014.
[24] M. Caminada and Y. Wu. On the limitations of abstract argumentation.
In Proceedings of the 23rd Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Ghent, Belgium, 2011.
[25] C. Cayrol. On the relation between argumentation and non-monotonic
coherence based entailment. In Proceedings of the 14th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 1443–1448. Morgan
Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 1995.
[26] C. Cayrol, C. Devred, and M.-C. Lagasquie-Schiex. Handling contro-
versial arguments in bipolar argumentation frameworks. In Proceedings
of the First International Conference on Computational Models of Ar-
gument, pages 261–272. IOS Press, 2006.
[27] C. Cayrol and M.-C. Lagasquie-Schiex. Bipolar abstract argumentation
systems. In I. Rahwan and G. R. Simari, editors, Argumentation in Ar-
tificial Intelligence, chapter 4, pages 65–84. Springer, Berlin, Germany,
2009.
[28] C. I. Chesn˜evar, A. G. Maguitman, and R. P. Loui. Logical models of
argument. ACM Computing Surveys, 32(4):337–383, 2000.
[29] K. L. Clark. Negation as failure. In Logic and Data Bases, pages 293–
322. Springer, 1978.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 253
[30] S. Coste-Marquis, C. Devred, and P. Marquis. Symmetric argumentation
frameworks. In European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Ap-
proaches to Reasoning and Uncertainty, pages 317–328. Springer, 2005.
[31] M. Croitoru and S. Vesic. What can argumentation do for inconsistent
ontology query answering? In International Conference on Scalable
Uncertainty Management, pages 15–29. Springer, 2013.
[32] K. Cˇyras and F. Toni. Non-monotonic inference properties for
assumption-based argumentation. In International Workshop on Theo-
rie and Applications of Formal Argumentation, pages 92–111. Springer,
2015.
[33] P. M. Dung. An axiomatic analysis of structured argumentation for
prioritized default reasoning. In Proceedings of the 21st European Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 267–272. IOS Press, 2014.
[34] P. M. Dung. An axiomatic analysis of structured argumentation with
priorities. Artificial Intelligence, 231:107–150, 2016.
[35] P. M. Dung, R. A. Kowalski, and F. Toni. Dialectic proof procedures
for assumption-based, admissible argumentation. Artificial Intelligence,
170(2):114–159, 2006.
[36] P. M. Dung, R. A. Kowalski, and F. Toni. Assumption-based argu-
mentation. In Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, pages 199–218.
Springer, 2009.
[37] P. M. Dung, P. Mancarella, and F. Toni. Computing ideal sceptical
argumentation. Artificial Intelligence, 171(2):642–674, 2007.
[38] J. Fox and S. K. Das. Safe and sound: artificial intelligence in hazardous
applications. MIT Press, 2000.
[39] J. Fox, P. Krause, and M. Elvang-Gøransson. Argumentation as a gen-
eral framework for uncertain reasoning. In Proceedings of the 9th In-
ternational Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pages
428–434, 1993.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 254
[40] D. M. Gabbay. Theoretical foundations for non-monotonic reasoning
in expert systems. In Logics and Models of Concurrent Systems, pages
439–457. Springer, 1985.
[41] A. J. Garc´ıa and G. R. Simari. Defeasible logic programming: An
argumentative approach. Theory and Practice of Logic Programming,
4(2):95–138, 2004.
[42] P. Ga¨rdenfors, editor. Belief Revision. Cambridge University Press,
1992.
[43] G. Governatori, M. J. Maher, G. Antoniou, and D. Billington. Argumen-
tation semantics for defeasible logic. Journal of Logic and Computation,
14(5):675–702, 2004.
[44] A. Hunter. Base logics in argumentation. Frontiers in Artificial Intelli-
gence and Applications, 216:275–286, 2010.
[45] N. Kokciyan, I. K. Sassoon, A. P. Young, M. D. Chapman, T. R. Porat,
M. Ashworth, V. Curcin, S. Modgil, S. Parsons, and E. I. Sklar. Towards
an argumentation system for supporting patients in self-managing their
chronic conditions. In AAAI Joint Workshop on Health Intelligence,
New Orleans, 2018.
[46] S. Kraus, D. Lehmann, and M. Magidor. Nonmonotonic reasoning, pref-
erential models and cumulative logics. Artificial intelligence, 44(1):167–
207, 1990.
[47] P. Krause, S. Ambler, M. Elvang-Gørannson, and J. Fox. A logic of argu-
mentation for reasoning under uncertainty. Computational Intelligence,
11 (1):113–131, 1995.
[48] P. Krause, S. Ambler, M. Elvang-Goransson, and J. Fox. A logic of argu-
mentation for reasoning under uncertainty. Computational Intelligence,
11(1):113–131, 1995.
[49] H. E. Kyburg Jr. Probability and the logic of rational belief. Wesleyan
University Press, 1961.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 255
[50] Z. Li and S. Parsons. On argumentation with purely defeasible rules. In
Scalable Uncertainty Management, pages 330–343. Springer, 2015.
[51] F. Lin and Y. Shoham. Argument systems: A uniform basis for non-
monotonic reasoning. Proceedings of the 1st International Conference
on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 89:245–255,
1989.
[52] R. P. Loui. Defeat among arguments: a system of defeasible inference.
Computational Intelligence, 3(3):100–106, 1987.
[53] N. Mann and A. Hunter. Argumentation using temporal knowledge. In
Proceedings of the 2008 Conference on Computational Models of Argu-
ment, pages 204–215. IOS Press, 2008.
[54] P. McBurney and S. Parsons. Dialogue games for agent argumenta-
tion. In I. Rahwan and G. Simari, editors, Argumentation in Artificial
Intelligence, pages 261–280. Springer, 2009.
[55] J. McCarthy. Circumscription–a form of nonmonotonic reasoning. Ar-
tificial Intelligence, 13:27–39, 1980.
[56] J. McCarthy. Applications of circumscription to formalizing common-
sense knowledge. Artificial Intelligence, 28(1):89–116, 1986.
[57] J. McCarthy and P. J. Hayes. Some philosophical problems from the
standpoint of artificial intelligence. Readings in Artificial Intelligence,
pages 431–450, 1969.
[58] D. McDermott and J. Doyle. Non-monotonic logic i. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 13(1-2):41–72, 1980.
[59] S. Modgil and H. Prakken. Revisiting preferences and argumentation. In
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Ar-
tificial Intelligence-Volume Volume Two, pages 1021–1026. AAAI Press,
2011.
[60] S. Modgil and H. Prakken. A general account of argumentation with
preferences. Artificial Intelligence, 2012.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 256
[61] S. Modgil and H. Prakken. The ASPIC+ framework for structured
argumentation: A tutorial. Argument & Computation, 5(1):31–62, 2014.
[62] R. C. Moore. Possible-world semantics for autoepistemic logic. Technical
report, DTIC Document, 1984.
[63] D. Nute. Defeasible logic. In International Conference on Applications
of Prolog, pages 151–169. Springer, 2001.
[64] S. Parsons, E. Sklar, J. Salvit, H. Wall, and Z. Li. Argtrust: decision
making with information from sources of varying trustworthiness. In
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents
and multi-agent systems, pages 1395–1396. International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2013.
[65] D. Phan Minh. On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamen-
tal role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-persons
games. Artificial Intelligence, 77(2):321–358, 1995.
[66] H. Prakken. AI & law, logic and argument schemes. Argumentation,
19(3):303–320, 2005.
[67] H. Prakken. An abstract framework for argumentation with structured
arguments. Argument and Computation, 1(2):93–124, 2010.
[68] H. Prakken. Rethinking the rationality postulates for argumentation-
based inference. Proceedings of Computational Models of Argument
2016, 287:419, 2016.
[69] H. Prakken and S. Modgil. Clarifying some misconceptions on the AS-
PIC+ framework. Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of
Comma 2012, page 442, 2012.
[70] H. Prakken and G. Sartor. Argument-based extended logic programming
with defeasible priorities. Journal of Applied Non-classical Logics, 7(1-
2):25–75, 1997.
[71] H. Prakken and G. Vreeswijk. Logical systems for defeasible argumen-
tation. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2002.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 257
[72] I. Rahwan and C. Reed. The argument interchange format. In Argu-
mentation in Artificial Intelligence, pages 383–402. Springer, 2009.
[73] R. Reiter. A logic for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13(1):81–
132, 1980.
[74] G. R. Simari and R. P. Loui. A mathematical treatment of defeasible
reasoning and its implementation. Artificial Intelligence, 53(2-3):125–
157, 1992.
[75] E. I. Sklar, S. Parsons, Z. Li, J. Salvit, S. Perumal, H. Wall, and J. Man-
gels. Evaluation of a trust-modulated argumentation-based interactive
decision-making tool. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,
30(1):136–173, 2016.
[76] T. Takahashi and H. Sawamura. A logic of multiple-valued argumenta-
tion. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Joint Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 800–807. IEEE Com-
puter Society, 2004.
[77] Y. Tang, K. Cai, P. McBurney, E. Sklar, and S. Parsons. Using ar-
gumentation to reason about trust and belief. Journal of Logic and
Computation, 22(5):979–1018, 2012.
[78] Y. Tang, E. Sklar, and S. Parsons. An argumentation engine: Argtrust.
In Ninth International Workshop on Argumentation in Multiagent Sys-
tems, 2012.
[79] S. E. Toulmin. The uses of argument. Cambridge university press, 2003.
[80] D. S. Touretzky. The mathematics of inheritance systems. Morgan
Kaufmann, 1986.
[81] B. Verheij. Two approaches to dialectical argumentation: Admissible
sets and argumentation stages. In J.-J. Meyer and L. van der Gaag,
editors, Proceedings of the Eighth Dutch Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence, pages 357––368, Utrecht, 1996.
[82] G. A. Vreeswijk. Abstract argumentation systems. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 90(1):225–279, 1997.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 258
[83] D. Walton. Commitment in dialogue: Basic concepts of interpersonal
reasoning. SUNY press, 1995.
[84] Y. Wu and M. Podlaszewski. Implementing crash-resistance and non-
interference in logic-based argumentation. Journal of Logic and Com-
putation, pages 1–31, 2014.
